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In This Issue:

V. Viktorova, D. Petrenko, N. Vlasova, E. Shishkina: “The question of the extent to which Russia should follow Europe, try to integrate with the EU, turn toward Asia or find ‘its own road’ has acquired special importance in connection with contemporary challenges and global changes. This is especially important for the younger generations immersed in processes of self-identification.”

N. Tikhonova, E. Slobodenyuk: “In Russia since the mid-2000s, there has been an increase in unemployment among people with higher education and a decrease in returns from such education. These processes were and are unfolding because of imbalances between people with higher education and the number of jobs that require it. This is why professionals in Russia are confronted with the growing risks of unemployment, unstable employment and relatively low wages. What’s more, these risks might in future be increased by the effects of social stratification and polarization in this professional group, its increased precariousness and impoverishment under pressure of accelerating technological changes across the world.”

K. Borishpolets: “How is the unfolding competition between the great powers assessed in Russia: as a preliminary stage of a global military conflict or a quest for a new way of global development?... The discourse in the Russian research community is a faithful reflection of the mounting conflict potential of the contemporary international milieu. It responds to the challenges of reformatting post-bipolar world politics caused by fiercer competition among the great powers. The majority of scholarly writings do not offer apocalyptic forecasts.”

D. Malysheva: “Is there any hope that after the withdrawal of foreign troops Afghanistan will become peaceful and secure and the second edition of the Taliban will be more moderate than Taliban-1? It is too early to make any forecasts on that score, but it is already clear that the imminent economic collapse is an obstacle to stabilization... owing to the recent changes there, Afghanistan is emerging as an important element in the intricate mosaic of regional relations.”

I. Nevvazhay: “The controversy over realism and constructivism in the theory of knowledge continues to engage the minds of philosophers... The given exists only in connection with an act of consciousness as an act of distinguishing. And that is are either an act of expression or an act of interpretation. When we focus attention only on one of these acts, we end up in the position of realism or the position of constructivism... [N]either of the concepts we are considering—realism or constructivism—is self-sufficient and contains criteria for assessing its adequacy, its correctness... Transcendentalism shifts the problem of naturalism versus socio-cultural constructivism alternative to a different

plane... This article proposes a version of synthesis, which explains the controversy over constructivism and realism and thus offers a way out of the impasse of head-on confrontation.”

D. Ivanov: “The topic of normativity rarely crops up in the philosophy of mind. This is largely due to the fact that this discipline is seen primarily as metaphysics of mind, as a domain that seeks to explain what is mind and what is its causal relationship with the world, above all the body. However, in the process epistemological issues connected with cognitive relations are often neglected. These are issues of the nature of perception and perceptive knowledge. The problems of normativity in philosophy arise precisely in connection with the need to answer these questions. Importantly, turning to these problems enables us not only to answer epistemological questions, but to solve a number of metaphysical problems.”

I. Evlampiev: “In his detailed analysis of Jewish religious beliefs of the time of Jesus Christ, Zelinsky shows that in all their main components these beliefs were profoundly alien to the Roman spirit, which explains why Roman society detested the Jews. If the new religion brought by Jesus Christ had grown out of Judaism, the Romans would have regarded it as a variety of Judaism, such that its quick spread in the Roman Empire would have been implausible. Zelinsky offers a different and far more logical explanation of the process: *The true religious foundation of Christianity was not the Jewish Old Testament, but the synthetic Hellenistic-Roman religion that had taken shape by the first century AD and whose spirit reflected the ideological principles of the young Roman Empire.*”

A. Minakov: “The life of the Jews in Tsarist Russia was in many ways determined by the traditions of the autocratic system and the personalities in power, the decisions of its emperors, the servility of the government ministers, the unpredictable behavior of regional elites and so on. The contradictory nature of the government’s policy with regard to the Jews, which was a mixture of Judeophobia and liberalism, was highlighted by the activities of Vyacheslav Plehve. Russian historiography and journalism have ascribed to him a tendency to perpetuate the discrimination of Jews and to systematically suppress them, even to encourage pogroms, while downplaying the significance of changes in laws regarding Jews, which he helped make more lenient.”

E. Abdullaev: “This article is concerned with the literary history behind the anonymous brochure entitled ‘La Russie Envahie par les Allemands,’ which appeared at the Leipzig Book Fair in 1844 and quickly became a sensation in Russia and Europe alike. Its author, Filipp Vigel, a former member of the Arzamas literary society, had fallen under the spell of the Slavophiles. The brochure served as the first manifesto and the first attempt at a historical-philosophical justification of the anti-German sentiments espoused by the majority of the Russian elite during the reign of Nicholas I.”

V. Shcherbakov: “Moscow and St. Petersburg have repeatedly been the subject of comparative characterization in Russian literature. Leo Tolstoy in his novels also tried to outline and compare the characters of the two Russian mega-cities, which have traditionally been rivals. In *War and Peace*, Moscow is depicted in

detail and with love, while St. Petersburg is shown in a schematic and aloof manner. The comparison of the two capitals is extremely contrastive here... Tolstoy wrote a great deal about *love* (often in the lofty Christian meaning) but himself was not a source of all-embracing and all-forgiving love. There was much in this world that he did not love, and he said so openly. Petersburg was the embodiment of everything Tolstoy *did not love*.”

European and National Identity in the Perceptions of Modern Russian Youth: The Case of St. Petersburg

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Natalia VLASOVA

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Abstract. This article is based on studies conducted in early 2020 as part of the ERASMUS+ Jean Monnet 611458-EPP-1-2019-RU-EPPJMO-PROJECT titled “Transformation of identities in Europe and Russia in contemporary conditions.” The subject was prompted by the still incomplete Russian identity and its axiological foundations and the need to study the impact of European values on the worldview of contemporary Russian youth in the globalized world. We have set the objective to clarify the level of European identity in the younger generation of Russia and the attitudes of young people who live in St. Petersburg toward Russian and European identities and toward the problems of European integration and mutual influence of cultures. The younger generation born in new Russia, after the Soviet Union’s disintegration, grew up under the impact of the emerging new Russian identity as well as globalization, European identity and Western values. Students in St. Petersburg, historically the most European of Russian cities were selected as the target group.

We relied on the method of in-depth interviews. We found out that the younger generation attached great importance to concepts of “European identity” as well as to European values and the European way of life. This confirms our initial supposition that European influence strongly affected the ideas about the world among the younger generation in the conditions of globalization. The respondents, on the whole, were less positive when it came to

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Russian identity, which fully corresponded to the aforementioned lack of absolute clarity as to the “Russian identity” concept and its base values. The fact that the sampling consisted of students in St. Petersburg universities meant that the results could hardly be extrapolated to other regions of the Russian Federation. The results of our research are preliminary, but they have allowed us to identify the most important trends of the emerging Russian identity and the levels of European and Russian identities in young people’s minds. They may serve a starting point for further studies.

Keywords: European identity, Russian identity, Europe, Russia, European integration, youth, in-depth interviews.

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Introduction

The problem of identity formation of contemporary Russians has already become an object of theoretical and applied studies. Having experienced two grandiose identity ruptures in the same century (the revolution of 1917 and the Soviet Union’s disintegration in 1991), Russia has been trying for 30 years now to build a new identity. The discourse has inevitably returned to the Russia/West dichotomy born by the discussions between the Slavophiles and Westernizers. In the dichotomy discourse Russia is presented either as a backward country that should be modernized according to Western patterns (Westernizers) or as a civilization in its own right (Slavophiles) for which Western influence is alien or even destructive. The fairly large number of publications including by prominent scientists Boris Groys, Olga Malinova, Valery Tkhakhov, Sergei Kara-Murza, Lyubov Fadeeva [11; 15; 14; 13; 9] affirms that the Russia/West dichotomy remains highly relevant for the formation of identities of contemporary Russians.

These and other authors try to answer the question of whether Russia is a European country in the civilizational, cultural and political respects. Opinions about Russia’s identity in the context of culture are not, on the whole, contradictory. It is traditionally believed that Russia inherited the European cultural tradition, yet it remains unclear how it is correlated with other cultural influences. Opinions about Russia as part of European civilization differ. Some authors look at it as part of Europe (the tradition inherited from the Westernizers), and others believe that it is an original and unique civilization that synthesized different cultural and civilizational elements (the tradition inherited from the Slavophiles). Russia’s pivot to the East can be seen, in particular, in the works of Lev Gumilev and Leonid Blyakher, as well as in the works of Aleksandr Dugin and other Eurasianists and Neo-Eurasianists. The political aspect of Russia’s identity is highly controversial. Many researchers have pointed to the lack of certain political institutions typical

of the West and the legal nihilism of Russians. Eduard Chaikin [6], for example, believes that this is the reason why Russia is not seen as a European country in the political discourse. The definition of “Europe” as a concept remains unspecified: It is either seen as the EU countries, as countries of the European continent or as the collective West [19; 22].

The extent to which European identity is present in the identity of the younger generation of Russia is very interesting. The European identity of Russians and the comparison of Russia and Europe remain on the agenda since the times of Peter the Great, yet the importance of European identity for the Russians changed throughout its history depending on the assessment of the Significant Other—that is, Europe or the West. The Soviet Union’s disintegration revived the importance of European identity for Russians: The trend toward closer relations with Europe and building a common “European home” prevailed in Russia’s politics. This stage was short. It lasted until the early 2000s when the rhetoric of the elites was moving toward Russia’s specificity. Sympathy with Europe was gradually weakening, along with self-identity as Europeans, even in the European part of Russia. This trend was discussed in many publications [3; 18]. In her article, Olga Popova [15, pp. 130-138] pointed out that according to public opinion polls the importance of European identity for those who lived in St. Petersburg was much lower than self-identification as Russians or St. Petersburg residents. She explained it by the fact that frequent visits of Russian citizens to Europe and the impact of the media reduced to a routine the image of Europe. The sanctions the EU introduced against Russia dented the attractiveness of the image of European identity.

Many European scientists in the past (Jules Michelet, François Guizot, Leopold Ranke, etc.) and today (Martin Malia being one of them) look at Russia as not quite European or a totally Eastern country. Anthony Pagden pointed out: “When seen... from the heartlands of Europe, Russia could appear distinctly ‘other’... When set, however, against the image of the true Orient, she appeared... European” [16, pp. 46-47]. Russia looked even more “Oriental” during conflicts and wars. In the last thirty years, its image in Europe has been changing, according to the rhetoric of post-Soviet Russia, from a country that might become part of the West if it followed [Western] recommendations (the 1990s) to a country that cannot change and, therefore, correspond to European standards (approximately in the last 10 years).

According to a poll the Levada Center carried out in 2007, only 11% of Russians agreed that Russia was “part of the West, it should move closer to the countries of Europe and the United States”; 74% of those polled believed that “Russia is a Eurasian state with its own historical path”; 7% favored the statement “Russia is an Eastern country and as such it should cooperate with its Asian neighbors,” while 8% did not answer [10].

The “European identity” concept is not quite clear, and its definition is debatable. As a concept, it separates Europeans from non-Europeans by several aspects: worldview, culture, values, economic potential, social guarantees [21]. There are two approaches to European identity: It is either a political project of the European Union and an important element of integration unfolding in Europe [5, pp.

68-86; 7, pp. 105-116; 16; 23, pp. 55-71] or, more broadly, European identity is a historical and cultural closeness of all countries of Europe [27]. In this sense, European identity spreads to all countries of the European continent. This approach demands a definition of the concept of Europe [28]. There is another, axiological approach under which the interpretation of Europe is extremely broad, since European values (personal freedom, liberal economics and democratic norms) are spread far and wide outside the European continent [4].

Within our studies we have analyzed the correlation between the European and national identities of students in St. Petersburg. By national identity we mean the feeling of belonging to and an awareness of emotional ties with the national state. We have evaluated the level of emotional attachment of young Russians to their country and the main values of Europeans and Russians as assessed by our respondents.

The problem of national identity of Russians has already been studied by many researchers [25; 24; 26; 8; 21; 20; 9], in particular by Valery Tishkov, Leokadia Drobizheva and Anna Sanina, to answer the questions: In what sense is Russian identity national, who are the Russian people, and what is the Russian nation? The gradually increasing confrontation between the global and the local has created a motion toward regionalization. Lyubov Fadeeva [9], for example, has pointed out that regional identity is an important part of multiple identities in the contemporary world.

L. Drobizheva and A. Sanina discussed the correlation between the state and civic identities. They pointed out that civic solidarity and common civic trust are very important as the platforms for successful identities shared not only by the elites but also by common citizens. Civic solidarity should rely on the basic values shared by society.

Globalization affects the process of identity formation among Russians. It should be said that the majority of Russian authors, especially in the 1990s, wrote about globalization as an objective world process, while their Western colleagues spoke of it as a subjective, ideologically and politically determined process. For example, philosopher Vittorio Hösle was convinced that in many respects citizens of the Eastern Bloc countries were attracted by the Western standards of consumption and warned that many other values might fall victim to them and that national identities might be endangered [12, p. 192]. Some Russian researchers, Sergey Kara-Murza being one of them, said the same [13]. Dmitry Kogat'ko and Valery Tkhakakhov have rightly pointed out: "Soviet society in its essence was not a consumer society—for ideological, economic and cultural reasons. It joined the category of consumers (at the material and symbolic levels) in the post-Soviet period. The movement from under-consumption toward a new type of consumption is a contemporary phenomenon" [14, p. 86].

It should be said that there is an identity as a construct produced by the elites and there are identities, which appear among citizens in their everyday lives. These models might be very different. Sociological studies allow us to identify the identities of contemporary Russians and the way they are formed. The results might contradict the theoretical constructs described in theoretical works. For ex-

ample, in their book *Russian Identity* Kogat'ko and Thakakov have pointed out: "The priorities of mass consciousness of contemporary Russians do not coincide with the ideas of intellectuals and the statesmen about their identification values. The former is no longer inspired either by autocracy, or Orthodoxy (religiosity) or popular spirit. Opinion polls reveal a steady dominance of another choice: 'law,' 'order,' 'justice,' 'human rights' are the key concepts with which Russians associate the revival of Russia" [14, p. 84].

Our study is highly relevant because contemporary Russian identity has not yet taken its final form (for more detail, see [2; 10]). Today, in Russia there is no consensus on the basic values. The old values of the Soviet period were revised to a great extent while new values were taking shape under considerable impact of the West. For this reason, the influence of European values on contemporary Russian identity (and the worldview of the younger generation in the first place) should be carefully studied.

We have set ourselves the task to find out what young Russians thought about European and Russian identities, about European integration and mutual influence of cultures. The results gave us a chance to assess the dynamics of forming Russian identity in the youth milieu. We chose students as the object of our studies because in the near future they would be involved in decision-making and would shape Russia's policy, including its foreign policy.

The results revealed the correlation between the national and European identities among the students in St. Petersburg. The sampling consisted of those who permanently lived in it and those who came from other cities to study at local universities. The fact that St. Petersburg is closer to Europe than all other Russian cities makes this study especially important. At the same time, our results cannot be extrapolated on other regions. The values and landmarks of the generation born and educated in post-Soviet Russia might be very different from the values of older generations. It should be said that even in Soviet times St. Petersburg (Leningrad) was oriented on Europe to a much greater extent than Moscow.

The new Russian identity has been taking shape in the last 30 years; this coincides with the age of the generation born and educated in new Russia. The fact that the 1990s–2000s were the decade of the greatest influence of the West allows us to surmise that the youth born in post-Soviet Russia is oriented on Western values to a much greater extent than its predecessors. This generation grew up, to a great extent, under the influence of globalization and Western values. European identity, very much like Russian identity, is in a process of formation. It is a project of the European Union designed to promote European integration. The contemporary Russian identity is a project of new Russia designed to unite all peoples of Russia previously tied together by Soviet values, into a new community. The correlations of European and national identities in Russian youth reveals the extent to which these projects are successful.

Methodology

We relied on interviews in groups (focus-groups) as the main method of studies. On the whole, we organized three focus-groups, 6-8 people in each. Our studies were carried in March-April 2020 online since personal interviews were practically impossible because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Interviews were recorded and later transcribed and coded. Group interviews were semi-structured and were based on several open questions formulated with an intention to identify the levels of European and national identities. The following questions were most important: experience of traveling and living in Europe; understanding of the concept "European," attitude to European integration, attitude to migrants and their impact on the identity, culture and economics; self-identification with Europe and self-identification with Russia; specifics of Russian identity, the correlation between national, supra-national and regional identities.

Group interviews were accompanied by questionnaires which corresponded to the main questions of the interview and which had been filled before the interview. This was done to deepen and structuralize the results and support them with figures. The questionnaires contained questions, which the polled were invited to answer using a 10-point system to assess their attachment to Russia and Europe and their attitude to European integration.

Coding was realized in two stages. At the first stage, we identified the main categories and patterns. At the second, the categories were revised to identify the central subjects and sub-subjects.

At the final stage, we analyzed the results and formulated the main conclusions.

Thus, our project was realized in the following stages:

- designing questionnaires and formulating questions for interviews
- group interviews (focus-groups)
- transcription
- coding in two stages
- analysis of answers and conclusions.

Description of the Respondents

Our studies involved 20 respondents between 18 and 25 who at the time of our studies were students at St. Petersburg universities. Nine out of 20 respondents were born in St. Petersburg, others arrived when they were 17 or 18 from Almet'evsk (Republic of Tatarstan), Bologoye (Tver Region), Veliky Novgorod, Krasnodar, Novorossiysk, Omsk, Penza, Rybinsk (Yaroslavl Region), Smolensk, Gukovo (Rostov Region). They studied at nine St. Petersburg universities: Higher School of Folk Arts (academy), Higher School of Economics, North-West Institute of Management (branch of RANEPA), Saint Petersburg State University of Economics, Saint Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg State Agrarian University, Saint Petersburg State Forest Technical University, Saint Petersburg

University of Management Technology and Economics, and Saint Petersburg State University of Industrial Technology and Design.

Our sample included nine students studying areas related to politics and /or European studies (International Relations and Foreign Regional Studies) and 11 students in other specialties (business informatics, economics, marketing, management, advertising and public relations, applied arts, philology, forestry).

Nineteen respondents spoke of themselves as Russians; one young woman who came to St. Petersburg from Almet'evsk said that she was Tatar.

Only two of the respondents had never been abroad. Nine students out of 20 traveled a couple of times every year; five students did this more often (three to five times a year), and two did not travel every year. This means that the majority of the respondents had an experience of traveling and had, therefore, met representatives of other cultures. They pointed out that they normally go to Europe, in particular, Northern Europe.

Five respondents had an experience of living in Europe for over two months: they had either studied under the ERASMUS+ program of exchange, worked at internships or traveled when on leave.

All respondents knew English; 11 of them spoke fluently, nine understood English but had no experience of communication in English.

Results

How Russian Youth Perceive Europeans

The concept "European" has not only a geographic or a political connotation; it presupposes cultural specifics, society, a set of special qualities, values and behavioral habits. When talking about what it meant to be a European our respondents pointed to the following abilities:

- be able to listen and to hear others
- make life easier in certain respects
- be open to people all over the world, take care and promote solidarity, respect each other
- be cultured, educated, well-groomed, free and well-read
- treat problems lightly
- respect personal boundaries, respect society, separate leisure and work, know how to relax
- behave properly and casually at the same time.

The respondents also pointed out that to be a European "you should live in one of the European countries" and "raise children in one of the European languages."

It should be said that when defining a "European" our respondents did not use terms related to politics and integration processes in the EU. We can surmise, therefore, that their opinions about European identity stem from the manners and behavior they saw during their travels or personal communication. They paid at-

tention to personal qualities in the first place, rather than to political processes unfolding in Europe.

Opinions of those who studied Foreign Regional Studies and International Relations did not differ much from what other students said.

The majority said that the mentality of Russians and Europeans did not differ much. One of the respondents, a 20-year-old woman from Omsk, supposed that this could be explained by globalization: "When I moved closer to Europe and started communicating with people, I understood that they were very similar. Probably this is typical of our generation, because with globalization we want to share our energies and communicate but it seems that there are no cardinal differences between us."

Students also pointed out that similarities were especially obvious in the younger generation. "They (Europeans) are very positively disposed to the youngest generation who know better than others what it means to be abroad and understand that there are big differences" (young man, 19, from St. Petersburg).

Members of the focus groups pointed out that it is much easier to communicate with those who lived in Germany, Poland, Latvia, Finland and Sweden.

The respondents pointed to the most important characteristics of Europeans:

- openness
- good education
- caution
- politeness
- tolerance
- responsible attitude toward their nation and realization of the aims of consistent development.

The respondents pointed to the following values of the European lifestyle:

- democracy
- freedom
- political safety
- quiet and regular lifestyle
- good social security.

Some of the respondents described Europeans as they saw them. "When I hear the word 'Europeans' I normally think of women in Finland, where they live a quiet life, they are engaged in education, look after themselves, do not use cosmetics. On the whole, they are very simple and beautiful" (young woman, 18, from Penza).

"I think that an average European is a man of about 35+ or probably 40 with a very good salary. He works at an industrial company. His family has two cars. Each of the family members has his/her living space spread across the city. The parents live somewhere out of town; young Europeans have flats" (young man, 25, from St. Petersburg).

The above speaks of a European as a well-to-do person who looks after himself and his development. This means that the concept "European" is associated with well-being and a high living standard.

All qualities enumerated by our respondents were positive; many of them

spoke of Europeans with rapture and were convinced that to be a European was “more prestigious.”

European Identity of Russians

An awareness of the level of their European identity allows young Russians to assess their closeness to European values and the way of life. The respondents were invited to evaluate on a 10-point scale their degree of awareness of themselves as Europeans (Fig. 1). They assigned 1 point for “I do not feel like a European” and 10 points for “I feel completely European.” An analysis of the answers revealed that out of 20 respondents, seven indicated a moderate tie with Europe (5 out of 10 points), which means that they felt themselves to be semi-European. The results of 7 or more points meant a fairly strong awareness of closeness to Europe. These were the results of 11 respondents, including one young woman of 18 from St. Petersburg, who felt herself to be [completely] European. One respondent assessed her Europeanization as weak—4 points out of 10 (young woman from Gukovo, Rostov Region).




Fig. 1. The level of European identity of the respondents (points).

The respondents pointed to several reasons of their awareness of themselves as Europeans.

(1) Living in St. Petersburg

“On the whole, I think of myself as a European to a great extent because I think that St. Petersburg is a European city to a fairly great extent” (young man, 19, from St. Petersburg).

The respondents pointed out that the mentality of those who live in St. Petersburg differed from the mentality of people living in the majority of other Russian cities.

“I can look at myself [as a European] because I came to St. Petersburg from Smolensk. There is a certain difference between these cities in adaptation and self-development if I remained there and had not come here. I go to Europe fre-

quently to acquire certain experience, positions in life and the ideas about life in general. This is why I differ from many of my Russian friends and today we see the world differently" (young man, 25, from Smolensk).

(2) An experience of travel abroad

"Sometime in the past I would have said 'No, I am not a European.' When you travel you realize that even if you are not in Europe you are closer to it because there are countries with absolutely different worlds" (young woman, 22, from St. Petersburg).

(3) "Closeness" to European values

"Their convictions and everything related to their tolerance are closer to me. I think that this better corresponds to my ideas about the world than what is, on the whole, accepted in many communities here in Russia" (young woman, 18, from St. Petersburg).

"The views and opinion shared by the European Union and the majority of its members, their ideas are very close to me. I can say that in this respect I am a European" (young woman, 20, from Omsk).

Two young women spoke of themselves as cosmopolitan and refused to associate themselves with any of the identities.

This suggests a conclusion that according to our young respondents, the European identity of Russians is formed thanks to geographic proximity to Europe (living in St. Petersburg), travels and frequent contacts with Europeans, globalization and access to European values.

The majority was convinced that Russians could be regarded as Europeans to a certain extent because of

- geographic proximity to Europe
- historical and cultural development
- trade contacts
- globalization.

Our respondents were convinced that the younger generation was more inclined to associate themselves with Europe than the older generations.

"I am absolutely convinced that the younger generation can be defined as Europeans. Because the high level of globalization in which we grew up has strongly affected our ideas about the world. We think absolutely like people in the West. I cannot say anything about the older generations because, on the whole, this national character is developing" (young woman, 18, from St. Petersburg).

"I think that people who are now growing up, those who were born after the 2000s will probably find it easily to associate themselves with the concept of Europeans" (young woman, 24, from Rybinsk).

Our respondents, however, could not define all those who lived in Russia as Europeans; they explained this by considerable differences between cities and regions.

"Talking of my native town, nobody there would have said that Russia is Europe, that he/she associate himself with Europeans. If 2% of those who live there have international passports, that is a lot" (young woman, 19, from Gukovo).

Young Russians prefer to be identified as Europeans. Here are their explanations.

(1) They think that this raises their status.

“I often hear that I look like a European—well, I don’t know. I am Russian deep at heart. Of course, I would like to be taken for a European when I go to another country. I think this raises my status” (young man, 19, from Veliky Novgorod).

(2) Respondents are convinced that in Europe negative attitudes to Russians are widespread.

“Yes, I would like to look like a European, because I don’t want to be the odd one out. I would like to be on the same level. Today, attitudes to Russians are not good. I would like to be treated like a European, as one of them” (young man, 20, from Krasnodar).

The high level of European identity among the respondents suggests that students in St. Petersburg associate themselves with Europe and believe that they share European values.

Attitude to European Integration

One of our aims was to find out what the respondents thought about European integration. The “European identity” concept was initiated by the European elites as a political project designed to consolidate solidarity, the EU and the integration processes in Europe. The term “European identity” was first used in 1973 in the Declaration on European Identity, which defined the basic common European values: democracy, human rights, market economics and freedom of entrepreneurship, principles of social solidarity and cohesion and no armed conflicts between the European countries, democracy, the rule of law, social justice, economic progress and human rights [23, p. 35].

The majority of our respondents supported the idea of European integration and pointed at its positive effect for Russia and for them.

“There are no problems in the process of educational integration. I like everything. Students are welcome; they get grants, they are involved in a huge number of programs, not only ERASMUS; there are personal programs and arrangements with our universities” (young woman, 18, from St. Petersburg).

From the point of view of contemporary youth, European integration demonstrates the following advantages:

- economic development
- mobility
- increasing trade flows
- assistance to less developed European countries.

The respondents could not agree on whether Russia should join the EU. Those who specialized in relevant disciplines were more skeptical about this prospect than the students of other professions. All of them agreed that today it was hard to imagine Russia as a EU member.

“I think that cooperation is necessary, as well as normal relationships, but I don’t think that membership will give us a lot. In fact, I do not see a European model within the framework of our big country, I think that their model does not suit us” (young woman, 18, from St. Petersburg).

"In principle Russia is a multinational country. Europe will never be ready for it to the slightest extent. There are many different indigenous peoples. Probably much later, 10 or 20 years later" (young man, 25, from Smolensk).

According to those who studied relevant disciplines, Russia would have found it unprofitable to accept the demands imposed on EU members. "To tell you the truth, I would not like similar obligations (as in the EU) to be imposed on Russia" (young man, 19, from St. Petersburg).

A considerable share of our respondents, however, supported this variant since, they argued, this would have promoted economics, improved international relations and simplified travels and trade.

"I think this will be comfortable for common people because of common currency; economics will stabilize and traveling will become easier. In view of Russia's territory, the EU will become a whole world. This will probably create a problem for the rest of the world from the point of view of economic and other conflicts" (young man, 20, from Krasnodar).

"I can say the following from the standpoint of economics and trade. This is my area, I work in it, and this will be very profitable for me personally" (young woman, 20, from Almet'evsk).

This means that the high level of European identity among the youth of St. Petersburg is connected with a positive attitude toward the processes of European integration.

Russian Identity

Contemporary Russian identity began taking its shape after the Soviet Union's disintegration in 1991. We can hardly start talking about a common Russian identity even if common identity is absolutely indispensable for an awareness of being citizens of Russia, a united big country. There are state and civil identities. State identity is formed by the elites on the basis of common laws and behavior norms while common civil identity appears at the horizontal level as a consensus on basic values. There are certain circumstances, which make the process fairly complicated:

- multinational and multi-confessional population
- huge territory with different climatic and geographic conditions that directly affect the nature and mentality of local populations
- regional differences and specifics
- cultural variety.

The following elements promote the process of formation of Russian identity:

- common state language (Russian)
- long common history
- culture based on the common language.

Opinions about Russian national identity differed a lot among our young respondents from St. Petersburg. There were at least two different approaches.

(1) Russians are seen as citizens of their country with no specific behavioral traits in common. "I think that a Russian is an individual who lives in Russia,

obeys its Constitution and, on the whole, a more or less law-abiding citizen”—(young woman, 18, from Almet’evsk). “To be a citizen of Russia” (young woman, 18, from St. Petersburg).

(2) Russians are discussed in the context of specific behavioral traits. The respondents offered the following typical features:

- they have a big heart and an open soul
- “blind faith and patriotism” as a negative feature
- aware of errors made by the country’s leaders, yet unable to correct them
- “ability to adapt” and “survive”
- willpower; “a galloping steed boldly racing / to enter a burning hut, brave”
- love of vast spaces
- openness
- adventurism
- love of freedom
- friendliness and hospitality
- sympathy.

The following features were described as negative:

- outdated values and principles
- devotion to the country and patriotism
- aware of errors made by the country’s leaders, yet unable to correct them
- “pay no attention to their special national identity”
- egoism,
- “feels like one of us and an alien at the same time.”

It should be said that the term “patriotism” was used as both a positive and a negative feature. In its positive connotation, it was seen as an attachment to and love of the Motherland. “Love the Motherland, connect your life with this country, work in this country for the common good and for your family” (young man, 24, from St. Petersburg).

In its negative connotation, patriotism is assessed as “blind faith” inherited from the past. This interpretation of patriotism as a positive or negative phenomenon differs from the commonly accepted interpretation as a “fairly complicated set of feelings connected with the love of Motherland.” The polls carried out by VTsIOM in 2005-2010 and quoted by A. Sanina revealed that 84-88% of citizens of Russia spoke of themselves as patriots [20].

The respondents found it hard to define Russians as individualists or collectivists. Some of them were convinced that collectivism of Russians could be seen as “love of thy neighbor” and “work for the benefit of society.” Others insisted that Russians were individualists or even egoists.

“Think about themselves in the first place, a kind of egoism. Survivability. In the past, there was more cohesion, but not today. Today all want to achieve their aims even by pushing others aside” (young woman, 21, from St. Petersburg).

Different opinions on this issue speak a lot about the contemporary state of Russian society. For example, Aleksandr Akhiezer [1] has pointed out that today there are de facto two axiological models in Russia—collectivist and individual-

ist—which divide our society into two practically equal parts.

Our respondents, too, pointed to a certain degree of dissociation in Russia. “I think that the Russian society is very much dissociated, that is, people do not trust each other, they are not ready to close ranks” (young woman, 20, from St. Petersburg). Our analysis of the answers demonstrated that there was a lot of tension in Russian society, that there was no solidarity and no trust. According to certain researches [8; 17] a consensus on basic values and mutual confidence are very important elements of a common civil identity.

The polled young people revealed very different opinions about their attitude to national identity. The range of opinions stretches from strong devotion to the country to “it is shameful to be a Russian.”

The respondents were asked to answer the question “To what extent is it important for you to be seen as a Russian?” on a 10-point scale where 1—not important and 10—very important (Fig. 2.). Out of 20 respondents, 7 believed that it was important to be perceived as Russians (7 and more points); 5 assessed this as 6 points which meant “not very important”; 3 respondents preferred a neutral position with 4 points while 2 indicated that it was absolutely unimportant for them to be seen as Russian (1-3 points out of 10).




Fig. 2. The level of Russian identity among the respondents (points).

A big number of the respondents were dissatisfied with the political situation in the country. They are convinced that Russians are excessively patient and are prone to passivity. “I have only one word—patience—to put the Russian mentality of the last 10 years in a nutshell. Our state is acting as it wants, nobody likes it, all and everyone want something different, money. Yet all remain on their sofas, they are indignant and passive. Here is the Russian stereotype for you. It is for this reason that the greater part of the younger generation wants to move to another country. Few of them like this country” (young man, 20, from Krasnodar). “Everybody says this should be done ,yet few act” (young woman, 21, from Bologoye).

“There is an impression that here is a Russian for whom it is not easy to

change anything; it easier to accept everything or let events take their course. This is about the recent events” (young woman, 18, from St. Petersburg).

At the same time, the majority of the respondents were proud of Russia, first and foremost, of its history and culture, achievements of its sportsmen, literature, scientific discoveries and its vast territory. They explained their negative attitude to the national identity by their rejection of the political course, conservatism and passiveness which, they believed, were typical of Russian society.

According to our respondents, Moscow and St. Petersburg could be described as European cities; they had different opinions about other cities.

They were convinced that the St. Petersburg identity differed a lot from the identities of people from other Russian cities. This was evident in their behavior and worldviews. People from St. Petersburg were seen as more interesting and much more pleasant in personal communication; more open and self-assured.

“When I come to Novgorod I see that people are absolutely different there. They talk differently, they have different ideas about the world. When I come back to St. Petersburg I become aware that I have absolutely different opinions about certain things. I might understand life better than they. It is much more pleasant and interesting to talk to people in St. Petersburg than in Novgorod” (young man, 20, from Veliky Novgorod).

“Having moved to St. Petersburg from Krasnodar, I noticed that indeed, the mentalities in the south and the north are different. I think that people in St. Petersburg are more pleasant. Here (in Krasnodar) people are from the south; there are many people from other cities and countries and frequently somebody wants to tell you something you do not need. This might happen sometimes in St. Petersburg. This is much more obvious in Krasnodar where aggression is more obvious. The climate is much warmer there and heat is provocative” (young man, 20, from Krasnodar).

Our respondents differed in their opinions about Russian identity: Some were positive, others negative. This reflects an absence of unity in Russian society when it comes to values, landmarks and development strategy and is discussed in the works of those who study the processes of self-identification in contemporary Russia [2; 10; 17; 21]. More than that: Russia is divided by an awareness of its specifics vs. its belonging to Europe [10].

Conclusion

Our studies of European and national identities of students in St. Petersburg suggested the following conclusions.

(1) Students from St. Petersburg speak of Europeans with respect and even admiration; they idealize the European community. They endow Europeans with positive qualities and believe that it is prestigious to be a European.

(2) The majority of the polled speak of themselves as Europeans; they are convinced that they share European values on the strength of their travels and communications with Europeans as well as historical and cultural closeness of

St. Petersburg to Europe.

(3) Young people are convinced that European identity is more obvious in those who live in Moscow and St. Petersburg, and insist that it is less obvious in other regions, using their native cities as examples.

(4) The range of opinions about national identity stretches from stronger devotion to one's country to the refusal to think of oneself as a Russian. Russians are endowed with positive and negative features.

(5) The majority of the polled students are proud of Russian history, culture and literature as well as fortitude and strong willpower of Russians. They explain their negative attitude to Russian identity by their dissatisfaction with the political situation in Russia and passivity of Russian society.

Our analysis of the data acquired in the course of our studies and the established correlation between European and national identities suggested that in the present conditions the European project of identity formation looks more attractive to the polled young people than the Russian project.

The results reflect the opinions about the European and Russian identities among the members of the student community of St. Petersburg and can be used as a contribution to quantitative studies of Russian identity, to comparative studies of European and Russian identities or serve as a starting point for wider studies.

The results are especially important for the studies of Russian identity since contemporary Russian identity has not yet acquired its final form. The question to which extent should Russia follow Europe, try to integrate with the EU, turn toward Asia or find "its own road" has acquired special importance in connection with the contemporary challenges and global changes. This is especially important for the younger generations immersed in the processes of self-identification. Their trajectories will determine the decisions taken in the near future in politics, economics, culture and international relations.

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Poverty of Russian Professionals: Scale, Causes, Trends*

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Abstract. Poverty among Russian professionals is widespread and at the end of 2019 affected almost a million members of this group. Low-income status is even more widespread among them. This situation, inherited from the 1990s, improved to an extent in the mid-2000s. In the 2010s, the rate of this improvement began to lag behind even its rate among a number of other professional groups. Poverty and low income among professionals are caused by several factors, especially inequalities related to residential community, employment sector and region. In the 2010s, these factors became even more important, the type of community being a key element that brought other factors along with it. The second group of factors included the size and nature of the dependency burden, especially minor children. Since the wages of one out of six professionals in Russia are below 150% of the subsistence level in the respective region, they do not ensure even minimal demographic reproduction. Despite the assistance extended by the state in the recent decade to families with children, the causes of poverty and low income among members of this group of professionals have remained the same. The third group of causes of their poverty is associated with the quality of human capital. The level of poverty and low income among professionals with low indices of human capital, irrespective of what type of community they live in, is relatively higher than among the groups with average and high indices, even though one in five receives a salary of no more than 200% of the subsistence level for their region. Poverty among Russian professionals stems from the traditional underestimation of highly skilled nonphysical (mental) labor; this also explains why monthly wages even of professionals with high human capital indices differ little from the wages of other professional groups. Thus, tactics

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used by professionals to improve their financial status— such as migrating, changing jobs within their community, finding secondary employment and building up human capital—do not bring the desired results.

Keywords: social structure, professional structure, professionals, poverty, low income condition, human capital, secondary employment.

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In any contemporary society, professionals (people who occupy jobs that require higher education) are regarded as relatively rich against the background of all other professional groups and the cornerstone of middle class. This is due to the fact that they possess one of the most important assets for the modern economy—high-quality human capital. At the same time, the price of any commodity, human capital including, is determined by supply and demand in the market. This means that under pressure of excessive supply of high-quality workforce the human capital rent gradually contracts. It might disappear causing unemployment and poverty among the professionals.

In Russia, since the mid-2000s, there has been an increase in unemployment among people with higher education¹ and a decrease in returns from such education [17; 34]. These processes were and are unfolding because of imbalances between people with higher education and the number of jobs that requires it.² This is why professionals in Russia are confronted with the growing risks of unemployment, unstable employment and relatively low wages. What's more, these risks might in future be increased by the effects of social stratification and polarization in this professional group, its increased precariousness and impoverishment under pressure of accelerating technological changes across the world [3; 36]. The economic crisis, which began under the influence of the pandemic, intensifies the trend towards increasing poverty among professionals in Russia.

This means that even if the problem of poverty among professionals typical of the 1990s had been removed from the agenda by the mid-2000s when the fast growth of well-being of all population groups had been obvious, it remained smoldering, so to speak, and might rekindle any time soon. At the same time, poverty of the members of this social group is not only a high obstacle on the road toward creating middle class in Russia, but it does not encourage its members to improve their human capital. Moreover, it reduces the opportunities for increasing their knowledge and skills, even if they have the appropriate aspirations. Their poverty interferes with reproduction of that population group with the biggest cultural and human potentials. Unable to support bigger families and invest into the human capital of their children, professionals prefer to limit birthrate: even simple demographic reproduction is fraught with high risks of poverty or low incomes. The fact that underestimation of highly qualified labor against the background of gradually increasing “equalization” of incomes [20] adds to the social tension potential in Russia. Meanwhile, protests against “equalization” contributed to the

great social transformations of the late 1980-1990s. This means that the effects of poverty and low-income condition among the professional are highly varied and are fraught with serious repercussion for Russia's future development.

It is these considerations that prompted us to make the subject of our study manifestations among Russian professionals of such phenomena as poverty and low income.

The Theoretical-Methodological Foundations and the Empirical Base of Our Studies

In the first place, we should explain whom we define "professionals," since there are several traditions of studies of this population group. Conceptions of society like technocratic, post-industrial, information-based, etc. use this term to define people engaged in high quality brainwork [2; 3; 8]. It was the works in this area that were mainly responsible for a new attitude to this social group and gained the greatest popularity in the world. Studies realized within the sociology of professions are also widespread [21; 20; 19; 27]. The subject of such studies is usually separate professional groups (doctors, engineers, etc.). Quite popular is the direction of research, represented mainly by economists, which considers professionals through the prism of the effective use of human resources, including taking into account the main trends in economic development [38; 9; 7]. Finally, many works look at professionals as a special group within the social structure of society: specifics of their life, strata or classes to which they belong, relation between the professional structure and the model of the given society's social structure [18; 10; 5].

Our studies belong to the fourth tradition. In our identification of professionals, we relied on the International Standard Classification of Occupations, ISCO-08 (for more detail see [12]) which identifies professional classes on the matrix of features. On the one hand, it takes into account a set of types of activities, tasks and responsibilities for which have a high degree of similarity; and on the other hand, the educational level that ensures the ability to perform the tasks and duties presupposed by this type of activity (for professionals, this is usually higher education).

We used the representative versions of the 9th, 20th and 28th waves of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey—HSE (hereafter, RLMS)³ as our empirical base. The polls within the waves were carried out in October-December 2000 (9th wave) which involved 6,924 respondents over 18, and 608 (16.9% of the working people) were professionals; October 2011-February 2012 (20th wave; 13,669 respondents over 18, and 1,417 (18.2% of the working) were professionals; and in October-December 2019 (28th wave): 9,916 respondents over 18, and 906 (17.7% of the working people) were professionals. These temporal points of our analysis relatively evenly spread along the 20-year long period allowed us to analyze the problems of poverty among the professionals at comparatively favorable moments of Russia's recent history and assess the dynamics irrespective of the direct impacts of economic crises.

Another important aspect of our studies is that we use the so-called absolute

approach to interpretation of poverty that relies on comparison of incomes of the population and the expertly set value “poverty line.” Such approach is normally used by organs of state power and statistical services of the RF to identify a group of poor population. To identify this group, we relied on the methods conceptually close to the methods used by the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) of the Russian Federation. The “poverty line” was calculated for each household by summing up the standards of the subsistence levels with due account of the region and its composition (number of children, old age pensioners and people of employable age). The resulting value was correlated with the total income of the household as quoted by the respondent during the poll. Household the total income of which was lower than the aggregate subsistence level calculated for each of them were assessed as poor.

This is not by far the only scholarly approach to the problem of poverty. There are two versions of a so-called relative approach which is widely used, and especially in the developed countries. The first of them, the so-called deprivation version of relative approach started by Peter Townsend [37]. He considered poor those who are not able to maintain a typical lifestyle for a given community and are characterized by the presence of deprivations uncharacteristic of its members. And second, the monetary version assumes that the certain levels of incomes in relation to the median (less often—average) for a given community obviously doom their owners to the inability to maintain the living standards typical for it. (For more detail about different approaches to poverty see [22; 29]). Other authors have already demonstrated [29] that in contemporary Russian society the incomes below 0.75 of the median of income distribution in any particular region make it impossible to preserve the living standards and are accountable for deprivations atypical for the majority of the local population.⁴

Poverty of the population of Russia as a whole in different interpretations has been and is studied fairly actively [11; 13; 22; 39]. At the same time, poverty of the professionals is, on the whole, an atypical phenomenon and, therefore, is practically never studied as an independent object of scholarly attention. In the 1990s, however, when poverty became widespread and when deprivation reached those who normally had firm positions on the labor market and the level of qualification of whom presupposed relatively high incomes Russian scholars became interested in the subject. These people became known as “new poor” even if this popular term was differently interpreted. More likely than not, it was applied to impoverished workers of qualified nonphysical labor [40, p. 19; 30, pp. 88-92; 4, p. 57]. In other publications, however (see, for example, [25]) the concepts “new poor” and “working poor” were used as synonyms. Later, in the 2000-2010s, the “new poor” concept practically disappeared from the parlance of Russian academics while poverty of professionals and its causes, with few exceptions [11; 31] was not analyzed even indirectly.

When writing about the methodological and methodical prerequisites of our studies we should specify that we studied not only poverty but also low incomes as another type of their social disadvantage. By low incomes we mean an average per capita income above the “poverty line” but not higher than 1.5 subsistence minimums for the households of a corresponding structure in a corresponding region. When selecting this value of a living wage as the boundary of low-income condition we took into

account an expanded, as opposed to statistical average, set of requirements of members of this specific group in the sphere of culture and education (their own and their children), in the first place, and, partly, the fact that it is not typical for professionals which speaks of relative disadvantage of those with this level of incomes.

Finally, the human capital concept closely related to the description of theoretical-methodological approaches and methodical foundations of our studies is interpreted in full accordance with its classical conception [1]. It proceeds from the fact that in the societies of the late industrial type knowledge becomes one of the important factors of production and one of the worker's personal key assets. This means that his knowledge should bring the worker incomes analogous to returns on investments in other types of capital.

Repeated calculations of returns on higher education in Russia have revealed the fact that in Russia there are rents on higher education and the duration of the period of studies [17; 28; 34]. Sometimes these rents are created by other types of knowledge and skills of professionals: knowledge of foreign languages, the basic computer skills, etc.

Given the variety of ways to measure human capital that currently exists in science, and the variety of its rent-bearing components, to assess its condition among professionals, we took into account the presence of higher education and indicators of a special Human Capital Index (HCI), which we calculated taking into account the indicators of two scales.⁵ The possible values of this Index ranged from 0 to 13 points. The indicators of this Index differed considerably for the entire working population and for professionals (Table 1). The median value of the Index among the working population of Russia over 18 was 3 points; among professionals, 7 points.

*Table 1**

Distribution of working Russians and professionals according to the values of the HCI, 2019 (%)

Points	Share among working	Share among professionals
0 points	4.1	0.1
1 point	22.3	1.7
2 points	16.5	4.4
3 points	8.7	5.6
4 points	8.6	7.4
5 points	6.8	8.4
6 points	7.1	12.3
7 points	7.2	14.6
8 points	5.6	12.3
9 points	6.5	15.2
10 points	3.2	8.0
11 points	2.0	5.3
12 points	0.7	2.2
13 points	0.7	2.5

*The cells with the biggest figures which being summed unite over 50% of the groups, i.e.,

are typical for it, are shaded.

We relied on the share of professionals with different HCI values to assess the values of 0-5 points as low; 6-7 points as low-average; 8-9 as high-average and 10-13 as high, since these HCI values are not typical even for professionals in Russia (Table 1).

The Scope and Dynamics of Poverty among Professionals in Russia

In Russia, by the end of 2019, poverty among professionals assessed by the absolute approach to poverty was fairly widespread (6.3%) but less frequent than among the working population as a whole (11.4%). Their low-income condition was even more widespread: 15.3% of professionals lived on average per capita incomes lower than 150% subsistence level (as 21.7% of the working population). The incomes of the majority of professionals were close to the incomes of households of qualified or even unqualified workers in the same regions (Fig. 1) yet the risks of poverty and low incomes were much higher among the workers.




Fig. 1. Per-capita incomes in households of members of different professional groups as correlated with the regional subsistence level (SL) for households of corresponding structure, 2019 (%).

Still, the current picture of incomes of professionals looks much better than in 2000 and 2011 (Table 2). Massive impoverishment of this most qualified part of society in the 1990s was overcome, on the whole, by the late 2010s. However, fundamental changes in this respect occurred even before the 2008-2009 crisis.

Table 2

The correlation between the poor, low-income and welfare professionals by their incomes in different years, 2000 / 2011 / 2019 (%)

Groups	2000	2011	2019
Welfare (average per capita household incomes over 150% SL)	24.8	72.0	78.4
Low-income (average per capita household income 100-150% SL)	20.7	19.2	15.3
Poor (average per capita household incomes below 100% SL)	54.5	8.8	6.3

At the same time, low incomes remain a massive phenomenon among professionals. In the 2020s, the share of poor among them was contracting even slower than among unqualified workers. This means that the situation can be hardly assessed as favorable. Even if between 2011 and 2019, the share of poor among professionals dropped by 1.4 times, among the unqualified workers it dropped by 1.5 times.

Main Causes of Poverty among Russian Professionals at the Macro-Level

Incomes of professionals are determined, first and foremost, by the sizes of their salaries. This means that the factors which determine their levels are the main reasons of their poverty. According RLMS, late in 2019 an average take-home salary of a professional was 34,733 rubles;⁶ an average for the working people being 29,293 rubles. This means that highly qualified brainwork is underestimated in Russian economics due to the traditions that appeared in Soviet times when higher education was free, when it was believed that society should be socially uniform and when there was a certain imbalance between supply and demand in the corresponding segment of labor market.

On the whole, the not too high wages of the professionals depend, to a great extent, on the type of a settlement which creates even more risks of poverty and low income in small towns and villages. In late 2019, in Moscow the median salary according to RLMS was 50,000 rubles, in the centers of the RF subjects, 30,000 rubles; in other cities, 27,000 rubles, in villages, 22,000 rubles. This differentiation is partly explained by the employment structure by branches. In late 2019, 55.9% of professionals in villages worked in the sphere of education in which wages were lower than the average among professionals. Organizations of culture in the countryside employed 12.4% professionals; 4.0% worked in agriculture, the branches with fairly low salaries and wages. At the same time, professionals with the highest salaries live mainly in big cities.⁷

Very much like inter-branch, intra-branch differences also depend on the type of a settlement. Wages and salaries depend on the type of an enterprise: the bigger the enterprise the higher are average salaries and wages. Since big enterprises are more likely than not function in big settlements the share of professionals with high and deeply differentiated wages is much bigger in regional centers, let alone in Moscow and St. Petersburg. There is a reverse side as well: wages that professionals earn at enterprises of similar sizes in different settlements and at enterprises that belong to the same branch are differentiated to a much lesser extent. In 2019, the sizes of

wages paid by the branch (education)⁸ that employs the biggest number of specialists differed (according to RLMS) by 13 times. At smaller enterprises of the same branch they differed by 10.9 times; at smaller enterprises only in big cities, 6.9.

Enterprises and organizations of the state and private sectors pay their professionals very different wages and differentiate employment. This, and all other factors described above, affects wages and salaries of all professional groups. Professionals, however, are stronger affected (Table 3). To some extent, this is explained by the branch specifics of these sectors.

Table 3

Differentiation of wages* of members of different professional groups employed by the state and non-state economic sectors, 2019 (%); ranked according to the differences of average wages among sectors)

Professional groups	Average for each professional group		Gap, times
	State sector	Non-state sector	
Managers	33,719	48,860	1.45
Professionals	30,731	42,667	1.39
Semiprofessionals	25,358	33,384	1.32
Unqualified workers in all branches	15,663	20,420	1.30
Clerks and services	22,895	28,756	1.26
People engaged in trade and services	20,234	22,181	1.10
Qualified workers (manual labor)	28,352	30,322	1.10
Qualified workers (machines and mechanisms)	31,193	31,371	1.00

* Salaries at the main place of work after payment of income tax

This means that when entering the labor market in their community, professionals find themselves in fairly strict frames of external structural limits. The place of settlement and economy of regions and communities predetermine, to a great extent, whether he/she will find employment at an enterprise of one of the branches, either big (medium), small or micro in the state or non-state sector, in an actively developing or depressive region.⁹ These factors are highly important: the individual might find himself among those who live below the poverty line or in the group of low-income people. Professionals from the countryside who constitute over half (59.3%) of those living below the poverty line are in the worst situation. The trend of greater localization of poor professionals in villages has been unfolding for several years now (Table 4).

On the whole, in the 2010s, the importance of all factors of risks of poverty related to the macro-level among the professionals increased. This is best illustrated by the dynamic of the Spearman Correlation (Table 5). The most important among them are characteristics related to the types of settlement. Throughout the 2010s, the form of property and the size of the enterprise at which professionals are employed and the branch to which it belongs were very important as a factor of possible poverty; the same remains important today albeit to a much lesser extent.

Table 4*

Places of settlement of professionals with different levels of average per capita incomes, 2000-2019, %

Place of settlement	Welfare	Low-Income	Poor
2019			
Moscow, St. Petersburg, centers of republics, territories and regions	54.1	38.9	13.0
Other cities	26.9	20.6	24.1
Urbanized settlements	4.2	13.0	3.7
Villages	14.8	27.5	59.2
2011			
Moscow, St. Petersburg, centers of republics, territories and regions	55.3	33.0	17.4
Other cities	24.4	29.0	22.6
Urbanized settlements	5.8	6.3	16.5
Villages	14.5	31.7	43.5
2000			
Moscow, St. Petersburg, centers of republics, territories and regions	69.0	55.4	45.1
Other cities	22.1	28.1	24.8
Urbanized settlements	4.8	6.6	6.0
Villages	4.1	9.9	24.1

*The cells with values of over 50%, which are typical for the corresponding group are shaded.

Table 5*

Spearman correlation between professionals' place of employment/settlement vs. their poverty/non-poverty status, 2011/2019 (%)

Characteristics	2011	2019
Type of settlement	0.224	0.245
Population	0.219	0.252
Enterprise size	0.052	0.111
State/non-state	0.007	0.067
Branch	0.028	0.039

*The cells the correlations of the values in which are statistically meaningful at the 0.01 level are shaded.

In the 2010s, the risks of low-income condition depended, to a much smaller extent, on the type of settlement and its population strength than the risks of poverty even if it is still very noticeable. The significance of other factors of the macro-level for the risks of low incomes has not changed.

The Main Causes of Poverty of Russian Professionals at the Micro-Level

The role of the type of settlement in poverty or the low-income status demonstrates different trends because these are very different phenomena by their nature. This becomes clear when we turn to the factors of micro-level at which the risks increase. Low-income condition of professionals is, to an extent, closer connected with the size of households and the number of minors in them. The poverty of professionals, for all the importance of these factors for them, is relatively stronger connected (if we talk only about micro-level factors) with the quality of their human capital, primarily with their level of education (Table 6).

Table 6*

Spearman correlation between various characteristics of professionals' place of settlement, household and human capital vs. their poverty/low-income status, 2019 (%)

Characteristics	Poverty	Low-income status
Number of minors in household	0.196	0.322
Size of household	0.188	0.309
Type of settlement	0.245	0.263
Age	0.093	0.143
Completed education	0.206	0.148
Higher education	0.204	0.145
Full-time higher education	0.191	0.158
Human capital index	0.152	0.105

*All correlations are statistically relevant at the 0.01 level. The cells with maximally great values are shaded.

Thus, poverty, to a greater extent than low income, is related to the position in the labor market, due to the specific knowledge and skills of professionals, while low income is more determined by socio-demographic factors. This should not be taken to mean that poverty is unrelated to these factors. In fact, the risk of professionals with big families (4 members and more) to find themselves in the group of the poor is 4.3 times higher than among those with smaller families; the risks for professionals who live in families with children below 16 are 5.6 times higher than for those who have no children. This means that wages of many Russian professionals do not presuppose even the simple demographic reproduction. No improvements in this sphere are anywhere in sight.¹⁰

There is no need to go into more details of this side of the problem of poverty among professionals: the role of the factors connected with the size and structure of households in the emergence of poverty in Russia has been discussed in Russian scholarly writings [23; 24; 26]. Here we will discuss the second group of causes at the micro-level connected with the risks of poverty. We have in mind the differences in the quality of human capital of professionals which strongly affect their wages: in late 2019 it was on average 36,884 rubles among people with

higher education; those who had no higher education could earn 27,009 rubles a month.

The HCI values strongly affect the wages and, as could be expected, proliferation of poverty among the groups with different values of their sub-groups (Table 7). Proliferation of poverty changes course at the border between 5 and 6 points¹¹ of the HCI. This divides professionals into those who correspond and do not corresponding to the minimal demands of contemporary economics.

Table 7

Wages* and proliferation of poverty in groups of professionals with different HCI values, 2019

HCI values	Average salary, rubles	Median salary, rubles	Share of poor among professionals with corresponding HCI values, %
High (10-13 points)	43,214	35,000	3.2
High-average (8-9 points)	37,217	30,000	3.4
Low-average (6-7 points)	34,020	27,600	4.3
Low (0-5 points)	27,577	17,000	14.0

*For those with several employment posts—at the main place of employment.

When assessing the data of Table 7 we should bear in mind, however, that they contain certain other inequalities of which we have already written (low values of the HCI for professionals in villages and fairly high for those who live in big cities; see Fig. 2). The lower quality of human capital of professionals working in the countryside is confirmed by their lower education level. While in late 2019, in Moscow, St. Petersburg and the centers of the subjects of the Russian Federation the share of professionals with no higher education was, according to RLMS, 15.8%; in villages the share was twice as high (36.2%). Only one-third (35.6%) of all professionals in the countryside received full-time tuition, whereas 85.5%—in the capitals and centers of the subjects of the RF (for more detail about settlement differentiation by the quality of human capital among the professionals see [33]).




Fig. 2. HCI Values Among Professionals Living in Settlements of Different Types, 2019 (%)

Even if all types of settlements have good chances to offer relatively high wages to professionals with higher values of human capital, in reality this possibility is below 50%. Moreover, the quality of human capital differently affects wages in different types of settlements. In big cities with wide labor markets and higher wages professionals with low quality of human capital are relatively comfortable. There, the incomes of only 28.5% of them are below the subsistence level while the share of professionals with relatively low HCI level living on incomes below the subsistence level in villages was 68.8%. The relatively low level of human capital in all types of settlement increases, to a lesser extent, the risks of low incomes.

We should say that these differences are not caused by the age structures of professionals in different types of settlements: in late 2019, in big cities and in villages their average age (according to RLMS) was practically the same: 42.3 and 42.7 years. The wage profile of professionals in different age groups differed but little. Old-age pensioners who continued working were the only exception: 80.3% of them had salaries not higher the 0.75 of median salaries for types of settlements where they lived.

Ways to Reduce the Risks of Poverty Among Russian Professionals

As could be expected, obvious differentiation of wages and poverty risks in different types of settlements suggests migration (movement to another place of settlements) as one of the chances to improve their material situation. Russian academics have pointed out that in recent years, migration of members of this professional group lost its popularity. Between 2011 and 2017, the share of professionals with personal experience of migration dropped from 31.4% to 24.0% because in the last ten years the number of migrants dropped by two times [16]. This is confirmed by our figures: only 2.4% of professionals according to information supplied by RLMS for 2019 moved to the settlements where they had lived by the time of the poll after 2011. The share for the previous decade was 4.2%; for the 1990s, 5.4%, that is, twice as big as in the 2010s.

This means that migration as a method of dealing with financial problems is gradually losing its popularity among professionals probably because the least successful group has no resources to move (not enough money and no resources in social networks, etc.). The quality of the human capital of many of them makes resettlement meaningless: they will have no chances in the competitive labor markets of big cities. Professionals with high quality human capital practically never improve their personal incomes by changing place of settlement [16]. They reach a wider labor market without resources in social networks which play a huge role when it comes to access to most attractive jobs [32].

Secondary employment for professionals, and all Russians for that matter, is another important chance to increase their incomes. On the whole, it is not widespread among professionals: in late 2019 only 4.6% relied on it. In fact, it merely helped maintain the same income profile as of those having one job (Fig. 3).




Fig. 3. Per capita incomes of households of professionals with and without secondary employment, as compared with the regional subsistence level (SL) for households of corresponding structure, 2019 (%).

This paradox is caused by the fact that normally people with inadequate wages (24,000 rubles against the median of 30,000 rubles without secondary employment) find secondary employment. It should be said that in the 2010s secondary employments acquired a different meaning for professionals. In 2011, those who had and those who had no secondary employment received practically the same wages (median 15,000 rubles). In these conditions secondary employment was a chance to improve his/her position compared to those who had no secondary employment rather than to overcome the poverty risks. Perhaps this is why secondary employment among professionals was then almost twice as widespread (8.0%) than in 2019. Low incomes and poverty among them were several times lower than among those who had only one job (5.8% against 20.4% for people with low incomes and 6.8% against 9.0% among the poor). The work load on those who have secondary employment is high: by the end of 2019, they worked 10 hours longer a week (on average) than those who had no secondary employment or 2 hours longer than in 2011.

Today, as in 2011, secondary employment is accessible, to a much greater extent, for professionals whose quality of human capital is, on average, much higher than that of those with no secondary employment (Table 8). Their relatively lower wages than those of other professionals mean that in Russia today a relatively high quality of human capital is not always transformed into at least average wages.

This means that many representatives of these professional groups can hardly use this method of upgrading their human capital to avoid poverty or low incomes. We have already mentioned that the classical conception of human capital presup-

poses that investments in this type of capital would bring additional incomes. By the end of the 2000s, however, in Russia the incomes created by the diploma of higher education were even lower among the professionals than among other professional groups, including qualified workers [28; 34]. The trends that appeared in the mid-2000s reverberate today. Russian authors have pointed out [17] that between 2003 and 2007, the effects of the duration of education in Russia were lower by 1% to 1.5% per year. While in the 2000s the returns of each additional year of education were still growing (albeit slower than in the 1990s, when they grew fast from 4% to 8% per a year of additional education), in the early 2000s the growth became slower, it ceased just before the 2008-2009 crisis and did not revive in the post-crisis years [28; 34].

Table 8*

HCI values of professionals with and without secondary employment, 2019 (%)

Values	One job	Secondary employment
<i>Education confirmed by diplomas</i>		
Below specialized secondary	5.0	4.8
Specialized secondary	17.9	14.2
Higher	77.1	81.0
<i>Values of the Human Capital Index</i>		
0-5	28.1	19.0
6-7	27.3	16.6
8-9	27.6	26.2
10-13	17.0	38.2
Median	7.0	9.0
Average	7.0	8.1
<i>Other characteristics of the human capital quality</i>		
Full time specialized education	54.7	59.5
APT in the specifics of employment during the last year	4.1	9.5

*The cells with the highest values in each line are shaded.

There is another way of reducing the risks of poverty and low incomes for professionals and members of other professional groups: they either decide not to have children or not to have two or more children. In view of the importance of children which is still alive in Russian culture this is a psychologically hard decision at the level of individuals and unwelcome at the state level. Nevertheless, some of the professionals opt for this variant: an average number of children below 16 in the households of this professional group is 0.68 against 0.74 among qualified workers or specialists of average qualification; 0.71 among rank and file trade personnel and 0.71 among all employed across the country.

Finally, change of place of work within the same settlement can be described as another method to increase incomes. According to RLMS, those who changed at once the place of work and occupation are dissatisfied with their new jobs and

payments. It seems that this is done where there are no other options in sight. This normally preserves employment rather than improves its quality or ensures higher salaries. The greatest effect (greater satisfaction with works or payments as well as the real size of salaries) is usually brought by changed place of work within the same profession: in late 2019, average salary in the group was 46,150 rubles against 34,136 rubles paid to those who remained at the previous place of employment. However, the indices of human capital in the group of those who changed the place of work but not profession were the lowest among all subgroups of professionals who changed jobs. This means that today in Russia more attractive jobs do not necessarily go to professionals with the high quality human capital.

Conclusions

Poverty and low income are fairly widespread among Russian professionals, albeit less so than in other professional groups. Nevertheless, since professionals constitute a very big group, nearly one million of them lived (even before the crisis caused by the pandemic) on incomes below the level of subsistence. No matter how large this figure is in comparison with the year 2000, when more than half of this population group lived below the poverty line, today this situation looks more favorable. But positive changes mainly began before the 2008-2009 crisis; in the 2010s, poverty among professionals decreased at a much slower pace than among unqualified workers.

Underestimation in Russia of highly qualified non-physical labor explains poverty and low incomes among professionals. In fact, the cost of investments in high quality human capital is normally not fully taken into account when the level of salaries is established. Today, the price of labor of professionals is, to a great extent, determined by the correlation of supply and demand in the specific segments of local labor markets rather than by investments. Moreover, lower wages of the professionals are also affected by the weak differentiation of wages of big professional groups inherited from the Soviet Union. To a great extent, weak differentiation of wages and salaries of groups of mass professions took shape in Russian culture due to free education (in the Soviet Union and partly today); lack of understanding that it needs rents; weak competitiveness of Russian economics which equates the importance of resources of social networks in head hunting and the quality of human capital. This means that we should not be amazed by job payments and per capita incomes in the families of professionals and by the fact that the shares of poverty and low incomes within this group differ but little from the situations in groups with a considerably lower quality of human capital.

On the whole, underestimation of nonphysical (mental) labor in Russian economics is consolidated by all sorts of inequalities in remuneration for labor inherited from the past—regional, inter- and intra-branch wage inequalities in different sectors, at enterprises of different sizes, etc. The main role in these inequalities belongs to the types of settlements. In view of economic specifics of different settlements these inequalities are superimposed to create a strong cumulative effect.

As a result, the best paid professionals mostly live and work in big cities; poor professionals, in small settlements, mainly in villages. This trend has become quite obvious in the last 20 years.

The causes of poverty of macroeconomic nature among professionals are aggravated by the causes at the micro-level including specific of human capital of professionals in settlements of different types. For the majority of them, however, the role of this factor is not decisive; in the course of time it is contracting rather increasing. There is another set of causes of poverty among the professionals which also belongs to the micro-level: the sizes and structures of their households. Their role has not changed in recent years despite certain measures of state support. The key role among them belongs to the load of minors. Here, too, poverty among professionals is, to a much greater extent than low incomes, connected with the positions on the labor market caused by the specifics of human capital. Low income, on the other hand, mainly depends on the social-demographic factors.

The choice of means and ways with the help of which professionals can change their financial status is small. First, they can decide not to have children, so far a not very popular choice used by certain members of the community. Second, upgrading the quality of their human capital. In any type of settlements, the majority of professionals with high quality human capital still survive on average (at best) salaries; they cannot ensure, without risks of poverty and low income even simple demographic reproduction. This means that this method of struggle against the corresponding risks holds no promises for the majority. Third, movement to a different type of settlement. Its popularity is gradually decreasing because those of the professionals who should have been for objective reasons interested in this variant have no money to realize it. The quality of their human capital is relatively low which means that change of settlement might prove to be economically ineffective. Forth, secondary employment. In the last 20 years, it lost its popularity among professionals while its meaning changed. In the past and now only highly qualified representatives of this professional group have an access to secondary employment. While in 2011 they had opted for secondary jobs to improve their material status, in 2019 only professionals with salaries below the average for their professional group opted for secondary employment to preserve, on the whole, their profile of income distribution under huge and increasing workload. Fifth, change of place of work within the same settlement. Very often, however, this is just an instrument of preserving employment rather than improving its quality. There is only one exception: move to a new place of work with the same specialty which increases wages by about 20%. The quality of human capital is not a decisive factor when it comes to finding more attractive and better paid jobs.

By summing up we can say that the problem of poverty and low-income condition among professionals in Russia is still very topical. This situation is fraught with serious consequences for Russian society as a whole and demands active measures. The high risks of poverty for the families with two children create problems with reproduction of high quality workforce on the countrywide scale. The weak connection between the quality of human capital and the level of wages does not inspire professionals to increase their knowledge and improve their skills. The

great number of factors that determine the level of wages and salaries associated with the economic structure in certain places makes the role of their own efforts to improve their financial status, etc. less important. This means that the state should pursue a more active social and economic policy even in relation to this seemingly prosperous group (compared with others).

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Notes

- ¹ The share of unemployed with higher education in the total number of unemployed in Russia increased from 11.3% in 2007 to 20.7% in 2018 [15, p. 115; 14, p. 43].
- ² In 2018, the share of people with higher education reached 34.2% of the employed while the total number of jobs for highly qualified specialists constituted 24.6% of the employed [14, pp. 25, 32].
- ³ The Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS-HSE) carried out by the HSE University and Demoscope Ltd with participation of the Carolina Population Center and the Institute of Sociology of FCTAS RAS. See site RLMS-HSE: <http://www.hse.ru/rlms>.
- ⁴ Our study was based on an absolute approach to poverty as dominating in Russia's social policy, while relative approach was used only for control. Here, ahead of further presentation, we have pointed out that according to RLMS HSE, in 2019, 13.4% of professionals had this income.
- ⁵ The key scale was the "Number of years of study." Its indicators, according to the tradition of analyzing human capital in its classical interpretation, are what that testify to the amount of knowledge accumulated by a person, the skill of learning they develop, the degree of their socialization, etc. Different points corresponded to training of different duration—no points were assigned for training less than 10 years; for 10-12 years of study, 1 point was assigned, and starting from 13 years of study, each year gave 1 additional point. The scale

“Skills” consisted of two sub-scales: “Knowledge of Foreign Languages” and “Knowledge of Computer Technologies.” The highest points for corresponding skills were 2 in each sub-scale; then these scores were summed up. The human capital index was based on the aggregated indicators of the scale “Number of Years of Education and Skills.” For more detailed description of the HCI see [35].

- ⁶ According to Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), in October 2019 the RLMS poll was started the average monthly wages of specialists of highest qualification was 48,848 rubles (see Table 24 in [6]), that is 42,498 rubles net of income tax. To a certain extent, the difference in wages according to statistical and sociological data is explained, first, by the specifics of identifying groups of professionals when using different classifications of occupations and, second, by the fact that the group of highest paid professionals whose wages are taken into account by Rosstat and are not included in polled samplings and, third, because by certain specifics of methods used to calculate wages by Rosstat and by sociologists. Despite the impact of these factors, differences in data constitute less than 10% in relative terms and, in any case, wages of professionals turn out to be relatively low.
- ⁷ The data gathered by state statistics confirm that the branch of employment determines, to a great extent, wages and salaries of professionals. According to aggregated classification of occupations, experts in information-communication technologies are the leaders where their salaries are concerned (average salary is 73,046 rubles) while specialists in education are outsiders (37,910 rubles; see [6], Table 6).
- ⁸ The sphere of education employs 1795.9 thousand Russian professionals out of the total number of 4854.0 thousand (see [6], Table 6).
- ⁹ RLMS does not represent the country’s population by regions, yet, as follows from information supplied by Rosstat, regional differentiation of wages and salaries of professionals is very big. In Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria, average salaries of specialists of higher qualifications was 24,914 and 25,449 rubles in October 2019; in Chukotsky and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Regions—103,048 and 92,118 rubles correspondingly (in Moscow the figure was 86,360 rubles). See [6], Table 34.
- ¹⁰ In 2019, almost half (45.6%) of the professionals with two children in their households belonged to the poor and low-income groups, including 11.8% with incomes below the subsistence level. In 2011, there were 47.9% and 13.4% among them respectively. This means that the situation has not changed at all.
- ¹¹ The indicator of 6 points on the HCI means the duration of the study period of 15 years and the presence of computer skills in the absence of foreign language skills.

Translated by Valentina Levina

Competition Between “Great Powers” in the 21st Century: Discourse and Attitudes in Russia*

Ksenia BORISHPOLETS

Abstract. The world in which we live today cannot fail to cause anxiety. The rising activity of those who support a unipolar world and the hegemony of one power brought the world close to the total loss of the achievements of post-bipolar international cooperation. Old conflicts in the strategically important regions of the global space and at its periphery have been revived. The tough and toughening anti-Russian course of the United States and NATO, escalation of anti-Russian sanctions and attempts to add tension to the situation along the Russian borders have stirred up many concerns. During the period that predated the current unprecedented worsening of the attitude to Russia in the leading Western countries, the Russian side invariably demonstrated its readiness for constructive dialogue, and its interest in cooperation with leaders of the world community. Russia's readiness to cooperate on the international arena is fully confirmed by an analysis of the ideas of Russian experts about the rivalry of the “great powers” at the end of the second decade of the 21st century. In her analysis of the situation, the author has proceeded from the fact that this rivalry corresponds to the problem range of international relations to a greater extent than to strategic studies, and that this rivalry is unfolding in the international milieu at a stage of transition when the special role of the great powers is frequently perceived as outdated. The author has relied on official documents and scholarly publications to draw several conclusions about how the Russian side understands the priorities of the great powers with respect to global security, settlement of armed conflicts, politics in the CIS and the Arctic, and future cooperation between the US and China in bilateral and regional formats. We have also devoted significant attention

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to views and of Russian experts regarding differences in opinion about regulating the world order since 2020.

Keywords: world politics, great powers, international cooperation, international rivalry, world order.

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Rivalry With Many Faces

International relations presuppose dynamic interaction between the great powers on the international arena the nature of which is highly varied. In many cases, only experienced experts can distinguish between competition and cooperation.

Here competences are very important yet subjective perceptions of real events by different specialists, their dedication to political realism or political liberalism are no less important. The term “competition” which conceptually can be traced to the theoretical ideas of Ken Boulding, Lewis Coser and Ralf Dahrendorf [13; 14; 15] and which is accepted in political discourse provides us with certain advantages when we deal with different formats of great powers’ behavior on the international arena. The term allows us to avoid extremely negative or extremely positive assessments of the observed phenomena and connectivity of the realities with one-side definitions of war and peace of the early 21st century. On the whole, competition on the international arena can be understood as the struggle of actors for gaining or holding superiority as an important aim which presupposes confrontation. In English synonyms presuppose supremacy [47; 60] as a foreign policy aim. Interpretation of “competition” in Russian-language publications offers even more variants: it is not only rivalry; it also refers to other aspects: contention and contest [20], a much more adequate reflection of the dialectics of world political trends of the post-bipolar period.

Judging by publications in English an analysis of contemporary competition between the great powers should take into consideration several conceptual moments. First, its content is closer to the problem range of international relations than to “strategic studies” [39]. Second, in the early 21st century, competition among the great powers is unfolding in the international milieu at the transitory stage of its development when their role frequently looks outdated. Third, a polycentric world is a much more probable scenario of the unfolding competition between the world leaders [10].

How is the unfolding competition between the great powers assessed in Russia: as a preliminary stage of a global military conflict or a quest for a new way of global development?

In their publications Russian and foreign authors have so far presented their fragmentary studies of the great powers’ actions that combine tough foreign poli-

cy programs with their desire to reach compromises. It is important to compare all sorts of assessments by Russian experts of the processes of reformatting post-bipolar world politics.

In 2014-2021, various aspects of interaction of the world powers on the international arena were discussed in numerous publications: in periodicals,¹ collections of articles and monographs. Important research has been undertaken by Russian scientists A. Arbatov, V. Baranovsky, V. Batyuk, A. Bratersky, A. Bogdanov, A. Baykov, N. Bubnova, D. Grafov, A. Gromyko, D. Danilin, V. Zhuravleva, S. Karaganov, A. Kortunov, A. Kuznetsov, V. Kozin, M. Lebedeva, V. Lukin, F. Lukyanov, A. Podberezkin, I. Safranchuk, N. Silaev, A. Suchentsov, N. Timofeev, A. Torkunov, A. Fenenko, T. Shakleina.

Transformation of the World Political Order in the Mirror of Russian Discourse

In Russia, comprehension of the processes unfolding in the world and the specifics of the great powers' policies are formed in official documents as well as in academic and expert publications. While official approaches registered in the Foreign Policy Concept of the RF 2016, annual Presidential Addresses to the Federal Assembly remain in the focus of attention of all analysts, the related to them academic discourse attracts only ad hoc attention. Here are several generalized descriptions of what Russian experts thought about changes in world politics in 2019-2020.

They pointed at the unstable, or even highly unstable in certain trends, state of the international political milieu. The Cold War ended three decades ago yet the questions about the architecture of the post-bipolar world order, insurance of world security and other conditions indispensable for sustainable development of mankind have found no clear answers. It is obvious, however, that the political situation in the world at the turn of the 21st century has changed radically. It differs to the greatest extent from the forecasts of Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington, which in the early 1990s were treated as highly authoritative.

First, scholars point at a high level of confrontation obvious in the politics of the industrially developed countries toward Russia. The policy of sanctions, the nature of information flows, local demonstrations of military might have dramatically risen the level of mutual mistrust between Russia and the West and created a situation typical of the period of bloc confrontation [59; 5; 12; 4; 32; 45]. In 2019-2020, analogies with the period of bipolarity appeared in many publications [48; 64; 53; 24] yet the contemporary format of world politics is only partially determined by the correlation of power between the American and Russian "poles." In the past decade, a new Eastern vector of the development of world community appeared while the PRC consolidated its global status. Today, the main problem has been created by the United States' inability to ensure stable (and secure) international political system without a real consensus among all world powers.

Second, the turbulence in the periphery has not disappeared. It is, in fact, mounting. Instability in various forms is increasing everywhere but the Middle East is the main vector of its escalation. Tension in the periphery consistently decreases political resources needed for its containment [63; 29; 41].

Third, the dividing lines between the spheres of (political and economic) influence of the leading centers of the post-bipolar world are being restructured. On the one hand, the U.S., EU and NATO have not abandoned their attempts to deprive Russia of its friendly regional neighbors. On the other, in the last 15 years China has consolidated its global positions [50]; cooperation between Russia and China in the main strategic trends has become more active. China is simultaneously increasing its economic and political presence in Africa and Latin America and across the CIS while Chinese structures are consolidating their positions on the EU and U.S. markets; the Chinese leadership is acquiring new and clearer forms of influence in the Asia-Pacific region. India is gradually consolidating its regional and transregional positions.

The problems of diversification of the routes of gas transit from Russia to Europe served a clear sign that the conventional boundaries between the spheres of international influence are changing. The positive development of integration with Russia's involvement along the BRICS, SCO, EAEU line and Russia's bilateral partnership with Turkey, Iran and several Latin American countries can be assessed as an important factor of current transformations. Firmer Russia's positions on the global scale—cooperation with African countries (2019) and successful opposition to the American efforts to depose the legal government of Venezuela (2018-2020)—can be assessed as signal events. The strategy of unipolar hegemony is obviously stalling, turbulence in the zones of the developing countries is growing while redistribution of the spheres of international influence is not linear but diffusive. Today, flexible forms of multilateral regulation of emerging situations in different zones of world space are preferred.

On the whole, in 2019-2020 Russian analysts were convinced that the nature of future political transformations would be determined not only by the logic of the development of obvious trends but also by the desire of the great powers to move away from the practice of increasing mutual mistrust.

Conclusions and Assessments of Russian Experts

The results of comprehension and assessment of the topical international processes and specifics of the policy of great powers are presented in several trends of the political discourse in Russia.

Security and the Priorities of the Main Centers of International Influence

The turn to a polycentric architecture of interaction on the world arena is closely associated with a new quality of the foreign policy strategy of a wide circle of states. Their post-Cold War multi-vector policy means, first, that they would

coordinate their interests on the basis of rational comprehension of reality and, second, in view of the leading positions of the United States in regulating their interaction. Not all of their expectations passed the test by realities.

Today, analysts still pay a lot of attention to the problems of military might and its strike components in the form of the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia.²

A comparative analysis of the foreign policy strategies of Russia and the U.S. (2016-2019) is especially interesting in this respect. The authors compared the main similarities and differences in the dialog between Moscow and Washington during the bipolar confrontation and at present. The majority of specialists believe that due to the changed international milieu the term Cold War cannot be used to define the current stage of bilateral relations [11].

When describing the dynamics of exacerbation of contradictions between Russia and the United States on the key problems of international relations as cyclical, Russian authors believe that starting with 2012 they returned to the state which by its quality characteristics can be compared with the period of bipolar confrontation which is confirmed by an absence of a direct military conflict, the U.S. and Russian nuclear primacy, the climate of reciprocal distrust, sanctions, the ubiquity of bilateral conflict and a limited degree of cooperation [11].

The attempts at an analysis of the conflict relationships between the U.S. and Russia suggest that “in the post-bipolar world the relations between the two countries are realized as a never-ending movement from limited cooperation to a primary conflict, the logic and the trajectory of which are defined by cultural-psychological factors as well as by domestic and international policy factors.” At the same time, experts invariably point out that world politics does not exclude simultaneous existence of several conceptions of world governance which “might fundamentally change the relationships between Russia and the United States” [45, pp. 5, 12].

The changed approaches of the American side to local armed conflicts realized during Donald Trump’s presidency are related to the set of questions of world political development in which the role of the United States is negatively assessed by Russian specialists. America’s actions in Syria and the Middle East are seen as counterproductive: the United States radically increased its involvement in Syria and Iraq not so much to defeat ISIS³ as to achieve its strategic aims, including confrontation with Iran [8]. At the same time, Russia which interfered with its armed forces in the Syrian conflict in 2015 on a request of the legal head of state created certain military-political, operative and technical problems for the United States. Despite the fact that the two countries have been discussing the Syrian issues at the top level since 2018, this dialog has not yet developed into real cooperation. This will hardly happen in the near future.

Political competition between Russia and the U.S. in the CIS space is another subject, which invariably attracts attention of Russian analysts. It is a result of the American strategy of “proliferation of democracy.” Experts have pointed out that even if in the 2000s American scored several considerable victories (Georgia and Ukraine switched to pro-Western foreign policy) “the post-Soviet countries did not shift to the anti-Russian platform” [43, p. 170].

Russian authors did not miss a high and growing level of America's confrontation with Russia and its interests on the Ukrainian trend [46; 41]. "The motives behind America's active involvement in settling the political crisis in Ukraine are determined by the United States' strategic tasks in the sphere of European security, transatlantic unity and formulation of a common strategy with its European allies to stand opposed to Russia's policy in the post-Soviet space." In this way, "not only the reality of the Ukrainian crisis is ignored together with the elements of its national, cultural and political specifics but the prerequisites of the positive development of states which earlier were regarded as important guaranties of Russia's post-Cold War security are also undermined" [1, pp. 55, 65]. Russian scholars are convinced that we should not expect mutual understanding between Russia and America on the Ukrainian issue any time soon.

Russian experts expressed their serious concerns about President Trump's policy in the Arctic and its military components. Trump not only followed in the footsteps of President Obama but also looked for new possibilities for an offensive to prevent any actions of Russia and China [44] and, on the whole, demonstrated a lot of activity in the Arctic [56].

The competitive nature of the relationships between Russia and the U.S. is confirmed by the policy of international regulation of information development. Unlike America, Russia speaks of "greater state control over individual production and information consumption." The official positions of these two countries on information security are diametrically different practically in all aspects [38, pp. 25, 37], and this is confirmed by the analysis of the American Cybersecurity Strategy [37].

Recently Russian experts have been paying more attention to the China-U.S. interaction in bilateral and regional formats [53; 16; 30]. They study the differentiation of partner relationships of Washington and Beijing with the Asia-Pacific countries and the methods the U.S. will use to build up its Pacific alliances while taking into account "peaceful rise of China." Convinced that the system of American alliances in the Asia-Pacific region serves the foundation of the military-political hegemony of the United States in one of the most important segments of the world, Russian experts invariably point out that the U.S. has to deal with a serious challenge, viz. the steadily changing correlation of political, military and economic forces between the U.S. and China. "There are three different trends which describe the response of the allies and partners of the United States to China's rise: balancing, neutralization and hedging. Washington relies mainly on balancing and continued cooperative involvement of partner countries. Beijing, on its side, has opted for neutralization of American alliances." Seen from Russia the developments in the Asia-Pacific region are positive: "If the East Asian countries draw out from Washington's strategic control the regional and global hegemony of the United States will weaken but, on the other hand, will not make China an absolute leader in Asia. This will lead to a strengthening of a polycentric world order" [27, p. 13]. In other words, the desire of several Asia-Pacific countries to diversify their strategic ties allows Russia to consolidate its positions in the region.

Today, very much as before, it is hard to assess the prospects of China—U.S. competition, which became very obvious in the context of foreign trade disagreements of 2018-2019. Russian authors have pointed out that “the U.S. and the PRC are obviously drawn not only into a political but also ideological conflict between the two great powers—between American globalism and Chinese nationalism. The chances of its settlement through talks are slim” [9, p. 37]. At the same time, if the American political class opts for simultaneous confrontation of a new cold war type with the RF and the PRC the situation will become even tenser.

Russian analysts agree that the relationships between America and China will move toward confrontation. “More than that. Two military-political coalitions of the United States and its allies spearheaded at China and Russia are being built in the Indo-Pacific. So far, the process is not too obvious. All these actions, together with the intensifying arms race in East Asia and on a global scale, can lead to unpredictable consequences” [36, p. 29]. In other words, intensified competition between the U.S. and the PRC in Asia will not only continue into the foreseeable future. From time to time, it will be complicated by contradictions over certain specific (for example technological [58]) and general issues.

Those who analyze the competitive relations between the U.S. and China have pointed to “background” information that have become part and parcel of expert discourse in America. A possibility of contradictions between Russia and China in the course of China’s hypothetical re-orientation from Asia to Central Asia is one of the favorite subjects of American analysts. In Russia, the issue remains on the fringes of scholarly discussions.

Experts in Russia are interested in the relationships between the U.S. and its West European partners and the widening disagreements on the Iranian, Chinese and certain other issues of the international agenda. According to foreign analysts to whom Russian experts refer, coordination of the American and European strategies in relation to China is an important resource of continued Western impact on the changing world order [34]. For several years running, the chances of American-European coordination were contracting. This means that to solve the problem the U.S. will have no choice but to pour more political resources in its coordinated policy with the UK and France in the first place. The opinion that we should recognize that “China succeeded in its fight for Europe” [23, p. 83] is very typical of the current situation in Europe.

We should pay attention to the very specific opinions of Russian authors when it comes to the balance of interests of Russia and China as parts of the “big triangle” which is taking shape in the processes of interaction on the world scene along the U.S., China and Russia line. Contemporary assessments are fairly restrained: they reflect the objective advantages and the challenges to Russia, caused, in particular, by the OBOR initiative [35]. The expert community on the whole agrees that the relationships between Russia and China are the “relationships of great powers of a new type” mainly oriented at long-term cooperation along the main trends of world development [55]. Constructive dialog that consolidates cooperation makes it possible to neutralize unfriendly attempts of certain American politicians to move the Chinese and Russian sides apart in exchange of softer

limitations in foreign trade, discussion of the South China Sea problems or even of Taiwan.

According to Russian specialists, the great powers' foreign policy priorities create an active and competitive milieu at the global and regional levels of the international political system in which the regional level plays an increasingly greater role in defining the nature of interaction and the dividing lines between the spheres of predominant interests. In view of the great variety of regional processes the great powers will, probably in the near future, revise their priorities. Otherwise, they would not be able to efficiently guarantee international security to confirm, in this way, their status in the world community. At the same time, while assessing the evolution of the Russian discourse of the last few years it is highly important to point out that its general tonality is growing increasingly alarming. It pays more attention to the Cold War problem range combined with more detailed criticism of possible global effects of tough confrontation between the U.S. and Russia and in the U.S.—China format [65; 51; 48; 19; 21; 26; 28; 30].

Main Centers of International Influence: Military Aspects of Politics

Tension in the relationships between Russia and the West forced the Russian experts in the military-political aspects of the Russian-American cooperation to pay even more attention to these subjects. While three or four years ago our scholars “tried to point at the potential threats to the system of nuclear arms control and, therefore, to the security of the leading nuclear states” [33]. The threats were mainly described as hypothetical conditions of “political haggling” used by the American side when talking to its Russian partners. Our experts, in particular, discussed the reliance on a preventive nuclear strike at the RF formulated by American experts and politicians.

While a nuclear preemptive strike at the RF delivered by another great power belongs to the sphere of hypothetic military strategies, America's claim to dominance in outer space with special emphasis on military force [25] is absolutely real. Moscow, which Washington consistently accuses of the desire to “dominate in outer space” occupies an absolutely different position: “The Russian Federation is the only country which confirmed in its Military Doctrine its reliance on the regime of security in outer space activities under the UN aegis” [61].

The U.S. decision to denounce the IRNFT (2019), dragging out the decision to extend the New START (Russia and the United States extended the treaty for five years early in February 2021) made the prospect of new formats of nuclear containment adopted by the nuclear powers in an absence of arms control quite real. Russian specialists were concerned that the great powers have reached the threshold of a large-scale nuclear arms race, exacerbated competition in the sphere of offensive and defensive strategic systems as well as space weapons and instruments of cyberwar.

By the end of the second decade of the 21st century, Russia and the West have found themselves amid an unprecedentedly fierce (unknown even during the Cold War) competition which means that the danger of the use of nuclear arms

became even higher. The so far not obvious sides might be drawn into the nuclear arms race. This means that “the future of control of nuclear arms and its non-proliferation in the polycentric world depend to the greatest extent on the positions of the political and military leaders of Russia and the United States including the possibility of involvement of third nuclear states in the process of disarmament... Everything is determined by the state leaders in Moscow and Washington, two persons from the point of view of constitutional powers. Even if they consult with some subordinates, no one has the right to challenge their decisions, and such a decision will probably have to be made in a matter of minutes” [2, pp. 32-33]. Other Russian authors share this opinion [33; 42].

According to Russian analysts, the military aspects of competition between the main centers of international influence are diversified. Very much as in the bipolar period they concentrate on the problems of nuclear arms including improvement of strategic and tactical means of delivery, take into account the challenges of using the latest technical achievements for offensives. Russian experts pay a lot of attention to overcoming the differences between Russian and American assessments of repercussions of the new nuclear arms race between the biggest owners of WMD. According to their approaches, the international security interests are determined in the most radical way by the agreed positions of two great powers, their rejection of the policy of escalation from the positions of military power in its most destructive formats.

Today the prospects of this type look more positive than at the end of Trump’s Republican Administration. The sides, however, should work persistently to coordinate formulations of several sections of START-3 as quite indispensable for confirmation of the future treaty [3].

The Dialectics of Building Up a New World Order

Competition among the great powers unfolding in different spheres, formats and geographical dimensions made the fundamental question about the state of international relations, of post-bipolar transformations—either completed or dynamically developing—highly adequate [62; 53; 54; 6; 7; 22].

There is a more or less widely shared opinion in the Russian expert community that we are watching how the liberal world order is falling apart, how the unipolar hegemony is moving toward “normalization of international relations” [18, p. 5].

Russian scholars who look at the changes as an alternative to a qualitative leap in the course of post-bipolar transformations demonstrate a balanced understanding of the emerging world order. Several prominent experts are highly vocal about their disagreement with the thesis about the crisis of the contemporary world order since the challenges identical to the recent ones cropped up in the past not necessarily as sources of dangerous tensions. Even if it is expected that “jostling for a place in the hierarchy [of a polycentric world] would increase... The realistic perspective is not a radical transformation of the system but the strengthening of the mechanisms that ensure its functioning, albeit with some

adjustments” [6, pp. 45-46]. To forecast future developments, we should bear in mind three basic features of the world order in the process of transformation: its sustainability, efficiency and maturity. These qualities depend on the skills of the main participants to minimize the problems that defy settlement, avoid panicking and concentrate on seeking the ways of positive cooperation to preserve international stability [7, pp. 7-8].

Many Russian authors have studied the fundamental trends of the emergence of a new world order. They concentrated in their works on assessments of the urgent and mid-term changes in the world [49; 40; 17; 31; 21] built on a combinations of paradigms of realism and liberalism. In this way, they outlined the spheres of interests which determined the competition between the great powers and the sphere of reasonable compromises without which international tension could not be reduced. These approaches add to the world agenda the need in universal assessments of the state of the world system and formulation of pragmatic measures indispensable for the current great powers interaction. Here we should quote Foreign Minister of Russia Sergey Lavrov who said at the XXVIII Assembly of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy in December 2020: “If we take Western development models, we have no place to fit in. We need to build something ourselves” [57].

Conclusion

The discourse in the Russian research community is a faithful reflection of the mounting conflict potential of the contemporary international milieu. It responds to the challenges of reformatting post-bipolar world politics caused by fiercer competition among the great powers. The majority of scholarly writings do not offer apocalyptic forecasts. On the whole, the authors point out that there are no irreversible contradictions between the strategic interests of the world community leaders. In other words, the desire to cooperate on the international arena rather than dedication to traditional realism is the common denominator of the feelings of Russian experts, including those involved at the preliminary stages of decision-making.

Russian political scientists confirm that the Russian side wants to arrive at mutually acceptable solutions in its relationships with its opponents. These solutions should fit the clearly outlined boundaries of Russia’s national interests which cannot and will not be pushed aside at the negotiation table and which fully correspond to the essence of state sovereignty.

The following scientific institutes and their publications—Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute for International Studies, MGIMO University of the Foreign Ministry of Russia—have a special role to play in this context. They are oriented on establishing systemic interconnections of world development while taking the elements of competition and cooperation of the great powers into account.

The majority of academic publications offer correct assessments of contradictions between the great powers. The authors carefully avoid extreme and alarmist assessments of the relationships between Russia and the United States and the overall state of the international milieu. The Russian discourse, however, is not unified: members of the liberal and conservative camps of the academic elite exchange critical remarks; the ideas about duration of political challenges and risks are vague while the nomenclature of positive and negative phenomena in world politics is defined with different degrees of toughness.

According to Russian researchers, the competition between the great powers is a regulator, detonator and *perpetuum mobile* of world development. In fact, today scholars and politicians are concerned, to a greater extent than before, about the obvious exacerbation of competition compared with the early years of the post-bipolar period. On the other hand, mutual desire to cooperate prevails over the challenges of confrontation. Russian researchers are convinced that the competition between the great powers is not a preliminary stage of a global military conflict.

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Notes

- ¹ “International Processes,” “Russia in Global Affairs,” “World Economy and International Relations,” “The U.S. & Canada: Economics—Politics—Culture” and many others.
- ² According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, in 2021 military spending of the U.S. reached the figure of \$778 trillion (against \$61.3 billion in the RF). Only the New START has survived out of 13 international treaties on nuclear arms control; the number of violations of IRNFT by the American side has reached 117, violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 19 episodes; In full accordance with American legislation in 2018 the president of the United States has acquired 14 legal reasons to use nuclear weapons in third countries.
- ³ Banned in Russia as a terrorist organization.

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Afghanistan and the New International Configuration in Asia

Dina MALYSHEVA

Abstract. This article analyzes the dynamics of international political changes in Central and South Asia in light of the consequences of the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and the Taliban's¹ second rise to power (the first one was in 1996). I show that the peaceful transformation of Afghanistan is impeded by such persistent threats as religious extremism, terrorism, and drug trafficking. The complex mosaic of regional relations, in which Afghanistan is becoming an important element due to the changes that have happened in that country, is determined in Asia by the growing rivalry and competition among major economies in the region, as well as among global players, and by the efforts of all of them to build various international coalitions. Of particular interest in this regard are the positions of neighboring states—the three Central Asian nations (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan), as well as China, Pakistan, India and Iran. Apart from that, this study also outlines the most important challenges for the national security interests of Afghanistan's Asian neighbors. This study offers a deeper insight into how the changed realities in Afghanistan dictate new approaches to security issues and identifies new features of the international political configuration taking shape in modern Asia.

Keywords: international relations, Afghanistan, Taliban, South and Central Asia, religious extremism, terrorism, regional security.

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Post-Occupation Afghanistan

The representatives of the Taliban Political Office who had been conducting negotiations with the USA since 2018 signed a peace agreement in Doha (Qatar) on March 2, 2020. Under the agreement the USA committed to withdraw its troops from the country and the Taliban to prevent attacks on the US and allied troops, to take measures against the use of the soil of Afghanistan by any group or individuals, including Al-Qaeda,² against the security of the United States and its allies; the Taliban also pledged not to cooperate “with groups or individuals threatening the security of the United States and its allies,” to support “the intra-Afghan dialogue” in the framework of national peace talks [2]. The events that followed, however, took a somewhat different turn.

Continuing to attack government units and security forces the Taliban, with unpublicized support of Pakistan’s *Inter-Services Intelligence* (ISI)³ started advancing rapidly, capturing major cities and border crossings. The establishment of control over the whole territory of Afghanistan, which paved the way to power for the Taliban, took place against the background of the withdrawal of foreign troops (the last units of the American military contingent left the Kabul airport on August 31, 2021). Kabul fell on August 15, 2021, practically without a shot being fired, President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai fled the country and the pro-Western government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan ceased to exist. The victors formed an interim government, mainly consisting of Pushtuns and supportive of the political, ideological and religious principles of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) which had existed on most of the country’s territory in 1996-2001. It is telling that the head of the new government was Mohammad Hasan Akhund, who was the foreign minister in the previous Taliban government and who was under UN sanctions since 2001.

Thus at the tail end of the year 2021, the foreign occupation of Afghanistan which lasted since December 2001 came to an end. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), created under the UN Security Council resolution of December 20, 2001 to ensure “security in Kabul and its surrounding areas” [14], thus failed to perform its mission. Nor did NATO, the military-political bloc uniting the USA, Canada and many European countries (most of which are also members of the European Union) which had received a mandate from the UN SC to command all the foreign troops on Afghan territory since August 11, 2003. Thus, the responsibility for the ignominious outcome of the Afghan campaign rests squarely with US-led NATO.

The withdrawal of foreign troops brought about an instant collapse of the Western project of democratic transformation of Afghanistan which had been pursued over all the 20 years of occupation. Nor had any other declared goals of the international (de facto US—NATO) coalition been achieved.

Thus, Al-Qaeda and many other terrorist groups whose liquidation was the main goal of the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan still exist, albeit in a much battered shape. Although the Taliban, like in its first time in power, denies the presence of foreign fighters in the country, their ranks are constantly swelling due to the

members of extremist and terrorist groups moving (or, some say, being moved [16]) to Afghanistan from “hotspots” in the Middle East. Among them are ethnic Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kazakhs, Uyghurs and people from the Russian North Caucasus. In general, the presence in Afghanistan of such an “army” of ideologically indoctrinated, well-armed and well-trained fighters fits into plans to create problems for Russia and China by destabilizing their borderland areas, plans repeatedly declared by American politicians. The Taliban is tolerant of the majority of Islamic terrorist groups and some of them (for example, Jamaat Ansorullo, declared a terrorist group in Tajikistan, Russia and some other countries) it even supports. The majority of the groups, often banned as terrorist, for example, the Islamic Movement of East Turkestan, the Islamic State, Daesh-Khorasan, etc., are thought to be outside the control of the central power (if such power exists, considering how fragmented Afghanistan is on ethnic, clan and other criteria). Small wonder that the level of violence in Afghanistan remains high. Nor should we dismiss the remarks made by the Afghan ambassador to India, Farid Mamundzay, in December of 2021 about the growing threat of Afghanistan becoming a terrorist hub, a safe haven for all the global terrorist organizations existing in the region and the world [7].

Another serious threat to international security that persists in Afghanistan is the drugs business. In many parts of the country it is woven into the national economy and, with the economy in ruins, profits from the trafficking of drugs (mainly to Pakistan and Iran and from there all over the world, including Russia) are practically the only source of livelihood for ordinary citizens and for replenishing the state treasury. Experts note that dependence on the drug business potentially deprives the Taliban of a chance to develop the legal economy and forces it to expand drug production because a ban on the growing of poppy crops, as the Taliban attempted to do during its first spell in power, would hurt that part of society from which the Taliban draws its main support, i.e., the rural population [8].

Is there any hope that after the withdrawal of foreign troops Afghanistan will become peaceful and secure and the second edition of the Taliban will be more moderate than Taliban-1? It is too early to make any forecasts on that score, but it is already clear that the imminent economic collapse is an obstacle to stabilization.

According to the data of the International Organization for Migration (UN IOM) cited by the Afghan news agency Khaama Press, over half a million people in Afghanistan have been internally displaced as a result of conflicts and insecurity in 2021 [5]. Afghanistan’s population is on the brink of a humanitarian catastrophe, says a report by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan Deborah Lyons (appointed to this post in March 2020).⁴ The report speaks of a 40 % drop of GDP, shrinking revenue and non-payment of salaries to civil servants. Hospitals are running out of medicines and patients are denied services. Up to 23 million Afghans will face distress because of food insecurity. The situation is compounded by dire forecasts of a drought, the second in four years [4].

International aid, on which the Afghan government has been almost totally dependent, has now been wound down. With the Taliban’s coming to power the

financial and economic sanctions imposed earlier on the more extremist branches of the movement (for example, the Haqqani Network) have been spread to the whole of the Taliban, which paralyzed the banking system. Furthermore, the US has frozen \$9.5 billion worth of the Afghan Central Bank assets at American banks and financial institutions [19]. Further international sanctions against the interim government of Afghanistan cannot be ruled out (most likely over violations of human rights, especially the rights of women), which would further aggravate the country's economic problems.

To attract investments the Taliban needs official recognition, so the Afghan leaders seek to foster relations with the main global and regional "power centers" and big and influential Asian countries. In meetings with officials from Russia, China, Pakistan, Uzbekistan and other interested countries, the Taliban representatives try to allay their fears concerning the security vacuum caused by the withdrawal of foreign troops. But the feeling of unease in the neighboring countries persists, as the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said in one of his speeches: "NATO's hasty departure has further tightened the tangle of Afghan contradictions. They left many weapons and military equipment in the country. It is important to prevent their use for destructive purposes. The Taliban said they would fight drug trafficking and terrorism, would not project instability onto neighboring states, and would work to create an inclusive government. We hope these promises are kept" [12].

There is no getting away from the fact that owing to the recent changes there, Afghanistan is emerging as an important element in the intricate mosaic of regional relations. In Asia, they are determined above all by the growing rivalry and competition among big economic powers in the region as well as global players and their efforts to form various international coalitions and formats (the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; RIC—Russia, India and China; the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—QSD; C5+1; Organization of Turkic States and other). Afghanistan's closest neighbors, the republics of post-Soviet Central Asia (CA) are also looking to find a place in this puzzle.

The Position of Afghanistan's Central Asian Neighbors

The idea of a future geopolitical and geoeconomic space linked with Afghanistan has considerable support in CA. Some initiatives toward that end have already been launched. The energy project CASA-1000 (Central Asia-South Asia) would connect the energy systems of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan with that of Afghanistan. A power transmission line would be built from Surkhan (Uzbekistan) to Puli Khumri (Afghanistan). The Hairatan-Mazar-i-Sharif railroad built with active participation of Uzbekistan is to be extended from Tashkent to Kabul and Peshawar. The Lapis Lazuli corridor is an international project to create trade and transport routes leading to Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. Finally, there is the TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) project, which so far remains on paper.

The main incentive for the Central Asian countries to get involved in these projects is the hope to gain access to Pakistani and Indian oceanic ports via Afghanistan. The external factor is also important: Pakistan, which has close historical links with the Taliban, is interested in attracting Central Asian resources, mainly power and energy sources. The US is lobbying a potential rapprochement between Central Asia and Afghanistan which is not surprising: for several decades since the break-up of the Soviet Union the US has been seeking to draw the Central Asian republics away from Russia and the CIS into what has until recently been dubbed "Greater Central Asia" [22] and, through the efforts of the US State Department, has now been transformed into the C5+1 format. The implementation of this project, aimed at close integration of five former Soviet Central Asian republics with Afghanistan, opens up new opportunities for the USA: it can strengthen its positions in the post-Soviet Central Asian space to challenge China and Russia there and more effectively control the regional processes in Asia.

It has to be noted, that until recently neither China nor Russia have been particularly forthcoming in financing the functioning or proposed projects in Afghanistan involving Central Asian countries. China sees the new routes that would be built from CA to Afghanistan as competition for its own economic programs (Belt and Road Initiative, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)) which it intends to promote vigorously. Russia, while showing some interest in cooperation with Afghanistan in the sphere of energy and water resources, is in no hurry to join the Central Asian initiatives and on the whole assumes a wait-and-see position, which is understandable considering that the new political system in Afghanistan is evolving and the outcome of this process is uncertain.

It is obvious, too, that if the Afghanistan projects with the participation of Central Asian countries are to succeed there needs to be a safe environment, which has yet to be achieved. Afghanistan's economy, devastated by wars lasting many years, is in a sorry state. The threat of a new spiral of civil strife has not gone away and religious radicals and drug traffickers are still much in evidence. All this makes the prospect of peace in the country rather uncertain.

Take the following worrying aspect. Although the Taliban leaders have repeatedly reassured their Central Asian neighbors that no threat to their security would come from Afghanistan's territory the Taliban has close links with a number of international terrorist organizations. They are not only located along the borders with Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, but effectively control the border territories. These forces, whether or not controlled by the interim government of Afghanistan, may undermine peace in CA. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Daesh-Khorasan (banned in the RF) and other groups connected with international terrorism, which have found shelter in Afghanistan, have not given up the plans to expand Sunni Islam to neighboring countries. The people from the Central Asian countries who are members of these groups, which are outlawed in all the CA countries, are hungry for revenge and seek to overthrow the secular governments of the CA republics and replace them with political systems based on radical Islam. Another danger is posed by the "sleeping" Islamist cells in CA countries connected (according to some reports [6]) with Afghanistan-based militants.

So, stability in Central Asia depends to a large extent on the balance of forces inside Afghanistan, on how relations will shape up between the Pushtuns and non-Pushtuns (Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and others) and on what stance the Central Asian republics will take with regard to the fraternal ethnic groups within Afghanistan. In other words, if things in Afghanistan turn for the worse, which is highly likely, the waves of instability may reach the Central Asian region, especially its three countries bordering on Afghanistan.

Meanwhile the attitudes of the three countries to the situation in Afghanistan vary.

Tajikistan's policy is determined by the fact that it is a front line state in the confrontation with instability in Afghanistan. Its 1,344-km border with Afghanistan (the longest among all states) runs mainly (1,135 km) along the River Panj. By the time the Taliban came to power its fighters controlled about 910 km of the border, according to the Tajik representative to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) [1]. Therefore countering the threats emanating from Afghanistan (drug trafficking, penetration of extremists and goods and arms smuggling) is still a relevant task for Tajikistan.

Tajikistan is also concerned about the sending by Afghanistan's interim government of special units to the provinces of Badakhshan and Takhar, which border on north-eastern Tajikistan. The Afghan news agency reports that the members of that battalion "conduct suicide attacks targeting the security forces of the previous Afghan government" [10]. The Taliban, experts believe, pursues a very concrete aim: to prevent the creation of a corridor between Tajikistan and the Afghan province of Panjshir [18]. This mainly Tajik-populated province was not under its control until September 6, 2021, when the Taliban forces seized Bazarak, the province's administrative center. Even so, in spite of the upbeat reports [23], the Taliban has not yet suppressed all the pockets of resistance in Panjshir [13].

The President of the National Academy of Sciences of Tajikistan *Farkhod Rakhimi* rightly points out that Tajikistan's guarded position in being more afraid of "surprises" from Afghanistan than the other states in the region has something to do with historical memory, viz., Afghanistan's active involvement in the 1990s civil war in Tajikistan. "We do not want our country, he stresses, to face destabilization again" [9].

Tajikistan is also concerned that Afghanistan's interim government is practically mono-ethnic while the Tajiks, the second-biggest ethnic group of Afghanistan (30% of the country's population, according to some sources) are not represented at all. President Emomali Rakhmon of Tajikistan in his speech to the UN General Assembly drew attention to the fact that the Taliban had failed to comply with its "earlier promises to form an inclusive government with broad participation of Afghan political and ethnic forces" [20].

Tajikistan's security greatly depends both on Russia and on China, which in fact controls the republic's economy and has quietly created a military facility in Badakhshan in order to secure the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region against the infiltration of extremist and terrorist militants. Russia for its part conducts joint military exercises with Tajikistan, which is a CSTO member, supplies it with

arms and military hardware and strengthens its military base thus helping Tajikistan to gear up to repel potential threats from Afghanistan.

Uzbekistan is quite happy to have Afghanistan as its neighbor. Its confidence in its security springs from its 68,000-strong army, which experts consider to be the most combat-capable in Central Asia. Uzbekistan is nothing loath to receive military aid from various countries, such as Russia, the USA and Turkey. But in accordance with the Concept of Foreign Policy Activity and the Defense Doctrine of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the country has a non-bloc status.

Uzbekistan hailed the creation of the new government in Afghanistan as early as September 8, 2021, which seemed to suggest that Uzbekistan saw no threat emanating from Afghanistan and was prepared, under certain conditions, to recognize the Taliban-led Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. There are several reasons for Uzbekistan's position.

First, that CA republic sees Afghanistan, with its favorable geographical location, as the most suitable territory for implementing economic projects that are important for Uzbekistan. In this, it hopes to enlist the support, as in the recent past, of the Uzbek diaspora, which is very influential in modern Afghanistan.⁵

Second, the numerous initiatives the republic's president Shavkat Mirziyoyev proposed toward Afghan settlement—in the framework of regular consultations of CA heads of state, regional economic forums, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the UN—enable Tashkent to position itself as a mouthpiece of “collective Central Asia.”

Third, Uzbekistan hopes that its active policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan will earn it a more prominent position in international affairs. One proof of this is the July 16, 2021 agreement, in principle, between Uzbekistan, the USA, Afghanistan and Pakistan to create a four-sided diplomatic platform to strengthen “regional connectivity.” The parties will seek peace and stability in Afghanistan by expanding trade relations, and establishing transit links and business-to-business ties [3].

The position vis-à-vis Afghanistan of the third border state, **Turkmenistan**, is difficult to judge about because very little information is coming out of that country. But it would be safe to say that Turkmenistan, which has a long (about 800 km) and poorly protected border with Afghanistan and a weak army, may become an easy target of attacks or blackmail by Afghan militant groups. Taliban militants and their allies have for several years now been concentrating in Faryab Province bordering on Turkmenistan, which complicates the security situation there many times over. In July 2021, Turkmenistan's Defense Ministry sent additional arms to the border with Afghanistan and announced mobilization of persons eligible for military service in the republic's capital. Turkmenistan is more vulnerable to external threats than Tajikistan, whose security is guaranteed by membership of the CSTO and all-round support of various CIS security structures, and Uzbekistan, which has military cooperation with the RF in spite of not being a CSTO member. Citing its neutral status, it does not get military aid as part of military cooperation arrangements from any of its neighbors in the region, including Russia.

On the whole, whatever the exigencies of the current situation the Central Asian countries may face, meeting the increased regional challenges in the light of

the complicated situation in Afghanistan assumes paramount importance. These sentiments are shared by the key states in the region, which are making a tangible contribution to building a new international political configuration in Asia.

Afghanistan and Its Big Asian Neighbors

China, which has emerged as one of Afghanistan's major trading partners, in the wake of the withdrawal of foreign troops from that country has adopted a strategy that pursues two main goals.

First, it has managed to prevent the redeployment of US troops and aviation from Afghanistan to the territories of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The US administration justified the plans to set up new military facilities through which the Pentagon could "remotely" control Afghanistan by the need to prevent that country turning into "a terrorist base" [17]. The US also urged the Central Asian states to take in 9,000 Afghans who had cooperated in Afghanistan with the American military administration [11]. These proposals were not implemented, largely through the coordinated efforts of China and Russia, which shared the fears of CA countries of being involved in a potential confrontation between the USA and the Taliban and becoming targets for its attacks. And of course neither China nor Russia want to see the USA establish itself as a recognized player in Central Asia and control the regional processes there. The other goal of China's Afghanistan strategy is to build a relationship with the Taliban over the Uyghur factor. Organizations supporting the spread of separatist sentiments among part of the Uyghurs in China are known to have found shelter in Afghanistan. One of these organizations, the Turkistan Islamic Movement (TIM, formerly ETIM), was based in the Afghan province of Badakhshan on the border with Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and has been declared to be a terrorist organization by China as well as by the UN. Seeking to minimize the problems stemming from the TIM, China managed to extract concessions from the Taliban so that in October 2021 it was announced that the TIM had pulled back its forces from the border with China [21]. Creation of a secure buffer zone along the Afghanistan—China border may have been one of the main conditions Beijing set to the Taliban. If it continues to cooperate with the PRC on the Uyghur problem this may pave the way for deeper economic interaction with China, which is very important for the foreign-investment-starved new Taliban government.

Commenting on the interaction with Afghanistan over the TIM factor, the Chinese newspaper *Global Times*—the mouthpiece of the CPC—stresses:

China does not want Afghanistan to fall into turmoil again due to domestic political struggle that always leads to humanitarian crises, nor does China want Afghanistan to become a shelter for Eastern Turkistan forces such as the ETIM. China does not want Afghanistan to become a source of regional unrest due to the excessive intervention of some external forces, affecting the security of CPEC. Therefore, on the issue of Afghanistan, China and Pakistan should coordinate with Russia, Iran and Central Asian countries. These countries together should warn Europe of a possible refugee crisis, and put pressure on the

US, India and some European countries to take responsible actions to provide humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan [24].

Thus, the circle of China's partners looks as follows: India has been excluded from it, but instead Pakistan which has close links with the Taliban, has been singled out as a strategic partner. This is in striking contrast with the Russian approach: Moscow feels that India has a major role to play in resolving the Afghanistan-related regional problems.

India, which has decades-old unsettled issues with China and Pakistan, is seriously concerned about the Taliban's advent to power because of the Taliban's possible links with groups acting in Kashmir and supported, as India is convinced, by Pakistan. It will be recalled that the Taliban, too, was initially created by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence with an eye to Kashmir where the Taliban's victory may give a new lease of life to the local extremist groups. Therefore, India's main task is to prevent Pakistan from strengthening its position in Afghanistan, to prevent Afghanistan from supporting Muslim radicals in Kashmir. The threat of events taking such a turn is real: in early September 2021, some Taliban representatives voiced solidarity with Kashmir separatists.

As for **Pakistan**, its position on the issue of countering India's influence in Afghanistan and Asia as a whole is similar to that of China. Nor can we overlook the fact that America's withdrawal from Afghanistan creates a very comfortable situation there for Pakistan considering its historically close links with the Taliban. However, some problems have traditionally complicated the political relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. First, there is the issue of the state border because the Taliban, like its predecessors, does not recognize the "Durand Line"⁶ as the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Adding to tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan are the border mountain areas, the so-called Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which were made part of the Pakistan province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018. The Haqqani Network, the most extreme part of the Taliban, has strong positions there.

Iran's position is based on its experience in the 1990s—tense relations with the Taliban and comparatively close interaction with the Northern Alliance (also known as the United Islamic National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan) founded in 1996 by Ahmad Shah Massoud to fight the Taliban. At present Tehran shares the fears of some of Afghanistan's other neighbors (for example, Tajikistan) that the Taliban would not form an "inclusive government" but would delegate into it only Pushtuns, debarring from government Hazara Shiites of Afghanistan who are related to the Persians religiously, linguistically and ethnically.

Iran has misgivings about the possible change of the regional balance due to the emerging military-political axis Afghanistan-Pakistan (and China by implication). Iran also fears the infiltration of its territory from Afghanistan by Taliban-backed Sunni militants and increase of drug trafficking. That Iran's relations with the new Afghan authorities will not be easy is evidenced by events in December 2021 when Iranian border guards repelled a Taliban attack.

All the above shows that the changed situation in Afghanistan has complicated regional challenges, causing neighboring Asian states to concentrate on the military-political aspect of security. Seeking to prevent events in Afghanistan

from developing along a negative scenario, they have increased their diplomatic contacts with the new Afghan leadership.

The most favorable scenario for Afghanistan's Asian neighbors and for Russia would be the achievement of a stable consensus in the country. One factor that would have positive consequences for stabilization in Afghanistan and in the region would be Afghanistan's accession to the SCO, an influential international organization which already has among its members Russia, Central Asian states and many major Asian economic powers. Such development would create favorable conditions for successful economic and political interaction among states in Central and South Asia.

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Notes

- ¹ Here and elsewhere, the Taliban is cited as an organization that was declared terrorist by decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of February 14, 2003 and is under UN sanctions for its terrorist activities.
- ² Here and elsewhere, a terrorist organization banned in the RF.
- ³ The structure consists mainly of service personnel drawn from three armed services of Pakistan’s Armed Forces: Army, Air Force and Navy.
- ⁴ The UN Security Council extended the Mission’s mandate until March 17, 2022, by its decision of September 17, 2021 (see [15]).
- ⁵ Uzbeks, who together with closely related Turkmen, form the third largest group of Sunni Muslims in the country, accounting for about 10% of its population.
- ⁶ This is a common name for the border demarcated between Afghanistan and the then-British India under an 1893 agreement between the Anglo-Indian diplomat Mortimer Durand and the Emir of Afghanistan Abdu Rahman Khan.

Translated by Yevgeny Filippov

Transcendentalism as a Program for Epistemology*

Igor NEVVAZHAY

Abstract. The author discusses the tension between realism and constructivism in the theory of knowledge and relevant avenues of research in the philosophy of science. In this paper, he argues that the development of transcendentalism can help reduce these tensions. He believes that one way to develop Kant's transcendentalism is offered by the semiotic interpretation proposed by K.-O. Apel. The author suggests a new interpretation of transcendentalism according to which the transcendental exists as a protonorm, which is a spontaneous act that assigns the "given" object either the status of a sign related to a certain meaning, or the status of a meaning referring to a certain expression (sign). The author develops G. Frege's concept of sense and argues that there exist two kinds of sense (sense-1 and sense-2), which correspond to the two fundamental characteristics of consciousness: intentionality and responsiveness. Thus, the transcendental act generates either intentional or responsive senses of reality. The proposed symbolic interpretation of transcendentalism allows us to explain the emergence of realism and constructivism as semiotic types of cultures and to overcome the tension between them. The proposed version of symbolic transcendentalism makes it possible to explain the nature of absolute existences in both classical and non-classical physical theories. Examples of such existences are absolute space and absolute time in Newtonian mechanics and absolute standards in H. Weyl's theory of gauge fields. These transcendental existences cannot be interpreted as real physical objects, and at the same time, they are necessary for the interpretation of physical experiments. The author concludes that transcendentalism is a promising program for the development of philosophy of science as an area for research in normativity, sign-symbolic structures of cognitive processes, and forms of knowledge.

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Realism, Constructivism, Transcendentalism

The controversy over realism and constructivism in the theory of knowledge continues to engage the minds of philosophers: the argument between these two positions is pursued in numerous articles and monographs. One evidence of this is an international interdisciplinary electronic publication *Constructivist Foundations* (since 2005, [12]), which reflects the views of constructivists. The realists try to stand their ground, coming up with ever new arguments to bolster their position [16; 17]. The controversy situation does not imply a victory of the “right” position over the “wrong” one. The argument may continue endlessly just like the infinite argument between materialists and idealists, nominalists and realists, etc. After all, philosophy deals with eternal questions. But we should not ignore the other path of philosophical development when controversy is resolved through the birth of a new concept which cannot be reduced to any of the initial alternatives. This article proposes a version of synthesis, which explains the controversy over constructivism and realism and thus offers a way out of the impasse of head-on confrontation.

I have earlier attempted a semiotic analysis of the problem of the “given” as a central problem in the argument between realism and constructivism. As Richard Rorty rightly pointed out, realism interprets “givenness” as “finding” and constructivism as “making” [28]. My analysis led to the surprising conclusion that realism and constructivism are mutually complementary [22]. I have shown that in the context of the argument between realism and constructivism, there is no primordially “given” in itself. The given is contextual. But why can the “given” be interpreted in the way formulated by Rorty?

In my analysis, I proceeded from Ernst Cassirer, who demonstrated that the logic of cognition involves two key actions, which mediate man’s attitude to the cognized world, viz., symbolizing the observed and attaching meaning to the symbol. These two acts, according to Cassirer, are analogues of the action of anatomical structures, which have a system of receptors and a system of effectors [4]. Thus, the given always exists relative to the subject and is either a meaning to be expressed (by finding its sign, or name) or a symbol which needs to be interpreted (by finding its meaning). There is no other “given.” The given exists only in connection with the act of consciousness as an act of distinguishing. And that is either an act of expression or an act of interpretation. When we focus attention only on one of these acts, we end up in the position of realism or the position of constructivism. Thus, if we assume that a given meaning defines the sign, we take the position of realism, and if the sign we use determines meaning, thereby we take the position of constructivism.

For a realist, any object is a content that needs to be identified and expressed. But in that case we must be sure that the expression, name, or text we have found is not subjective, i.e., that it somehow corresponds to the content and is determined by it. For example, when we name a visible object as “a table” we must be sure that we have given it a name corresponding to its content. But what sustains our confidence? I do not think it is some kind of intuitive obviousness. We determine the concept of “table” by explaining the content of this notion (i.e., interpreting the name) and then compare the set of features of the table (fixed in the definition of the concept) with the visual object “table” and confirm or discard our hypothesis that we have found the “correct” name. Thus, whether or not the expression we have found correctly expresses the given content depends on correct interpretation of the name (more broadly, the text). Thus, the given as “finding” is justified by the given as “making.”

And vice versa: the given as made is justified by the given as found. Indeed, if the subject in intentional acts interprets the sign, how do we know that this interpretation is correct (i.e., not purely arbitrary)? The question must be answered. If a sign designates something then it cannot designate just anything. The answer to this question should be looked for either in the domain of signs or in the domain of meanings. The interpretation is correct either if it corresponds to the rules of handling signs (the formal criterion in the domain of syntax) or the meaning corresponds to some objective content that exists independently of any interpretation. That constitutes a content-related criterion of correctness and it is apparently justified by the realistic criterion of “givenness.”

Thus, neither of the concepts we are considering—realism or constructivism—is self-sufficient and contains criteria for assessing its adequacy, its correctness. This leads to the conclusion that these are complementary concepts: neither of them is fully legitimate (or grounded). Each requires an addition from the opposite concept, and each is the foundation that justifies the conceptual claims of the other.

In light of the above, constructivism and realism are not two theories of cognition, but two strategies, or paradigms of cognition. Theories can be true or false, but strategies can be effective or otherwise. These strategies determine what we call “given” or “the vision” of the world. Constructivism and realism are two opposite strategies, which proceed from different presumptions that determine man’s attitude to the sources of knowledge and cognition. In using the term “presumption,” I mean that it only works until circumstances that refute it are found. Presumption is not the truth in its classical meaning, but an assumption that determines the strategy of our acts in cognizing reality.

If realism and constructivism were mutually exclusive alternatives the question of their synthesis would be meaningless. However, the provision that they are mutually complementary enables us to understand the link between them, the link having to do not with realism or constructivism, but with the philosophical position that would enable us to explain under what conditions the realistic and constructive positions both become possible and justified. This hypothesis was put forward by the Russian philosopher Aleksandr Ogurtsov. In his study of the

research programs in the 20th-century philosophy of science, he arrived at the following conclusion concerning the naturalism-constructivism controversy:

Only the revival of transcendentalism offers a way out for modern philosophy if it is to overcome the said controversy. Transcendentalism shifts the problem of the naturalism versus socio-cultural constructivism alternative to a different plane, the plane of analysis and discussion of other issues and problems, viz., the conditions that make our knowledge, our actions, our norms and rules possible [25, p. 377].

I believe that this hypothesis holds out a promise and I will try to show how it can be implemented. I submit the following thesis: transcendental conditions that make these alternatives possible are connected with some fundamental semiotic structures of thought and are rooted in the structure of language. To justify this thesis we have first to examine Kant's characteristics of the transcendental.

Kant's Idea of the Transcendental Self and Its Semiotic Interpretation

Kant's idea of the transcendental Self emerges in the context of the problem of synthetic a priori judgments. Kant defines the transcendental in human reason as the absolute condition of knowledge. Kant explains the existence of the transcendental Self through the requirement of continuous and objective experience. The continuity of experience as the subject-object relationship presupposes the continuity of object, subject and their relationship. The objective basis of the identity of the Self and continuity of the object is provided by the laws of nature. According to Kant, the main condition of the continuity of experience is the continuity of existence of the Self conscious of its existence as being identical to itself.

Kant's concept of the transcendental Self is inherently contradictory. Kant took the view that the transcendental Self as noumenal existence cannot be defined as an existing object with regard to which an experience is possible. Thus noumena were purely intelligible objects. But in that case, Kant notes,

the concept of a *noumenon* is problematic, i.e., the representation of a thing of which we can say neither that it is possible nor that it is impossible, since we are acquainted with no sort of intuition other than our own sensible one and no other sort of concepts than the categories, neither of which, however, is suited to an extrasensible object [15, p. 380].

Thus, Kant concludes that the transcendental Self cannot be defined either as a phenomenon or as a noumenon.

Further, according to Kant, the transcendental is characterized by spontaneity. The activity of the understanding is largely confined to applying a priori concepts to the objects of experience. The understanding is exercised by making judgments about objects, i.e., by forming propositions. The existence of a priori concepts is made possible by the existence of transcendental ideas. The nucleus of transcendental ideas is the transcendental Self expressed in acts and in the "I think" concept. Kant wrote:

[A]ll manifold of intuition has a necessary relation to the **I think** in the same subject in which this manifold is to be encountered. But this representation is an act of **spontaneity**, i.e., it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility [15, p. 246].

Spontaneity of the acts of consciousness, of self-consciousness, according to Kant, is the basis and the condition of the existence of a priori representations. Thus, the transcendental subject is characterized by spontaneity. At the same time, this explains why the transcendental Self cannot be an object of cognitive actions and is in that sense unknowable. According to Kant, “I am” and “I think” is a special existence, as is clear from the following:

[S]uppose there... turned out... the occasion for presupposing ourselves to be legislative fully *a priori* in regard to our own existence, and as self-determining in this existence; then this would disclose a spontaneity through which our actuality is determinable without the need of conditions of empirical intuition [15, p. 457].

That is, spontaneity is a special mode of human existence and it is the source of legislation in the sphere of reason.

Kant's teaching on the transcendental subject contains the notion that spontaneous existence is freedom, it is unconditional. Everything based on freedom, according to Kant, is the sphere of the practical. In Kant's frame of reference, any act performed or deliberately not performed by an individual is practical. The notion of act covers not only material actions, but also feelings, will and thought. Transcendental existence is essentially practical, i.e., is a free act.

So, with Kant the concept of transcendental Self is polysemantic. According to Kant, the transcendental Self cannot be seen as an immutable self-identical “force” within us; it is neither noumenal, nor phenomenal, it is non-objective, spontaneous and free. This kind of polysemy spawns varying interpretations of nature and the essence of the transcendental [1; 13; 14; 31]. This article does not purport to review and assess various interpretations of the transcendental in Kant's philosophy. But I would like to draw attention to some steps of philosophical thought which have paved the way for semiotic interpretation of the transcendental, which I consider the most promising.

One of the first to take a step in this direction was the American philosopher Charles Peirce. Karl-Otto Apel was the first to recognize his pioneering role in semiotic transformation of transcendental logic. Transformation began with the interpretation of consciousness, thought as semiotic reality. According to Peirce, consciousness does not exist separately and independently from language:

[C]onsciousness is a very vague term... consciousness is sometimes used to signify the *I think*, or unity in thought; but the unity is nothing but consistency, or the recognition of it. Consistency belongs to every sign, so far it is a sign... there is no element whatever of man's consciousness which has not something corresponding to it in the word... the word or sign which man uses *is* the man himself ... the organism is only an instrument of thought... the identity of a man consists in the *consistency* of what he does and thinks [26, pp. 156-157].

From this, Apel notes, Pierce concludes that the Kantian transcendental unity of apperception can be understood as a semiotic unity of consistent interpretation [2, p. 84]. This is a fundamental departure from the classical concept of consciousness going back to ancient philosophy. That is why the transcendental subject can be seen as a sum of speech acts.

Another step in the same direction was taken by the Neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer. In his *An Essay on Man*, describing man as symbolic animal, Cassirer proceeded from the work of the late 19th-century biologist Jakob Johann von Uexküll [34]. Uexküll considered the dogmatic notion of the existence of an absolute physical reality that is the same for all living beings to be a fallacy. Reality is not one and not homogeneous, on the contrary, it is extremely diverse: it has as many different schemes and patterns as there are various organisms. Cassirer uses Uexküll's approach to describe and characterize the human world. However, the human world has some features that distinguish it from biological life. Man has created a new way of adaptation to the environment. Between the systems of receptors and effectors he has a third link which can be described as a symbolic system.

As compared with the other animals man lives not merely in a broader reality; he lives... in a new dimension of reality... Instead of dealing with the things themselves man is in a sense constantly conversing with himself. He has so enveloped himself in linguistic forms, in artistic images, in mythical symbols or religious rites that he cannot see or know anything except by the interposition of this artificial medium. His situation is the same in the theoretical as in the practical sphere [4, pp. 24-25].

Cassirer identified reason with language while believing that along with conceptual language there exists the emotional language and along with logical and scientific language there exists the language of poetic imagination. Therefore, as Cassirer emphasized, *reason* is an inadequate term for designation of the forms of human cultural life in all its richness and diversity. All these forms are symbolic. Thus, Cassirer defines man not as thinking but as symbolic animal.

Cassirer began his revision of classical ideas of cognition with the critique of the sensualist theory of reflection and the theory of concept-formation. Cassirer argued that cognition is not passive perception of impressions by the subject, but a processing of impressions through abstraction. Cassirer juxtaposes to the key concept of the theory of reflection ("impression," *Eindruck*) the concept of "expression" (*Ausdruck*) to stress creatively active formation of the picture of the world by human consciousness. According to Cassirer, the main concepts of any science and its cognitive means are not passive reflections of being, but have the character of created intellectual symbols. Thus Cassirer believed that the task of cognition is the study of intellectual symbols through which various disciplines observe and describe being.

This signifies a change of the notion of cognizing subject, which instead of Kantian "pure consciousness in general" becomes first a language structure and then a concrete historical agent. Finally, he accepts various forms of intersubjectivity, such as Jürgen Habermas' life-world or Apel's communication community.

This is a crucial moment in the history of transcendentalism: with the discovery of “communicative reason,” transcendental philosophy of subjectivity is replaced by transcendental philosophy of intersubjectivity. On this point I share Maya Soboleva’s opinion that this paradigm of transcendentalism is best represented by Apel’s concept of transcendental pragmatics [30].

Apel sought to overcome Kant’s characteristic “methodological solipsism”: to make the concept of reason more concrete in the context of the concept of language, he put forward an ideal “unlimited community of communication” as a transcendental subject. The ideal communication community observes all the norms of discourse ethics making it possible to adequately understand the sense of any argument and estimate its correctness. It is a level of control that is necessary if people are to comply with any rules at all. The ideal community is found in every real communication community as a transcendental structure seen as its “real possibility” [2, pp. 77-92]. This structure performs two functions: first, it is the constitutive function insofar as it is seen as an a priori condition of the possibility of any real communication community; and second, it has a regulative function insofar as it is seen also as a goal of real communication community. It thus legitimizes cognition and justifies its intersubjective significance.

By replacing “pure consciousness” with a real subject who uses signs, Apel makes it clear that the possibility of cognition is essentially the possibility of intersubjective understanding in an ideal communication community. This important result of modern transcendental philosophy is borne out by the analysis of the structure of scientific knowledge, which discovers in this structure purely symbolic entities recognized by the scientific community solely on the pragmatic grounds that they give an insight into the processes and regularities of the real world.

Symbolism of the Transcendental as the Ultimate Epistemological Ground

We have seen that the transcendental Self, on the one hand, has a semiotic structure and, on the other hand, is the ultimate condition of any cognition and knowledge. As noted above, Kant’s concept of the transcendental Self is ambiguous and has different and sometimes incompatible characteristics. According to Kant, the transcendental Self is not substantial or objective, is neither noumenal nor phenomenal, it is spontaneous, unconditional and practical. It is not easy to find a philosophical position that combines all these characteristics in a meaningful way. However, the history of philosophy offers some “tips” which in my view permit to formulate a position, which explains all the aforementioned characteristics; but this involves revising the classical concept of the Self as a self-identical ultimate ground of cognition and knowledge.

The search of a new non-classical metaphysics is one of the major challenges facing modern philosophy [3; 33; 11; 20]. This revolutionary process was initiated by Kant whose transcendental philosophy project proposed changing the method of thinking in metaphysics proceeding from the need to move from the study of objects irrespective of the conditions of their cognition to the study of an a priori

method of cognition and revealing the transcendental conditions that make cognition of objects possible. Modern philosophy takes a further step in understanding the transcendental Self by renouncing the notion of a self-identical substantial Self [8].

Critique of what is known as the philosophy of identity and renunciation of the classical interpretation of identity and difference led the French philosophers Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze [6; 5] to the ideas of non-classical “philosophy of difference.” Non-classical philosophy has a totally different idea of the first principle. The ontological first principle is *différance*, which Derrida interprets as distinguishing difference [7]. It does not belong to any of the distinguished instances, i.e., it is neither matter, nor consciousness, nor essence, nor a phenomenon, nor something that exists, nor something that does not exist. It cannot be fixed as “this thing.” Non-classical difference is something that arises and disappears in a spontaneous way, something that is “it” and is not “it,” and is “non-it.” Whereas the classical difference is opposed to identity, non-classical difference is seen as the difference between identity and non-identity.

The new first principle is “inherently belated” because we will never be able to capture this *very first principle* by our consciousness, we will always be late and will encounter only the results of the working of this principle. Our consciousness is born from this principle, which is unconditional with respect to our later reflection.

Derrida sought to clarify this enigmatic instance of *différance* by bringing in the analogy with the way language functions. *Différance* functions like language described by structural linguistics in which the sign and the meaning (referent) do not exist separately from each other [7]. *Différance* generates the difference between the signifier and the signified. If the transcendental Self plays the role of the ultimate foundation of knowledge in epistemology, we can think it, following Derrida, to be semiotic differentiation (*différance*).

Speaking about consciousness as an act of differentiating, we need to clarify the nature of this act. What act gives birth to the difference between the signifier and signified? In this connection, I would like to draw attention to Niklas Luhmann’s suggestion that the concept of “form” introduced by the mathematician George Spencer-Brown can be interpreted as a sign [19, p. 77]. The signifier is on one side of “form” and the signified is on the other side. The sign is the boundary distinguishing the signifier and the signified. The sign basically performs two key functions: it points to something and replaces it. It seems to me that Spencer-Brown’s intuition is ingenious, according to which space acquires certainty, becomes marked, structured when a boundary is drawn within it [32]. The certainty of being (being comprehended as “what”) arises thanks to the act of drawing a boundary that generates a difference between the “internal” and the “external,” the signifier and the signified. This can be illustrated by the paintings of the Belgian artist René Magritte under the umbrella title “La condition humaine,” where a shift of the boundary changes the vision of the world (see, for example, <https://fabrilia.ru/person/magritt/chelovecheskoe-uslovie-1>). Let us recall just one of them. In the forefront, we see a room overlooking the sea. Then we notice the easel with

a canvas attached to it, showing the sea. Initially the sea in the painting seems to be part of the real sea as seen from the window, i.e., pertaining to the signified. But noticing the conditions under which we see this part we come to the conclusion that what we see on the canvas is not the real sea, but its depiction. Thus the signified becomes the signifier. The change of our vision of the world is conditioned by drawing a new boundary within the world as a result of which the world changes.

In connection with the above, I would hazard this hypothesis: the transcendental Self is an act of consciousness which confers on what is perceived the status either of a sign referring to some meaning, or the status of meaning which calls for some expression (sign). The fact of the presence of consciousness in the world is revealed through man finding signs, symbols and meanings in the world. If nothing in the world becomes a sign or a meaning, then there is no consciousness in the world.

As stated above, “the given” is only in conjunction with the acts of consciousness as acts of distinguishing. And that is an act either of expression or of interpretation. We arrive at the position of realism if we absolutize the meaning of the act of expression, and at the position of constructivism if we absolutize the meaning of the act of interpretation.

The relations between sign and meaning may vary. These relations can be the basis of a typology of cultures. Such a typology has been proposed by the Russian semioticians Yury Lotman and Boris Uspensky. It is based on the distinction between two types of connection between the sign and the meaning [18]. In the first type, meaning determines the sign and in the second type—the sign determines the meaning. It can be said that the types of cultures Lotman and Uspensky referred to correspond to the two epistemological attitudes: realism and constructivism. I would suggest the names for these two types of culture. In *the culture of expression* meaning or a given content determines the sign, which corresponds to the position of realism; by contrast, in *the culture of interpretation* the sign determines the meaning, the content, which corresponds to the position of constructivism. The above noted link between sign and meaning is marked by what philosophers call “intent,” directedness “toward” something. Edmund Husserl, following Franz Brentano, established in philosophy the notion of intentionality as a fundamental characteristic of consciousness. But we have the right to ask a fundamental philosophical question: what determines these intentions which lead either to realism or to constructivism, what is it that makes the subject look for the meaning of a sign or a sign for a meaning? It is a question about the nature of intention, and why it exists and how it is realized. The question about the nature is the question about what generates intentionality, which part of consciousness is responsible for it. To answer these questions let us turn to the concept of sense, which is key to semiotics.

Gottlob Frege defines sense as the concrete way of presentation of that which is designated [10]. With Frege, sense relates to the name, the sign. He draws attention to the fact that in the mathematical sentence $a = b$ the signs “a” and “b” are not just synonyms designating the same thing. They have different senses and convey different information and knowledge of the thing. Thus, the expression

“water is H_2O ” does not merely replace one sign with another, but conveys an important discovery which carries new knowledge about a chemical substance. This is connected with the new sense the sign has as a way of presentation of a designated something. It should be recalled that one of the reasons why Frege introduced the concept of sense was to justify the existence of empty concepts in logic. But empty concepts have no referents, though according to Frege, they have sense. I think, however, that this proposition is at odds with the definition of sense. I think Frege’s definition of sense contradicts the fact that empty concepts exist. But if sense, according to Frege, is a mode by which a designated thing is given, one cannot attach a sense to a sign that does not express this or that designated. Yet Frege writes: “In grasping a sense, one is not certainly assured of a referent” [10, p. 211]. How, then, can we talk about sense as a mode of presentation of that which is designated if the latter is absent? What does sense present? I think the way out of this situation is to assume different definitions of sense. I propose to qualify Frege’s definition of sense as sense-1. It is justified in the framework of epistemological realism, which recognizes the primacy of the reference. This is clear from the fact that the formula $a = b$ presupposes the same reference. If the signs “a” and “b” corresponded to two empty concepts or even if one of them were empty the equation $a = b$ would be impossible, mathematically meaningless. Empty concepts call for a different definition of sense, which may be called sense-2.

Let us take advantage of the fact that Frege sometimes speaks about sense as a thought contained in a sentence [10, p. 230]. This is of course too broad to be an adequate definition of sense. In light of the aforementioned typology of cultures we can broaden the definition of sense in the following way: sense is what connects the signifier (sign) and the signified (designated thing). Let us call it sense-0. Perhaps Frege had this sense in mind when he likened sense to thought. Thanks to this connection, we think ourselves and understand the thoughts of others. But the concept “connection” is dual in that it refers to two relationships. Indeed, if sense-0 is the link between sign and referent, then the relation of the signified to the signifier is fixed in sense-1 as a mode of presentation (expression) the designated through a name or sign (Frege’s definition of sense). But the other relation—the relation of the signifier to the signified—has to be fixed in sense-2 as a method of interpretation, which posits the signified, i.e., by attaching reference to the sign. This is a different understanding of sense, which I call sense-2. Giving a sign to a reference (presenting, or rather expressing referent) and attaching reference to a sign are two different procedures, which realize two different meanings of sense. Indeed, here we have two relationships and two types of connection: the relationship of reference to sign and the relationship of sign to reference. In semiotics, these are relations of replacement and indication. In epistemology, this corresponds to acts of expression and interpretation. The aforementioned duality of the meaning of sense is reflected in the interpretation of “property” in the logic of concepts. The content of a concept is traditionally defined as the set of essential characteristics thought to be present in a concept. But this may mean that we think reality through signs. Therefore, we ascribe to the manifold of things a general

property. But a property can also be thought as a general characteristic of the set of things which form the scope of a concept. We find this situation in the argument about universals between nominalists and realists.

But what is the significance of introducing the concept of sense-2 and a different concept of sense-1 for understanding scientific knowledge? The relation between sign and designated things is mediated by sense. When both sign and reference are present, we deal with concepts that are not empty. Synonymy and homonymy phenomena are possible. The former takes place when reference can be expressed by different signs and consequently by different senses-1. The latter takes place when one sign can point to different referents and the latter therefore have different senses-2. But the most interesting situations are those when there is a sign but no reference, in which case we speak of empty concepts, or when there is a referent, but no sign, in which case we can speak about concepts without a logical content. However, just like empty concepts have sense-2, so concepts without content have sense-1. But these senses do not link sign and reference, such that in these situations they are intentions. Sense-1 is intended meaning (reference) and sense-2 an intended sign. We frequently face such situations in daily practice. For instance, when seeing a not-very-familiar object we ask ourselves what it is, i.e., how to call it. By naming it, we realize the intent of expressing it, i.e., the intent to recognize the object. But consciousness also performs another function when, realizing the interpretative intention, it either looks for an object corresponding to the existing sign or creates such an object.

The above is relevant to scientific cognition. In science, there are not only empty concepts, but also concepts without content. The history of science offers numerous examples of temporarily empty concepts, which may acquire their references over time. For example, the concept of an atom, which appeared in ancient times, but its references began to gradually form only starting from the 18th century. In contrast, the concept of phlogiston has remained empty. The concept of perpetual motion in thermodynamics is also empty but, unlike phlogiston, it performs an important function in helping to determine thermodynamic principles.

From the viewpoint of the concept of realism, empty concepts should be eliminated from the system of world knowledge. Their value for realism is at best instrumental. For constructivism, however, empty concepts are valid means of constructing reality. Mathematics offers a vivid example. From the point of view of realism, contentless concepts have sense and are often found in scientific cognition. Lack of content means absence of essential properties in objects thought within the scope of a given concept. We may not yet be aware of the properties the corresponding objects possess because so far we have only found the names, or signs, which merely point to the existence of their objective content. Thus, the subject has no forms of presentation of the designated objects or hypothetical content. For example, Democritus maintained that atoms exist but the properties through which they may be given us and the "projections" in which they can be seen are unknown to us. These should be the properties that make it possible to distinguish atoms from non-atoms. These properties began to be revealed gradual-

ly beginning from the 18th century. Another example. The notion of force had existed for a long time but for a long time the properties of any forces were unclear. Over time, a mathematical description of force established that force was a vector defined by direction and magnitude. It was not until Descartes, who introduced the concept of a system of coordinates, that language was developed to describe or express force as a objective meaning of six projections of the force vector on a coordinate axis: the beginning of the vector (x_1, y_1, z_1) and its end (x_2, y_2, z_2). We have to recall Descartes' predecessor, Galileo Galilei, who accomplished a breakthrough in forming the mathematical language of physics by putting forward the "book of nature" metaphor written in the language of mathematics in which numbers and figures serve as letters. By this metaphor Galilei paved the way for investing previously intuitive but contentless concepts of motion, velocity, acceleration, mass and force with properties and corresponding signs that made it possible to express the physical content of these concepts.

The senses referred to above are active, through them intentional and responsive acts are performed [36]. For example, if we hear some sounds, which do not make any sense to us (blowing wind or inarticulate speech) they do not carry any concrete meaning to us waiting to be expressed. On the contrary, if the sounds appear to make sense (articulate speech), i.e., they seem to convey sense-2, we look for a way to express this meaning through some kind of signs. But sense-1 may precede concrete meaning. The latter is created in the process of interpreting signs, which carry sense-1. This happens when in the process of communication one subject (A) speaks and the other subject (B) tries to understand the first subject's speech. Subject B assumes that the text (system of signs) of subject A has some concrete meaning (speaks about something) which subject B reconstructs for himself interpreting in his own way the signs he receives from subject A. When the concrete meaning of the text assumed by subject A coincides with the reference of the text reconstructed by subject B we say that the original text is understood. In the process of communication both semantic procedures—expression and interpretation—are involved and both intentions (sense-1 and sense-2) are at work. In any of these situations, the beginning is a *transcendental act spontaneously generating either intentional or responsive senses* of the reality given us.

The transcendental act explains why man nearly always seeks to "duplicate" the world. Thus, an artist who sees a glass on the table may instantly draw it in his album. Why does he do it? Apparently, the artist is conscious of reality in this way. Usually, people resort to words to duplicate the world, just like the artist uses the language of drawing. A dancer may perform certain steps to indicate some kind of reality. In any case, some kind of language is used. The transcendental works like Noam Chomsky's universal grammar. An infant at the early stage of its life does not distinguish the inner states of its organism from the external circumstances. The ability to distinguish attests to the presence of consciousness, which arises through the learning of language, which duplicates the world.

Thus, sense-1 directs the sign toward reference and sense-2 directs reference toward the sign. The former is called intentionality and the latter responsiveness. But the act of attaching sense to something (in general) is a transcendental act be-

cause it creates conditions that make cognition possible. The process of cognition itself is the process of looking for a sign or a reference corresponding to some sense. And it is always a process that generates knowledge.

Sense is the intermediary in the relation between sign and reference. But, as has been mentioned, senses may be of various kinds. However, there is some established sense which, through convention (or unconsciously) is considered to be normative, or correct. Semiotic theories, usually citing Ferdinand de Saussure, stress the conditional link between the sign and the reference. Norm as a certain sense of the sign makes this link standard, proper and unconditional. Merab Mamardashvili once noted that consciousness is the place that connects what is not connected naturally [21]. The link between the signified and the signifier does not exist in the objective world and is not determined by objective laws of nature. Establishment of an artificial link between the signified and the signifier is the creation of the norm. The link between the signified and the signifier is determined by norms and not by natural laws. The idea of the normative link between signifier and signified forms the basis of the semiotic concept of norms I proposed in 2014 [23; 24]. The proposed definition of norm is based on semiotics and consists in the broadening of the linguistic interpretation of normativity to include all kinds of normativity. Elsewhere I will proceed from norm as a specially fixed sense.

The normativity of sense makes it possible to describe the positions of realism and constructivism as types of cultures. As has been stated above, the culture of expression is dominated by the realistic view of the world and of cognition. In it norms are determined by the objective contents or references that determine sign expressions. It is important to bear in mind that language, like concepts, does not reflect objective reality, as radical realists believe, but merely expresses it through various forms of human activity. Constructivism dominates the type of culture that can be termed the culture of interpretation. Here norms are formed in the process of interpreting the given signs. As a result, objects are created as designated by signs. These references do not necessarily coincide with real objects of which we only know what language tells us. However, in addition to the classification of norms based on the works of Lotman and Uspensky, an extended version may be offered. I propose a third type of connection (and accordingly, a type of norms) in which sign and reference are *mutually conditioned*. The sign points to the reference which coincides with the sign, or reference is expressed by a sign which coincides with the reference itself. This situation corresponds to what in logic is called an empty concept, and also to what I term as a contentless concept. If a sign has no reference in case of an empty concept, the sign itself can be its reference. Also, if a reference does not have a sign in case of a contentless concept it itself can be its sign: referent is its own sign. Exotic as these norms may seem, they nevertheless exist in scientific knowledge and perform important functions. I believe that this third type of norms corresponds to transcendental entities. The essence of transcendental is that one cannot distinguish the sign and the reference that generates habitual norms with clearly differentiated sign and reference. So, I propose to consider transcendental norms as protonorms.

The Transcendental in the Structure of Scientific Theories

The transcendental is the condition of possible experience generated by consciousness when it invents entities, which, while not being objects, make objectification possible. The transcendental act establishes boundary within the world which generates the distinction between the signifier and the signified. As a result, given reality turns either into a sign or a reference. Some objects of theoretical knowledge function in this symbolic meaning. What is remarkable is that these objects cannot be explained either from the position of realism or from the position of constructivism.

To illustrate the above, let us consider specific examples from the history of the physical science. Let us start with the concept of absolute space in the mechanics of Galileo and Newton.

In classical mechanics, the concept of inertial motion as “true” motion is highly important. The inertia of a body is manifested in the constancy of the speed of its motion relative to another reference system or body. Motion has two planes: the plane of content (i.e., inertia) and the plane of expression (motion with a constant speed). Here the sign and the meaning mutually condition each other. This means that the sign (the plane of expression, i.e., constant speed of motion) determines the meaning (i.e., the plane of content or inertial motion not exposed to external forces) and the meaning (i.e., the plane of content) conditions the sign (the plane of expression). Absolute space is a form of expression (constant speed of motion) that determines content, i.e., inertial motion. In other words, absolute space is a reference system such that if a body moves relative to it at constant speed, this motion is inertial, i.e., existing without external forces. This is not true for any local inertial frame, but it is true for a selected frame, which is represented by absolute space, which turns out to be just a human invention, a symbolic structure that makes it possible to explain the existence of inertial motion and justify the second law of mechanics.

Absolute space is a sign whose meaning is the set of inertial local reference systems. Absolute space is at the same time exactly space, i.e., it is the meaning of itself as a sign. Absolute space is transcendental existence, which is a semiotic structure that determines the method of cognizing the nature of inertial motion. Absolute space is felt by man as existing objectively outside of human consciousness. Such is the dual nature of the transcendental.

Another relevant illustration. Some modern theories of elementary particles rely on the idea of gauge fields which makes it possible to describe physical forces geometrically [9]. Historically, this approach was pioneered by Albert Einstein in his general theory of relativity. The concept of gauge invariance proposed by Hermann Weyl is premised on the recognition of the existence of absolute measurement standards in the gauge space. (For the sake of historical fairness, the idea of global gauge invariance of the world was put forward by Gottfried Leibniz in his hypothesis that if God changed the size of all things in the world by two times, we would not notice the change). Let us consider a simple example, which demonstrates the essence of the interpretation of gauge invariance. Imagine a spaceship

traveling in space away from gravitational masses. The astronaut is in a state of weightlessness. In one gauge transformation of the flight trajectory, the spaceship starts moving in a circle. For physical phenomena to happen in a uniform way, there must be, in the first and in the second case, a gravitational field that compensates for the effects due to the curved trajectory of the spaceship's movement [35]. This example is called upon to show that the laws of physics can be invariant relative to local gauge transformations if there is a physical field for compensating for changes from point to point. Such a theory of local gauge transformations enables any physical forces and fields to be described geometrically.

Weyl's absolute standards of space are strange objects. They cannot be defined as physical objects, since there are no physical experiments in which such objects are treated as existing. If absolute standards were real physical objects, they would change their scale when translated to Weyl space. This would contradict the status of absolute standards, as measurement instruments do not depend on the properties of space. But we cannot speak about the existence of gauge transformation of real physical values without assuming an ontological status of a multitude of identical absolute standards. Thus we can say that absolute standards are metaphysical objects. Their existence and functions depend on the recognition of the existence of gauge invariance of physical laws. Thus, Weyl's absolute standards are impossible objects in the physical world.

The change of the value of a physical property in Weyl space is the content of the physical process. It is expressed by the number of absolute standards corresponding to the changed value. Here meaning (content) determines the sign. On the other hand, the corresponding number of absolute measures determines the content plane, i.e., the change of the value moved in Weyl gauge space. This holds only for the norms that have symbolic nature. The special character of absolute standards is that their value, unlike that of real physical objects, does not change when they move in Weyl space and does not lend itself to measurement.

So, what is the status of the absolute existences considered above? They cannot be explained in terms of realism or constructivism. Thus, constructivism argues that existences invented by human reason cannot be expected to exist in reality or to express something objectively existing. But the transcendental entity simultaneously exists and does not exist. That is, it is impossible to consider this entity only as an abstract, and not as a real object. But the gauge invariance effect, for example, requires that the absolute standard be present in the physical world. But realism is also vulnerable when it insists that the absolute standard should exist in reality. If one assumes this, the absolute standard would defy objective physical laws. In other words, from neither position—realism or constructivism—can a transcendental entity simultaneously exist and not exist.

To sum up our results, it is fair to assume that any physical theory must contain ideas of transcendental existences without which human reason is unable to understand nature, physical experience and justify physical principles and laws. As has been shown, the transcendental is a semiotic structure in which the sign turns out to be a sign of itself, i.e., it is simultaneously sign and meaning. Concrete

knowledge of the world is formed in the process of distinguishing the sign from the meaning.

In conclusion, it is necessary to define the content of the scientific program of transcendentalism in epistemology, as distinct from realism and constructivism. Transcendental conditions of the possibility of cognizing the world are built into reason in the shape of concealed protoforms. The object of the study of transcendentalism in the philosophy of science is the emergence of “third world” normative phenomena [27; 37], the genesis of semiotic structures, which form the social “substance” of knowledge. In Russian philosophy, this area of research was represented by Mikhail Rozov’s theory of social relays [29]. Thus, something has already been done toward defining the transcendental program in the philosophy of science.

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Normativity in the Philosophy of Mind

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Abstract. This paper deals with the problem of normativity in the philosophy of mind. It points out that the normativity of conscious experience has long been ignored in the discipline. This is largely due to the fact that philosophers have paid attention primarily to the metaphysical aspects of mind. The work also notes that the turn to the epistemology of mind makes it important to study the normativity of mental states. Such research can help us not only to clarify a number of epistemological questions, but also to solve some metaphysical questions. For example, an inquiry into the problem of normativity can be helpful in grounding externalism in the philosophy of mind. The author considers the problem of normativity in the philosophy of mind through the prism rule-following problem formulated by Wittgenstein. He demonstrates that any internalist understanding of the content of mental states either ignores the normative aspect of conscious experience or is confronted by Wittgenstein's skeptical paradox. The only way to avoid these difficulties is to adopt the externalist view of the content of mental states advocated by John McDowell. According to this position, the content of mental states is understood as an objective state of affairs that can function as a rational grounding of the subject's conscious activity.

Keywords: philosophy of mind, normativity, rule-following, content of mental states, externalism.

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More often than not, the topic of normativity in philosophy comes into focus when we turn to such disciplines as ethics and the philosophy of action, logic and epistemology. Unlike metaphysics and ontology, these disciplines are concerned not with providing descriptions of what exists and how, but with working out prescriptions which tell us what to do: what behavior is moral, proper or generally

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rationally correct; what is the right mode of reasoning and what cognitive process really yields new knowledge. And, of course, these disciplines seek to clarify what constitutes normativity in the relevant area.

The topic of normativity rarely crops up in the philosophy of mind. This is largely due to the fact that this discipline is seen primarily as metaphysics of mind, as a domain that seeks to explain what is mind and what is its causal relationship with the world, above all the body. However, in the process epistemological issues connected with cognitive relations are often neglected. These are issues of the nature of perception and perceptive knowledge. The problems of normativity in philosophy arise precisely in connection with the need to answer these questions. Importantly, turning to these problems enables us not only to answer epistemological questions, but to solve a number of metaphysical problems. For example, as this article purports to show, it is the normative character of intentional states that justifies externalism regarding mental content thus overcoming Cartesian attitudes which mandate that we see the mental as something internal that is separate from the world.

Many credit René Descartes with laying the foundations of the modern understanding of mind. Breaking with the Aristotelian notion of the psyche as the animating principle Descartes opens up the phenomenal dimension of our mental experience with which he identifies consciousness. Descartes arrives at this conclusion through the methodology of doubt. He thus describes the aim of this procedure: “Anything which admits of the slightest doubt I will set aside just as if I had found it to be wholly false; and I will proceed in this way until I recognize for certain that there is no certainty” [1, p. 16].

In following this procedure, we may doubt the existence of the external world, our body as part of the external world, and the mental processes belonging to the body. But we cannot doubt that it seems to us that everything we call into question exists. Thus, Descartes writes:

[I]t is also the same ‘I’ who has sensory perceptions, or is aware of bodily things, as it were, through senses. For example, I am now seeing light, hearing a noise, feeling heat. But I am asleep, so all this is false. Yet I certainly *seem* (my italics—*D. I.*) to see, to hear, and to be warmed. This cannot be false; what is called ‘having a sensory perception’ is strictly just this, and in this restricted sense of the term it is simply thinking [1, p. 19].

Descartes uses what is here translated as thinking in the broad sense as a synonym of “consciousness” (*conscientia*). In other words, he identifies consciousness with the sphere of appearance, phenomena, phenomenal givens. The fact that its existence can be thought independently from the existence of the external world, Descartes believes, paves the way for various dualistic theories.

Can consciousness in its phenomenal aspects be imagined irrespective of the state of affairs in the external world? Descartes does not rule out that the sensation of the fire in front of which he sits in his dressing gown and of the warmth emanating from it are false sensations, an illusion, a dream (“How often, asleep at night, am I convinced of just such familiar events—that I am here in my dressing gown, sitting by the fire—when in fact I am lying undressed in bed!” [1, p. 13]) which

could be there even if the world did not exist at all. But how could Descartes or any other hypothetical subject wedded to the position of radical skepticism know that he is perceiving a fireplace, a dressing gown, etc.?

This is not a question about whether the subject knows something about the existence of the external world or whether the perception of the fireplace corresponds to the fireplace itself. We allow, like the radical skeptic, that the world may be non-existent. The question has to do with something different. Assuming that the world does not exist and that the subject is dealing exclusively with phenomenal givens in his mind, how does he know that the phenomenal given he identifies at this concrete moment as “the fireplace” really corresponds to this concept? Answering the question we can point to the practice the subject follows: each time he registers a phenomenal given with corresponding characteristics he designates it by a corresponding term (fixes it with a certain concept). However, because the subject is confined to the sphere of his consciousness this practice of isolating a certain phenomenal given in a certain way depends exclusively on the arbitrary will of the subject. One may argue that the subject proceeds from the memory of previous occasions of identifying this given, but since memory may fail, in each specific case the subject has to determine anew what he is dealing with. The only criterion he can rely on at each concrete moment is that it simply *seems* to him that he is right in identifying this or that thing.

Obviously, we cannot characterize this method of identifying givens as being governed by some kind of norms that distinguish the right and wrong modes of action. Right and wrong become something that depends on the fleeting mental state of the subject who may feel a certain mode of action to be right at one moment and wrong at another moment, while being convinced that he has always chosen the course of action he feels to be right at every given moment. Consequently, we cannot say that the subject has some kind of knowledge because normativity is a necessary characteristic of any cognitive activity.

II

It will be noticed that the above argument reproduces Wittgenstein’s critique of the idea of private language.

But could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experience—his feeling, moods, and the rest—for his private use?—Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary language? But that is not what I mean. The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language [9, pp. 88e-89e].

The ideas of such a language are Cartesian. According to Descartes, we are separated from the world by the veil of our consciousness. We deal first and foremost with the phenomenal givens of consciousness and not with the world which might not even exist at all if we conceive of consciousness as something like an

illusion, a dream, i.e., something that does not depend on any objective state of affairs. Yet even such consciousness has a language. In this language the meanings of language expressions are various sensations and images, i.e., givens of consciousness.

Because the subject of such consciousness cannot directly interact with something external to his consciousness (for example, with other people, physical objects and so on) to him the learning of the language is a process of associating certain language expressions with corresponding sensations and images ("I simply associate names with sensations and use these names in descriptions"). It is precisely this understanding of language and consciousness that Wittgenstein criticizes:

Let us imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign 'S' and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation.—I will remark first of all that a definition of the sign cannot be formulated.—But still I can give myself a kind of ostensive definition.—How? Can I point to the sensation? Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak, or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation—and so, as it were, point to it inwardly.—But what is this ceremony for? For that is all it seems to be! A definition surely serves to establish the meaning of a sign.—Well, that is done precisely by the concentrating of my attention; for in this way I impress on myself the connexion between the sign and the sensation.—But 'I impress it on myself' can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connexion right in the future. But in the present case I have no criterion of *correctness*. *One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right.* And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right' [9, pp. 91e, 92e].

Some scholars single out the paragraphs of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* in which he discussed the idea of individual language as a separate section (§§ 243-275). However, Saul Kripke remarks that these paragraphs continue the theme Wittgenstein had begun to discuss in the preceding paragraphs (§§ 138-242). In this part of his work the philosopher turns to the problem of rule following in the context of the problem of the meaning of language expressions. Wittgenstein argues that understanding the meaning of a language expression is essentially understanding of the rules of its use. Obviously, when we discuss the rules of a certain behavior we explicitly touch upon the problem of normativity. As Tim Thornton notes, "a *rule* is explicitly normative: it *prescribes* the moves that accord with it and those that do not" [8, p. 28]. In other words, awareness of the rule makes it incumbent upon the subject to act in a certain way, in the case of language we can say that understanding the meaning of a language expression forces us to use this expression in accordance with the corresponding pragmatics. McDowell formulates this in the following way: "We find it natural to think of meaning and understanding in, as it were, contractual terms" [6, p. 221]. The contractualist position registers the fact that normative connection is established between understanding of the rule and subsequent action or behavior pattern. If a person wants to master a certain practice, for example, to learn a language, understanding of the rules of the relevant type of activity presupposes that the subject assumes an obligation to act in a certain way.

It is important to note that what has been said about the meaning of language expressions can be applied to the content of mental states in general. The meanings of language expressions are normative. In this, they are similar to the rules of social practices the knowledge of which causes the subject to act in a certain way. The content of mental, or rather, intentional states is also similar to rules. Thornton writes:

[I]ntentional mental states are similar in that they too prescribe those acts, or events, that are in accord with or satisfy them. So having a mental state, like an expectation, imposes a standard by which the world can be judged. In the case of an expectation, subsequent events will either satisfy or frustrate it, what that depends on is determined by the expectation itself [8, p. 28].

Thornton points to the normative character of intentional states commenting on Wittgenstein's remarks on that score, for example, the following passage from the *Philosophical Investigations*:

A wish seems already to know what will or would satisfy it; a proposition, a thought, what makes it true—even when that thing is not there at all! Whence this determining of what is not yet there? This despotic demand? ('The hardness of the logical must.') [9, p. 129e].

Summing up, it can be said that normativity of intentional states manifests itself in that the content of given states determines the conditions under which this state can exist obliging the subject to act in accordance with the given conditions or in order to bring about these conditions.

III

If we take into account the normativity of consciousness and language we have to give up Cartesian notions on consciousness as the sphere of private phenomenal givens. The meanings of language expressions and the content of mental states are connected with rule-governed activity of which Wittgenstein wrote the following: "Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it" [9, p. 81e]. In other words, noting the connection of meanings and content with rule-governed activity, we recognize that consciousness inevitably presupposes the existence of something that is external to it. The external imposes limitations on any conscious activity. It is only by scaling this activity against something external that we can even begin to speak about whether it is right or wrong.

Although Wittgenstein's argument strikes at the very core of the Cartesian idea of consciousness Cartesianism in some moderate form apparently has a chance to stand its ground. For example, while admitting that consciousness and the external world are necessarily connected we can still adhere to the view that the content of our mental states is something internal to us, that it is "in our head." The content is often thought to be something opposed to inchoate "raw" reality

from which it is isolated through various procedures, for example, abstraction or interpretation. Say, capturing the meaning of a language expression or understanding the rules of some (linguistic) practice in general may be seen as the result of interpreting events unfolding in front of us.

Does such moderate Cartesianism allow of taking into account normative aspects of mental states? The answer seems to be no. The thing is that in learning a certain type of activity, we deal with a finite number of examples. This means that previous experience does not tell us unequivocally how we should proceed in each concrete situation. Confronted with a new situation we should therefore follow the general rule that regulates this kind of activity. As moderate Cartesians we believe that capturing, or understanding the rule is the result of our interpretation of previous activity, i.e., of the finite number of examples of this activity with which we are familiar. But a finite number of examples of a certain activity can be interpreted variously to tailor them to suit different rules. In effect, we face a paradox: any type of activity can be made out to accord with or contradict any rule.

Wittgenstein formulated this paradox in the following way:

This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here [9, p. 81e].

As Kripke points out, Wittgenstein proposed a new version of skepticism which is similar to Hume's and which puts into question the link between past and present [3]. Applying a certain rule to a new situation the subject may believe that it accords with past experience. However, Kripke argues, there are no facts that the subject could adduce as grounds independent from his opinion to prove that his current rule-governed activity is the same as his previous activity. From the skeptic's point of view, the subject can only claim that it seems to him that he is acting in accordance with his previous experience.

To put it another way, if the examples of a certain type of activity familiar to me from the past can generate two interpretations as to which rules regulate this type of activity, then, in performing the same act in the future, I will invoke some rules and ignore others. If my conscious rule-governed activity depends solely on my ability to interpret my previous experience of interacting with the world the skeptic will always tell me that I do not know if my present actions correspond to past experience, for example, if I use a certain language expression correctly. As Kripke writes, "the sceptic claims (or feigns to claim) that I am now misinterpreting my own previous usage." If this is really the case and if, "under the influence of some insane frenzy, or a bout of LSD, I have come to misinterpret my own previous usage" [3, p. 9], there is no way I can ascertain whether I am acting in accordance with past experience or it only seems to me. Inasmuch as the only criterion I can cite to prove that I correctly understand the rules of a certain activity is that it seems to me to be the case the understanding of conscious activity offered by moderate Cartesianism still does not affect the normative aspect.

Seeking to obviate this kind of skepticism, we can claim that although this variant of skepticism is possible in daily life we have access to the right understanding of how to act. McDowell refers to this variant as rampant Platonism. On this view we always have access to the right interpretation of how to interact with the world. But such an answer does not refute the skepticism we are discussing here. It essentially asserts that the right course of action is that which seems to me to be right.

Another response to this skepticism would see us agree with the skeptic: although it seems to us that we are acting as before, we still do not know whether we act right in a certain situation and whether our acts accord with past experience. While conceding that we may try to explain rule-governed activity by appealing to the way we function in the world and society, for example, by revealing the causal mechanisms which make us disposed to various behaviors. However, this approach creates only an illusion of understanding rule-governed activity. In fact, it eliminates the normative character of conscious activity. Thus if we want to avoid a clash with the skeptical paradox and its consequences we should stop regarding the content of mental states as the result of interpretation of events of the external world. We should stop seeing interpretation as a procedure of extracting, abstracting senses, meanings and rules regulating our interaction with the world from the external world of non-conceptual givens confronting us. As Wittgenstein put it, "there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call 'obeying the rule' and 'going against it' in actual cases" [9, p. 81e].

IV

The rule Wittgenstein has in mind is understood by becoming immersed in the corresponding practice. It would be wrong though to understand immersion in practice as merely acquiring a disposition toward a certain behavior. The proposed solution, as has been noted, loses the normative aspect of rule-governed activity. To retain the normative aspect we need to understand immersion in practice along McDowell's lines, i.e., as acquiring the ability to act on rational grounds. The grounds cannot be understood as senses, meanings, rules, etc. that are "in the head" and are juxtaposed with the raw non-conceptualized givens of external reality, but are themselves seen as the result of interpretation and processing of these givens. This approach, as we have seen, will bring us up against the skeptical paradox. We have to understand the rational grounds that make us act by immersing ourselves in corresponding practices as something objective. McDowell adopts this view referring to it as naturalized Platonism.

In seeing rational grounds as something objective we essentially adopt the externalist position in the philosophy of mind, casting aside all elements of internalism characteristic of Cartesianism. Rational grounds seen as senses, content of our mental states which guide our actions are simultaneously seen as objective facts that we encounter. McDowell asserts this variant of externalism when he

writes: “*That things are thus and so* is the content of the experience, and... that very same thing, *that things are thus and so* is also a perceptible fact, an aspect of the perceptible world” [5, p. 26].

Externalism is not some kind of way-out position. It has been gaining more and more followers in the areas of philosophy of language and mind since the 1970s. Witness what Fred Dretske, one of the foremost representatives of philosophical externalism, has to say about it:

Materialists should be willing to tolerate some degree of externalism about the mind. It is hard to see how to avoid it. Beliefs are prominent citizens of the mind, and beliefs are individuated in terms of what they are beliefs about. I know of no plausible psychosemantics, no plausible theory of what makes one thing *about* another, that isn't externalist in character [2, p. 143].

The main contributors to this approach are Kripke and Hilary Putnam. However, in the context of analytical philosophy externalism about content is already found in the works of Bertrand Russell, the man who pioneered this philosophical tradition. According to Russell, the content of our thoughts are propositions and their constituents are the actual objects to which we ascribe properties. The description of these objects is something internal, mental. The objects themselves are extra-mental elements. The kind of externalist approach Russell proposed can be called two-component externalism. It assumes that one part of the content of our judgments and thoughts is something external, an extra-mental object about which the judgment says something, while another part of the content is still internal for the mental sphere. For example, this part can be seen as a description with the help of which we characterize the object. It will be seen that this version of externalism poses no serious threat to internalists. Internalists can afford admitting that in a broader sense we should take into account external objects as contributing to the general semantics of judgment, of thought. However, from their point of view, the most important element of this semantics is the narrow content which should still be understood as something internal for the mental sphere.

McDowell rightly characterized the two-component externalism of the Russell type as a version of Cartesianism. Indeed, in adopting this view we still think of our consciousness as being separated from the external world, for example, by the system of descriptions. Russell believed that practically all names are hidden descriptions. Only demonstrative pronouns such as “this” and “that” are real names. However, they point not to the object itself but to sense data, which can be considered to be elements of conscious experience. It can be said that although Russell had proposed a two-component variant of externalism, in reality his views should be properly described as internalistic. We access the world either through descriptions or through exposure to sense data.

The revival of externalism in the 1970s was due in large part to the renunciation of Russell's theory of descriptions. As Kripke demonstrated, names are not hidden descriptions. Their main feature is their ability to refer directly to external objects. Kripke's critique has been thus summed up by Michael McKinsey:

Kripke's arguments against the theory of names as abbreviations-for-descriptions is based on some highly convincing intuitions concerning *modal* properties of sentences containing common names. Consider the hypothesis to the effect that the name 'Aristotle' is an abbreviated description 'the last great philosopher of antiquity.' If this hypothesis were true then the sentence

(2) Aristotle was not a philosopher

would express the same proposition as the sentence

(3) The last great philosopher of antiquity was not a philosopher.

However, contrary to this hypothesis it is fairly obvious that (2) and (3) *do not* express one and the same proposition because (2) expresses a possible truth while (3) must express a lie [7, p. 297].

The arguments similar to those put forward by Kripke, as well as Putnam, have persuaded many philosophers to adopt an externalist position in the philosophy of language and mind. However, the variant of externalism most philosophers took on board remained a two-component one. This means that it retained to some degree the link with internalist, Cartesian ideas of consciousness. To wean us away from this connection, according to McDowell, it is necessary to adopt a one-component version of externalism.

McDowell argues that to this end we should interpret this proposition not in Russell's meaning as including an extra-mental component, but in the Fregean sense, as thought. For such thought there is nothing external. The object about which something is said is not something external to thought. I would interpret this thesis in the following way: The object is part of thought as an intentional object. Following the Fregean view of the nature of propositions, McDowell simultaneously proposes understanding thought in *de re* modality [4, p. 214]. Thought is not something "in the head." As has been noted, the content of our mental states, when we are not in error, is the real state of affairs, a fact.

An observation is in order here to prevent the reader from being misled into thinking that McDowell advocates a special variant of subjective idealism. McDowell notes that the concept "thought" can be understood in two ways.

Speaking about thought, we may refer to the content of thought or we may refer to the mental process of thinking. McDowell identifies with the state of affairs in the world only the content of thought. The process of thinking, of course, is an internal mental phenomenon.

I believe that such interpretation of thinking, and conscious activity in general, best reveals the phenomenon of normativity of conscious experience. When we speak about normativity, we usually mean that the subject in his activity should comply with some limitations imposed on him that do not depend on him and that he should take into account if he wants to achieve certain goals. These limitations are not causal such that the subject ceases to be a subject and turns into an object among other objects in the physical world. The limitations the world imposes on us are normative when we are able to act freely, identifying the state of affairs as grounds for a certain action and consenting to act on these grounds, accepting the obligation to follow some course of action. In McDowell's frame of reference, it means that we are open to the world. This view of conscious attitude to the world is possible if we interpret the grounds simultaneously as something conceptually

formed that can be the content of our mental states, as well as the objective state of affairs. What is brought into line with the world and the content of our conscious experience is our conscious activity connected with our ability to react to the grounds that we obtain by becoming immersed in a certain social practice and acquiring a “second nature.”

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The Birth of Christianity from the Spirit of the Roman Empire: A Paradoxical View of Europe's Religious Development in the Works of F. F. Zelinsky*

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Abstract. This article analyzes the unorthodox concept of the development of ancient religions and the emergence of Christianity set out in the six-volume work of Faddey (Thaddeus) Zelinsky *History of Ancient Religions*. Zelinsky refutes the well-established idea of the origin of Christianity from Judaism, and argues that it was based on the Hellenistic-Roman religion of the early Roman Empire. This religion had a monotheistic and pantheistic idea of a God who is the basis of all world processes and human actions. At the same time, the idea arose that a “particle” of God could enter a human personality (the personality of the emperor). According to Zelinsky, it was these ideas that became the basis of Christianity, which radically rethought them but nevertheless left them close to the beliefs of the majority of the citizens of the Roman Empire; that is why early Christianity quickly spread throughout the empire. The article suggests that Zelinsky's flight from Bolshevik Russia in the 1920s and his life in the Polish Catholic environment deterred him from developing his ideas to their natural outcome, which might have conflicted with Catholic teaching. The article reconstructs the result that Zelinsky should have come to if he had carried his ideas through: He would have had to admit that the teachings of Jesus Christ and early Christianity that arose from the Roman religion and not from Judaism were the same religious tradition that the Catholic Church historically persecuted as Gnostic heresy.

Keywords: early Christianity, Judaism, Roman religion, pantheism, Gnosticism, Catholicism.

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Faddey Zelinsky (1859-1944) presented the results of his lifelong study of the development of European religions in the monumental six-volume *History of Ancient Religions* [8-13]. He started writing it during the First World War (the first two volumes, *The Religion of Ancient Greece* and *The Religion of Hellenism*, were published in Petrograd in 1918 and 1922), and finished in emigration in the 1920s and 1940s in Poland and Germany. Volumes 3-4 *Hellenism and Judaism* and *The Religion of the Roman Republic* (in two books) were brought out in Polish in Warsaw in 1927 and 1933-1934; the two final volumes, *The Religion of the Roman Empire* and *Ancient Christianity* only saw the light of day in 1999 in Torun. The result of this formidable effort was an unusual concept of the origin and development of Christianity which challenged the traditional idea that it arose out of Judaism. Unfortunately, this ground-breaking theory is largely unknown to contemporary scholars; works on Zelinsky's ideas are few and far between [1; 5; 6].

In formulating his main thesis, Zelinsky pulls no punches:

Christianity came out of Judaism, it is often said. But this is a lie. The only true fact is that the first disciples of Christ were those who initially and simultaneously preached the law of Jehovah. However, it is an irrefutable fact that the law of Christ, rejected by Judaism, was embraced by Hellenism, i.e., by the Hellenic and Hellenized souls of the East and West, and to such a degree that the boundaries of Christianity in the 4th-5th centuries AD almost coincided with the boundaries of the Roman Empire, excepting Judea. From this it indisputably follows that there was no *psychological continuity between Judaism and Christianity and that, on the contrary, such continuity existed between Hellenism, on the one hand, and Christianity, on the other. This means that the religion of the Greeks prepared minds for adopting Christianity better than Judaism* [8, p. 383].

The traditional view of the religious development of the European civilization holds that the most important phase in this development was Judaism as a monotheistic religion opposed to the Paganism of Ancient Greece and Ancient Rome. Judaism was seen as the natural environment to produce the prophet of the new religion. The prophet was Jesus Christ, and the historians confidently stated that the new religion he brought first gained a large following among orthodox Jews before it swiftly spread throughout the Roman Empire, almost mystically overcoming the resistance of all the Pagan beliefs held by the Romans.

The mystical element of course is present in religion, but even the most mystical of beliefs lend themselves to an explanation in terms of the natural laws of historical and ideological genesis. At the time of the earthly ministry of Jesus Christ, the Jews mainly lived compactly in Palestine and their religion was not practiced beyond their own living area. It was hardly known at all in the Roman Empire, and if it was known, it was treated with hostility because of its overtly nationalistic and "particular" character that was in stark contrast with the universalist tradition of Roman religiosity. Accordingly, the advent, among Jews, of a new preacher, even a powerful one who proved the depth of his faith by death

on the cross, could not have attracted much interest in the Roman society that surrounded Judea.

In his detailed analysis of Jewish religious beliefs of the time of Jesus Christ, Zelinsky shows that in all their main components these beliefs were profoundly alien to the Roman spirit, which explains why Roman society detested the Jews. If the new religion brought by Jesus Christ had grown out of Judaism, the Romans would have regarded it as a variety of Judaism, such that its quick spread in the Roman Empire would have been implausible. Zelinsky offers a different and far more logical explanation of the process: *The true religious foundation of Christianity was not the Jewish Old Testament, but the synthetic Hellenistic-Roman religion that had taken shape by the first century AD and whose spirit reflected the ideological principles of the young Roman Empire.*

Incredible as this hypothesis may seem, Zelinsky's monumental work makes a convincing case for it. He argues that religion in the early Roman Empire already had two key elements of future Christianity: the notion of single God whose creative activity embraces and sustains all that exists, including man, and the notion of the advent of Messiah called upon to save the world, the Messiah being a man in whom a particle of the one God is embodied.

This is an unorthodox view of Ancient Rome's "pagan" religion, but Zelinsky in his work demolishes the stereotypes about the Roman religion which obscure Rome's real role in the history of the entire European civilization. Paganism is a religion of primitive peoples and communities, which in their self-consciousness are incapable of moving from deification of individual aspects of the world to an awareness of the existence of a single and integral divine basis of all natural phenomena. But Ancient Greece and Ancient Rome were highly developed civilizations, they could boast advanced cultures and exceedingly sophisticated philosophies which clearly indicated the need for a single absolute foundation of all that exists. In this context, it would be absurd to claim that the Greek and Roman religion was no different from the paganism of primitive, barbarian tribes.

A detailed analysis of the Roman religion of the time of Caesar Augustus (Octavian) leads Zelinsky to the conclusion that it does not just fit the definition of "monotheistic" but surpasses on this count the Jewish religion in its fine grasp of the dialectics of the interaction between God and manifold phenomena of the world which are permeated with God's influence. Zelinsky writes:

The Roman deity is one in multitude and multiple in oneness. Hence... it is clear that the division between monotheistic and polytheistic religions cannot be applied to the Roman religion because it belonged to both categories. More precisely: monotheism and polytheism are two aspects of the same function of the human soul which the Romans called *religio* [9, p. 685].

To illustrate the original dialectics of the unity and plurality of the deity Zelinsky cites a work of Horace in which the poet first prays to the multitude of traditional Roman gods and then in the second part "appeals to 'gods,' i.e., the deity in general because the number, of which we got repeated proof, does not mean

anything here" [9, p. 686]. As a result, Zelinsky resolutely asserts the superiority of the Roman religion over Judaism.

Indeed: deity is one in multiplicity and multiple in unity, something to be borne in mind above all as the main feature of the Roman religion. And this is the reason or, if you like, one of the reasons why the Judaist deity was unacceptable for a Roman: this deity was sole, but not one in multiplicity. Herein lies also the reason why the Roman could well accept the Christian deity [9, p. 686].

In another work, Zelinsky compares the idea of the divine in the religion of Romans and the idea of the Absolute in the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. To the Roman, his gods were not individual entities, but *actions* involved in natural phenomena,

the latent pantheism of the Roman religion was actual pantheism. This immediately distinguishes it from the pantheism of Spinoza, which was precisely a substantial pantheism, and likens it to the worldview that has its origin in Heraclitus and its crowning in Schopenhauer. Indeed, we can best understand and appreciate the Roman religion if we say in the language of the German philosopher that it was the *worship of the world Will* in its diverse manifestations [14, p. 13].

A key aspect of this idea characterizing equally Schopenhauer's philosophy and the Roman religion is the conviction that "the world Will" also abides within us in the shape of our personal will. That is why the Romans believed it was possible to influence the course of earthly events by appealing to the Deity through gifts and persuasion.

Although this tendency went hand-in-hand with Greek "transcendentalism," i.e., what Zelinsky saw as the tendency to "substantivize" divine forces through Olympian gods headed by Jupiter, the nucleus of Roman religiosity remained intact. Even in adopting the Greek hierarchy of gods the Roman mind "diluted" its rigidity by deifying individual properties and acts of these gods that were particularly important in the world and in society. That enlarged the Roman pantheon by adding to the traditional Olympian gods such deities as Hope, Concord, Virtue, Piety, Welfare, etc. [14, p. 37].

Even more strikingly, Zelinsky finds in the religion of the time of Augustus (Octavian) an anticipation of the main idea of Christianity, the human incarnation of God. This idea has its source in the Hellenistic religion. Zelinsky writes that "Hellenism was the first to bring forth the tenet of everlasting divine entity which 'becomes flesh' and in this shape abides among humans to reunite with divinity after the body dies" [9, pp. 688-689]. Only rulers were deemed to be such chosen people. No wonder this religious idea gained prominence at the time when the Roman Empire took final shape, when Emperor Augustus was seen as the greatest of all living men, a true *God-man* who had ensured peace and prosperity of a vast country comprising all the civilized humankind. Zelinsky stresses that this is not a deification of a fallible human personality of the Emperor: religious worship is directed toward *the divine essence present in the earthly human being*. One of Horace's odes portrays Emperor Augustus as a man who gains the divine status

when Hermes enters him. But in the era when the Roman religion was in the ascendant Hermes was a special god whose image was associated with hermeticism, one of the most complicated and profound ancient religious trends. Hermes was interpreted as divine Logos, the Maker of all that exists. In light of this fact, we can see an even clearer parallel between the image of the divine Augustus and the image of Christ. Zelinsky writes that if Horace's idea had prevailed "the worshippers of the deified Emperor Augustus would have ample grounds for saying about their Messiah what St. John would later say about ours: 'And the Word became flesh and lived among us... full of grace and truth'" [11, p. 200].

Zelinsky concedes that for the Christian mind the parallel between the "divinity" of Emperor Augustus and the divine nature of Christ is blasphemous, but then the falsely religious form of the tenet, becoming widely recognized, could well have prepared and formed the foundation of an elevated truth.

Another motive of Greek religion which prepared Roman religious consciousness for adopting Christianity was the tenet about the Son of God who "existed in two varieties, the God-son and the human who is the son of God, or, to use the language of myth, as Apollo and Heracles" [9, p. 689]. These two motives—incarnation of God and son of God—come together in the figure of Emperor Augustus to form an idea similar to the Jewish Messiah. However, as Zelinsky stresses, if one compares the final image of Christ understood as Messiah and the Son of God with the two polar "models" of Messiah presented in the Old Testament (Judaism) and the religion of the early Roman Empire one has to admit that Christ is very close to the latter "model" and remote from the former: for the Jewish Messiah is the savior only of his own people whereas Christ is the Messiah of the whole mankind; "and mankind is a concept fostered on Greek soil and at the time in question already thoroughly assimilated by Rome" [9, pp. 689-690].

In his earlier work, which was a brief sketch of a later detailed treatment of Roman religion in volumes 4 and 5 of *History of Ancient Religions*, Zelinsky offers a laconic but very judicious description of the Roman religion as an *absolute* and universal basis of all forms of religious beliefs of the European humanity far superior to the Judaic religion to which this status is traditionally accorded:

'Religion' is not the same as faith, or confession, or piety; it is the mysterious chain that connects us (*religans*) with something higher than us, whatever it may be. We may discontinue all the pious practices, cast aside all the tenets that constitute some confession, we may even lose all faith—but we remain religious as long as we allow in our world view some space for the great Unknown and feel ourselves being part of it [14, p. 2].

But being an absolute "model" according to which the faiths of all peoples developed, only the Roman religion could form the basis for the emergence of a final religion expressing the fullness of divine Revelation.

This is the reason why it was in Rome that Christianity found such fertile soil: negating all other religions of the then civilized world, including Judaism, it was the final phase of the development of the Roman religion. It has long been remarked that the war Christianity declared on Rome was not about what was intrinsically Roman, but about later Greek and Eastern accretions; it was enough for these accretions to fall off for Rome and Christianity

to come to know each other and merge. The Greek Pan died when the Cross was raised over its world; but the Roman *religio* did not only survive, it shone even brighter under a new banner [14, p. 5].

In contrast to his grand vision of Roman religion, Zelinsky's opinion of Judaism turns out to be highly negative and certainly too extreme in that it magnifies the negative sides of Judaism and ignores the positive sides (for example, the very high status of personality in the Jewish religion [7]).¹ He describes Hellenistic and Roman religion as a religion of joy, love and beauty and the Jewish religion as a religion of hatred and fear: hatred of all other peoples which oppose the Jewish people and fear of the severe and unpredictable God who often treats with inexplicable cruelty not only "aliens" but also "one's own." The ancient God (Apollo), when he visits people, brings them divine perfection and a joyous state of bliss, while Jehovah's visit in the Old Testament is always a disastrous event, which sows destruction and death. "In fury you trod the earth, in anger you trampled nations" (Habakkuk 3: 12)—this is the usual form of such a visit [8, p. 513]. The abiding fear in the hearts of even orthodox Jews stems from the fact that Judaism describes God not as a source of love, but as a source of law, with the law sometimes being at odds with our moral sentiment and reason, so that it can be broken only due to a chance concatenation of circumstances, under the influence of ordinary human impulses.

The Jewish idea of God was unacceptable for the Greeks and Romans (for the overall spirit of the Ancient world which Zelinsky calls the "Hellenistic soul") because it looked positively "barbaric" compared to the sophisticated religious and philosophical ideas of the citizens of the Roman Empire. For while considering Jehovah to be the one and only God of all men, the Jews recognized him as their *own* God who had made a covenant only with one people and was therefore prepared to persecute and annihilate other peoples. Such cruel "selectivity" in God's attitude to humans is a gross human property, which cannot be justified either from a moral or religious point of view and bespeaks a profoundly false idea of the lofty first principle.

Similarly, the Greeks and Romans consider the straightforward Judaist anthropomorphism in the portrayal of God to be naïve and false. As philosophical thought developed it shed the notions of the Supreme Being having anthropomorphic features which made it impossible to consider Him to be *absolute* and *infinite*. By contrast, the Old Testament God looked like a human and exhibited all the inner traits characteristic of humans, including negative traits. And it is positively incredible that Jehovah can make mistakes and often changes his mind and "regrets" his former deeds. Zelinsky writes:

God in the Old Testament is a superman: he appears, walks, stands, is still or moving; we cannot help imagining Him to be more or less like Michelangelo pictured him, a man standing at full height, rather like Zeus with Homer and Phidias. But then with Zeus the human look was justified because he was the head of the Olympic family, a brother, spouse and father; but such a combination of traits is unacceptable in the lone Creator of the Universe and Earth [8, p. 428].

Although over time the image of God acquired more universal and philosophically abstract features, this tendency could not bring essential changes because of the persistent nationalism of the Jewish faith which could only be justified in a strictly anthropomorphic God.

Comparing Judaism and the ancient religion in the shape it acquired at the time of the early Roman Empire Zelinsky draws this legitimate conclusion: if we recognized that Christianity originates from Judaism this would mean that “the advent of Christ was merely the fulfillment of the predictions of the prophets of a small and universally hated people on the banks of the Jordan” and the influence it exerted on the whole subsequent history would remain a mystery; if we accept its origin from the Roman religion we would be able to say that the advent was “the fulfillment of the expectations of the whole world from the Pillars of Hercules to the borders of India” and its historic significance would become perfectly clear [9, p. 691]. The choice any objective investigator is bound to make in this dilemma is obvious.

However, having dismissed the version of Christianity having its origin in Judaism we must then explain why this version is so popular and enduring. In the part devoted to the development of Christianity Zelinsky’s reflections no longer seem to be unassailable and accurate. Zelinsky considers the Catholic teaching as it took shape in the early Middle Ages to be the final and most adequate form of the new religion which fully complies with the intentions of its Creator. He identifies three historical phases of early Christianity: the teaching of Christ proper, its Judaic version that emerged in the middle of the 2nd century AD and the “corrected” Hellenized version which took shape in the 5th century and formed the basis of the further development of the Catholic church. It turns out that it was the Judaization of Christ’s teaching which was started by the early Jewish disciples and dominated the history of the later Roman Empire and the early Middle Ages over several centuries had created the false stereotype of the new teaching originating from Judaism.

Although Zelinsky’s last (900-page) volume is replete with detailed stories from the history of early Christianity, it prompts a host of questions and objections to which it is hard to find answers. Zelinsky, oddly enough, says practically nothing about the essence of Christ’s teaching and its original version. It is no accident that the first chapter, devoted to early Christianity, is titled “The Galilean Secret.” Out of the huge body of ideas pertaining to the original teaching of Christ he picks decidedly secondary problems connected with various interpretations of some tenets in Catholicism and Protestantism. Contrary to the view of many 20th century scholars who pointed out substantial differences of early Christianity from its later version, Zelinsky argues that the teaching of Christ was close the “standard” version of the Catholic doctrine, except that it was encumbered by some alien features because it was initially spreading among the Jews.

Indeed, this forms the main thrust of the work’s final volume: Zelinsky asserts that the most important thing that happened to Christianity in the second to fifth centuries was its liberation from the Jewish elements introduced by early Christians. But he maintains a mysterious silence about when and how these Jewish

elements were introduced. Furthermore, in attaching great significance to the reverse process of de-Judaization of Christianity, Zelinsky describes it in a way that suggests that it was not very substantial, since it involved matters that were somewhat secondary: removing vestiges of the Jewish way of life (observation of the Sabbath, exaggerated attention to the distinction between “pure” and “impure,” minimization of the religious role of the woman), introducing the cult of saints as intermediaries between lay believers and God, worshiping icons and, finally, establishing the cult of the Mother of God. All these features are very important for believers psychologically, but they have nothing to do with the essence of the Christian teaching; thus it turns out that it remained practically unchanged in its main tenets over the first four centuries of its existence.

It has to be admitted that the style of Zelinsky's last work on the history of ancient religions differs dramatically from that of his previous works: whereas the former was informed with scientific objectivity and a critical approach to long-established clichés about European religious life, the latter is largely undisguised apologia for Catholicism which is portrayed as the most “absolute religion” toward which humanity had been moving since ancient times. Orthodoxy and Protestantism turn out to be less perfect forms of the “absolute religion” because they have allegedly preserved more traces of Jewish influence. None of this, of course, corresponds to reality and indeed the author's argumentation is surprisingly weak while being replete with tedious lengthy passages concerning trivial details of the Christian teaching. One gets the impression that the change of the place of residence in the 1920s, although Zelinsky vehemently denied that it was “emigration” by calling Poland his only and true homeland while rejecting Russia in that capacity, significantly narrowed the initial grand plan of his investigations. Finding himself in a Catholic milieu, Zelinsky had to give up developing his ideas in the most original and audacious direction. Having embraced Catholicism as the truth that was beyond criticism or questioning, he had to dramatically tone down his criticism of the church version of Europe's religious development. Because the Catholic church did not deny that its teaching was descended from Judaism and the Old Testament, Zelinsky had to give up his radicalism in promoting the idea that the real basis of the Christian (Catholic) teaching was not the Old Testament, but the religion of the early Roman Empire. It would not be irrelevant to recall that in his book *Rome and Its Religion* published in Russia in 1903 he described Christianity as just “the last phase of the development of the Roman religion.” In the final volume of his opus magnum he has removed his radical opinion, finding in Judaism a good many positive elements—precisely the elements that it shares with Catholicism.

Sadly, Zelinsky's fate after he moved to Poland turned out to be very much like that of other Russian émigrés: Like most of them, toward the end of his life he fell back on the traditional faith, which guarantees “truth” and “salvation,” renouncing the more daring ideas that contradicted it. The only difference was that for him this faith was not Russian Orthodoxy but Polish Catholicism.

But does it mean that the paradoxical description of Europe's religious development Zelinsky set forth in his main works cannot be carried through to its nat-

ural conclusion and that we cannot know the final point at which he should have arrived if he had retained the critical and creative mode of thought that is the hallmark of his main works written in Russia? Not at all. Moreover, I am convinced that the logic of his ideas can and must be pursued to its end. In the last volume of the *History of Ancient Religions* there are several passages in which Zelinsky forgets, as it were, his new pro-Catholic attitude and makes statements that are strikingly radical and obviously at odds with the overall “apologetic” thrust of his book. Let us note just two such fragments.

Starting his account of the process of de-Judaization of the original Christian teaching, Zelinsky asks what at first glance seems a strange question whether Jesus Christ was a Jew and gives a startling answer, of course he was not. His argument is very simple and therefore absolutely convincing. This example shows how many false stereotypes are attached to the universally accepted ideas about early Christianity. Curiously, in this case Zelinsky puts the rational-scientific and not mythological story of the origin of Jesus in the mouth of an imaginary “free-thinker” who is skeptical about religion but wants to get at the historical truth about the founder of Christianity; in this fragment the author assumes, as it were, a dual role of a pious Catholic who is reluctant to agree with the argument because it contradicts his faith, and an objective historian who must agree with irrefutable arguments. In the framework of the rational-scientific approach, Zelinsky admits that since Jesus comes from Galilee he cannot be a Jew, thus putting into question Jesus’ lineage as stated in the beginning of the Gospel according to St. Matthew and the Gospel according to St. Luke. Because Galilee in the late first century BC was mainly populated by Syrians, Philistines and Greeks Jesus must have belonged to one of these peoples, with Zelinsky apparently favoring the Greek origin.

However, denying that Jesus was not an ethnic Jew does not mean that he was not a Jew. Here we get a glimpse of a curious idea which is implicit rather than explicit. He recalls the well known historical fact that at the tail end of the first century BC Judaism was forcibly imposed on Galilee, with mandatory circumcision and introduction of the Law of Moses [13, pp. 16-17]. Zelinsky does not pursue this idea any further but a suspicion naturally creeps in that Jesus was born in a family that was a victim of such forced Judaization and was thus an “involuntary” Jew. If so, we can reasonably expect him to have a cool and even highly negative attitude to the religion to which his parents and he himself had been forcibly converted.

Leaving aside this story for the time being, let us look at the book’s preceding chapter which describes the main Christian heresies and especially Gnosticism and the teaching of Marcion. Zelinsky agrees with Adolf Harnack who described Gnosticism as “an abrupt Hellenization of Christianity” [12, p. 364]; the definition accords well with the main trend in the development of Christianity he describes in his book, and yet he does not endorse the Gnostic version of Hellenization maintaining that the Gnostics and Marcion were *too critical* of the Old Testament. This suggests that Zelinsky is not so critical of the Jewish religion and its Gospel. However, he subsequently unpacks Tertullian’s polemic with Marcion and

unexpectedly takes Marcion's side on every point! He approves the enhancement of the religious status of women in his teaching, commends the structure of the church created by Marcion and even recognizes that it was the model of the future Catholic church; he goes along with Marcion's interpretation of Christ's words about love for one's neighbors and admits that he correctly resented the cruelty of the Old Testament God whereas Tertullian in his polemic with him took an essentially pro-Judaist and not a Christian position [12, pp. 379-380]. In the end, Zelinsky recognizes Marcion's protest against the division of religion and morality in Judaism as his "immortal service" [12, p. 381] and comes to a startling conclusion about that "heretic": "On the whole it can be said that the more we are able to see through the cover of hostile descriptions of the real essence of Marcion's character and teaching, the more it is elevated in our eyes and the more we come to respect him" [12, p. 384]. He even accepts the legendary and not very credible claim of Tertullian that before his death Marcion returned to the Catholic fold. We feel that Zelinsky is very sympathetic toward this prominent figure of early Christianity portrayed in the church tradition as the most dangerous enemy of the orthodox teaching. Most importantly, Zelinsky *shares* almost all the tenets of his teaching except the best known one to the effect that the creator of our world is not a good Father God but a base, malevolent deity, the Demiurge whom Marcion identified with the Creator God in the book of Genesis.

To understand why Zelinsky is so well-disposed toward Marcion let us consider once again how he looks at the development of early Christianity. Following his logic Christ's teaching from the outset formulated the essence of the future Catholicism, but the early followers of his teaching so much distorted it with their Judaist notions that it took three centuries to rid it of Jewish ideas. Expressed in this schematic way, this historical model may appear to make sense, but the slightest attempt to flesh it out shows that it contains irreconcilable contradictions and that it is based on assumptions that do not stand up to elementary criticism.

Let us try to find the traces of Judaization of the teaching of Christ in early Christian writers to which Zelinsky refers. Christ himself, in his view, stayed within the framework of Judaism to a very small degree, if at all, such that these elements cannot be seen as a big problem. Nor is Zelinsky particularly critical of the Gospels considering the Jewish elements in it to be of minor importance. However, in his account, the very first theoretician of Christianity, St. Paul, waged a resolute struggle against Judaization of Christ's teaching. We are led to conclude that the very first followers of Christ so distorted his teaching that St. Paul had to combat these distortions literally two decades after the Teacher's death. And yet, neither the authority of its founder, nor the authority of St. Paul, nor the authority of the Gospels, which were already there by the end of the 1st century, influenced the "inert mass" of believers which, according to Zelinsky, continues to introduce Judaist elements into the Christian teaching. It turns out that the Judaist additions introduced over several decades (!) since the teaching was founded were so significant that it took a whole three centuries (!) of fierce struggle to eliminate them and achieve a degree of Hellenization of Christianity that was already manifest in Marcion's teaching but happened to be a "wrong" kind of Hellenization. As a

result, a picture is formed that absolutely contradicts and essentially *absolutely refutes* the key thesis of the preceding parts of Zelinsky's work. In them Zelinsky argued and apparently indisputably proved that the emergence of Christianity was not connected with Judaism and the Jewish environment, and that it was universally accepted and quickly spread through the Roman Empire precisely because it was in tune with the traditional faith of the Romans. However, having reached the final volume Zelinsky switches to the directly opposite position and paints a totally different picture of the development of Christianity: it is impossible to imagine such a massive dominance of Jewish ideas in early Christianity as Zelinsky describes unless one assumes that it existed initially and for quite a long time thereafter *only in the Jewish environment* which rejected the "Roman" elements in Christ's teaching and added Jewish ideas.

The situation gets totally absurd if we recall that in the early centuries, in Zelinsky's account, a series of outstanding Christian thinkers not connected in any way with Judaism and indeed raised in Greek and Roman culture (Tertullian, Tatian, Irenaeus, Hippolytus of Rome, Epiphanius of Salamis and others) were advocates of the dramatically Judaized Christianity. Zelinsky inveighs heavily against this trend, calling, for example, Tertullian and Tatian "fanatics of self-sufficient faith" in the third volume of his work [8, p. 495]. As a result, for Zelinsky Marcion in the middle of the 2nd century turns out to be far more Catholic in spirit than authoritative canonical figures.

These contradictions and discrepancies can only be resolved if we admit that Zelinsky's entire historical structure leads to a result that is incompatible with his late pro-Catholic convictions. We can see the natural result of his theories by turning again to his exposition of the teachings of Marcion. It is no accident, it seems, that Zelinsky says nothing about a thoroughly authenticated key element in Marcion's preaching in which he not only proclaimed his version of the Christian teaching, but accused the Roman hierarchs of *distorting the teaching of Jesus Christ*. The texts he cited—the ancient Gospel and the initial unedited text of the Epistles of St. Paul—were intended to bolster this charge. The question is pivotal for understanding the genesis of early Christianity. Zelinsky, for all his sympathy toward Marcion, clearly subscribes to the church version of the story whereby Marcion's charges against the Roman presbyters were a trick designed to hide his true goal, i.e., creating his own teaching and subjugating the whole Roman church. Thus Zelinsky goes along with the claims of the church critics that the Gospel and Marcion's versions of St. Paul's epistles were "fakes" of Marcion who had shortened the already existing text of St. Luke (which is an extended variant of the Gospel) and edited the canonical texts of the Epistles.

Here, for fairness sake, we should mention modern studies which, based on thorough textological analysis, have proved that Marcion's Gospel was *more ancient*, i.e., was the *primary* text, which provided the basis of the Gospel of St. Luke [3]. This means that Marcion's accusations leveled against the Roman church had weighty foundations. Most probably the Gospel of St. Luke (and the two other synoptic Gospels) *did not exist* at the time of Marcion's preaching (in the middle of the 2nd century AD) and they were written ("vouchsafed" to the

Roman church) precisely after Marcion's preaching to prove the validity of the church version of the teaching.

But if Marcion was right in his argument with the Roman church it turns out that it was the Roman church that had carried out a radical Judaization of the original Christianity which Marcion tried to combat and hence the true teaching of Christ was more in line with what we know as Gnosticism and the teaching of Marcion than with the teaching of the Catholic church which differs from the teaching of the Roman church in the 2nd century only in insignificant details, if we consider the whole body of Jewish ideas introduced into early Christianity.

The adoption of this hypothesis eliminates all the contradictions in Zelinsky's version and makes it really consistent and logical. It is worth repeating that in considering the teaching of Christ and stating that it basically coincides with the teaching of the Catholic church Zelinsky for some reason does not touch upon the fundamental substance of the teachings. This may be because an analysis of the substance of the Catholic teaching would have laid bare its discrepancy with the main tenets of the Roman religion and put into question the central thesis to the effect that Catholicism stems from the Roman religion and not from Judaism. In reality the main feature of the Roman religion, as Zelinsky himself pints out, is its pantheistic interpretation of God as the inner essence of the world and man. This motive is totally at odds with the Catholic teaching which, like Judaism, juxtaposes the almighty God and the sinful and flawed man, but *exactly corresponds* to the main principle of the Gnostic teaching and the teaching of Marcion both of which maintain that the unknown and unknowable Father-God is present in the soul of every human being. To this we may add that Zelinsky's reasoning about Judaism as "a religion of hatred" in volume 3 of his work suggests that Christianity at its birth must have stressed this flaw of Judaism, but this is characteristic of Gnosticism which calls the Jewish Creator God an evil Demiurge, God who deceives people and subjugates them with the help of the Jewish religion. The pivotal nature of this feature of early Christianity logically follows from Zelinsky's description of the origin of Christ: if we accept the hypothesis that Christ belonged to that portion of the citizens of Galilee who had been forcibly Judaized, we can understand his attitude to the Jewish Jehovah as the God of evil and violence, and his utter rejection of Judaism and the Old Testament as instruments of subjugating people to this evil God.

By accepting the Gnostic version of Christianity to be the genuine, undistorted version of the teaching of Christ [2], we can logically explain the development of Christianity in the early centuries and eliminate all the difficulties Zelinsky encounters in his effort to present Catholicism as the adequate expression of that teaching. Because Gnostic Christianity has obvious substantive links with the religion of the Roman Empire, it is natural that, having been created in stark opposition to Judaism, it spread easily throughout the Roman Empire and gained a huge following. However, as church organization was formed and the church hierarchy emerged, it became obvious that the innovative religion that called on every person to discover a "particle" of God within himself and to become a God-Man, an absolute creature like Christ, was not very suitable for building the power of the hierarchs over the

laity. And then the hierarchs remembered Judaism, which was ideally suited for building a “vertical power structure.” The history of Marcion, which has luckily survived in historical memory, proves convincingly that it was *in the late 1st and early 2nd centuries that a radical Judaization of Christ’s teaching occurred in the Roman church* and that, unlike the fairly inessential details of religious practices Zelinsky writes about, *it had to do with two absolutely crucial motives of the teaching*: first, the incomprehensible, non-anthropomorphic and even non-existing Father God of Gnostic Christianity was again identified with the Jewish anthropomorphic Creator God, Jehovah, and second, the central idea of a “particle,” a “spark” of God being present in every man was removed by the adoption of the idea of the fall of man, which led to the recognition of the inherent weakness and insurmountable flaws of man, who can obtain God and gain salvation only through church and its ministers. Salvation itself was transformed from the Hellenistic-Roman version into a Jewish one: The immortal soul that continues to abide in the earthly world or retires to the heavenly Pleroma was replaced with the late Judaist concept of Doomsday and bodily resurrection of the dead.

Against the background of these fundamental Judaic additions to the early Christianity, which Catholicism has retained in their entirety, all the features Zelinsky mentions as the result of “de-Judaization” look like trifles; as a result, we have no option but to recognize Catholicism, as well as the two other confessions, to be nothing but varieties of the same religion which has departed so far from the teaching of Jesus Christ that it can best be described as “Judeo-Christianity.”

However, the genuine, undistorted teaching of Christ has not vanished; although the church over the centuries brutally persecuted its adherents as Gnostic heretics, it has entered European culture, we find it in great philosophical systems from John the Scot, Joachim of Fiore, Meister Eckhart and Nicholas of Cusa to Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer and Bergson. Moreover, European history has seen two short but great epochs when the Gnostic, i.e., true, Christianity became preponderant in culture and had a chance to become the driving force of history, i.e., Renaissance and the German Romanticism. It is not by chance that in the *History of Ancient Religions* and his other works Zelinsky very often turns to these two epochs of which he speaks in glowing terms. In the 19th century, Gnostic Christianity was most vividly and fully reflected in Russian culture and philosophy, and it is not surprising that the logic of Zelinsky’s thought in his main work, which clearly builds on the traditions of Russian philosophy, was leading him and probably would eventually have brought him to the same conclusion as that arrived at by the great Russian seekers of true Christianity, Fyodor Dostoevsky, Leo Tolstoy and Vladimir Solovyov. However, his forced movement from Russia to Poland, whatever Zelinsky said about it himself, led him to “reappraise values”: he chose to accept the traditional faith of his ancestors without any criticism and failed to bring to its natural conclusion his great work, which could have formed the basis of a totally new vision of the history of the European civilization.

My study has shown that an adequate assessment of a thinker’s philosophical views must involve an attentive examination of the social environment and the historical events that influenced him and nudged him toward making conclusions

totally different from his initial plan. The humanities are inherently integral, and historical-philosophical analysis in particular calls for ventures into adjacent areas of the humanities [4].

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Note

- ¹ Replying to criticism on this issue, including charges of anti-Semitism, Zelinsky stressed that he distinguished the *religious* and *cultural* influences of Judaism and the Old Testament on the development of European peoples. He had a negative attitude only to the first aspect, i.e., the content of the holy texts, while recognizing the positive significance of their “very beautiful and soul-stirring” artistic form [8, p. 520].

Translated by Yevgeny Filippov

V. K. Plehve and the Policy toward Jews in Russia at the Turn of the 19th and 20th Centuries

Andrey MINAKOV

Abstract. This article is devoted to the Russian autocracy's policy on the Jewish question in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It examines the role of V. K. Plehve, the State Secretary (1894-1902) and Minister of Internal Affairs (1902-1904) of the Russian Empire, in the shaping of government policy toward the Jews at different stages in his career. The author notes the contradictory character of Plehve's views: On the one hand, he was involved in some measures that aggravated the plight of the Jewish population, but on the other hand, he supported gradual easing of repressive legislation. The author notes Plehve's attentive attitude to the international Jewish movement.

Keywords: the Russian Empire, V. K. Plehve, the Jewish question in Russia. Zionism, the Jewish Pale.

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The life of the Jews in Tsarist Russia was in many ways determined by the traditions of the autocratic system and the personalities in power, the decisions of its emperors, the servility of the government ministers, the unpredictable behavior of regional elites and so on. The contradictory nature of the government's policy with regard to the Jews, which was a mixture of Judeophobia and liberalism, was highlighted by the activities of Vyacheslav Plehve. Russian historiography [28; 30; 35; 36; 41] and journalism [22; 11; 38; 43] have ascribed to him a tendency to perpetuate the discrimination of Jews and to systematically suppress them, even to encourage pogroms, while downplaying the significance of changes in laws regarding Jews, which he helped make more lenient. This was due partly to selective reading of the sources and partly to the influence of the assessments in the liberal and radical press as well as in the memoirs of his political opponents (most notably Sergey Witte).¹

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In the late 19th century, the situation of Jews was discussed in a succession of meetings which developed (usually temporary) legislation. These activities were coordinated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. After a wave of pogroms that swept the Pale in 1881-1882, the ruling circles of the Empire tried to identify their cause and establish to what extent they were spontaneous or organized. The Interior Minister Count Nikolay Ignatieff attributed them to the nefarious activities of the revolutionary elements as well as the natural reaction of the Christian population to the aggressive economic behavior of the Jews [20, p. 153; 29, p. 115; 46, p. 231]. Since April of 1881, Plehve held the post of Director of the Police Department, and Ignatieff enlisted his services in developing new legislation [45, p. 458]. Meanwhile the special commissions charged with finding out the causes of anti-Jewish riots set up in August 1881 in all the gubernias within the Pale, following Ignatieff, criticized the Jews for shirking productive work, religious isolationism etc., but at the same time advocated a lifting of all the restrictive legislation [46, pp. 232-243; 29, p. 117].

Selectively using reports from the gubernias, Ignatieff started advocating new anti-Jewish legislation. However, his colleagues at the Ministerial Committee, especially Nikolay Bunge and Dmitry Nabokov, took a firm stand against the toughening of legislation fearing, among other things, an adverse reaction from the international community. Having met with opposition of the heads of the financial and judiciary agencies, Ignatieff made a submission to the Emperor [49, pp. 60-61]. As a result, his recommendations were included, albeit in an abridged form, in the Provisional Rules on the Jews endorsed by Alexander III on May 3, 1882. The rules forbade Jews living within the Pale to settle in rural areas, acquire or rent real estate outside cities and shtetls (other than Jewish land-farming communities) as well as to trade on Sundays and major Christian holidays [7, p. 181, no. 834]. The restrictions were to be effective until "a general revision, under established procedure, of the laws on Jews." Such a revision was undertaken in 1883-1888 by the High Commission set up for that express purpose under Count Konstantin Pahlen. It gathered a considerable body of material and proposed a repeal of the restrictions introduced in 1882 which, in the opinion of its members, aggravated the poverty of the Jewry and complicated its relations with the Christian population.

Meanwhile in 1886-1887 the Interior Ministry cut the Jewish quotas at secondary and higher educational establishments which caused widespread resentment because education was one of the few pathways for moving out of the Pale and up the social ladder [3, pp. 328-330; 16, pp. 39, 54-55].

On January 23, 1890, Deputy Interior Minister Plehve was appointed chairman of the commission on revising the restrictive legislation on the Jews issued on May 3, 1882, and on spreading these rules to the gubernias of the Polish Kingdom [40, p. 576]. The Interior Ministry was cognizant of the experience of the Pahlen commission, but was still in favor of further restrictions. However, not much is known of the results of this work because the introduction of the prepared report at the State Council was postponed due to the objections of the Finance Minister Ivan Vyshnegradsky [34, p. 314; 50, pp. 134-135; 42, p. 457]. The Fi-

nance Ministry consistently came out against discrimination of Jews which undermined Russia's reputation in the European banking circles [32, pp. 130-131]. The inter-agency polemic reached its peak under Witte [13, pp. 219-221].

Plehve at the time was obviously under the influence of the Emperor and Ivan Durnovo who had replaced the Interior Minister Dmitry Tolstoy in 1889. Thus, as the head of the commission to draft a new Urban Statute he justified the debarment of Jews from the Dumas, citing a similar provision in the 1890 Statute on Zemstvos. And "proceeding from the root foundation of our social governance and the calling by the supreme authorities of the best people of a locality to manage its interests," he argued that "it is pardonable to doubt that the Jewish environment can produce such best people".² At the same time, Plehve noted:

[A]ny government undertaking on such a difficult issue of governance as the Jewish issue does not only meet the exigencies of a given time, but is part of the continuity with other official decrees, anticipating in some way the following ones... Considered from this point of view, the banishment of Jews from public governance, in the opinion of the opponents of this measure, does not conform to the requirement of state foresight, for it is hardly possible to envisage that the Jews will ever leave our fatherland; any other outlook in the field of the future destinies of the Jewish race does not allow of decrees that would put a population of several million in the position of outcasts.

Jewish suffrage and the possibility of taking part in economic life, according to Plehve, were also dictated by the significant number of Jews in cities within the Pale, which the implementation of the Provisional Rules of 1882 was further increasing.³

The imperfections of the 1882 Provisional Rules were acknowledged not only in the findings of government commissions and conferences, but also in the annual reports of local governors. Thus, the Governor of Kyiv, Lev Tomara, reported in 1889 that Jews outside of cities, in defiance of the 1882 Provisional Rules "without signing written deeds, or hiding the existence of the same, tended to use plots of land without incurring any responsibility." This met with "growing dismay of the peasant population which cannot understand why the Jews, who are forbidden to rent land under legal contracts, can use them without any written conditions." Alexander III wrote on the margins: "Revise the law."⁴

The Governor of Volyn, Sergey Sukhodolsky, reported in 1895 that "for the administrative bodies combating the mobile Jewish population who have illegally settled and are operating in the villages, is a task that is virtually beyond their power and physically impossible."⁵ Moreover, the existence of the Pale, concentration of Jews in the cities artificially created "Jewish centers" where there were no legal ways of making a living. Sukhodolsky openly urged the need to abolish the Pale arguing that "the fewer Jews live in each particular locality the less difference they will make for the indigenous population, the less cause for concern will they give to government power."⁶ However, Nicholas II wrote on the margin of the report: "I do not at all share the Governor's view" [4, p. 29].

Meanwhile the Pskov governors more than once reported the growth of Jewish land-owning. Reacting to the 1898 report of Konstantin Pashchenko, the

Pskov governor since 1888, the Emperor admitted that "it is a highly undesirable phenomenon." A similar remark in the report of Boris Vasilchikov for 1900 elicited an august order: "An exceedingly important issue. Ministers of internal affairs, justice and finance consider measures to stop the influx" [5, pp. 78-79]. The 1898 report of the Smolensk governor Vasily Sosnovsky who referred to the same problem bears this resolution: "Highly undesirable phenomenon. Bring it to the attention of the Interior Minister." Next to a similar remark in the 1900 report of the Novgorod governor Otton Medem, the Emperor wrote: "Attention Minister of the Interior" [6, p. 127; 5, p. 61]. In 1900, the Mayor of Petersburg reported a growing number of Jews in the capital [5, p. 88]. In the report on the state of the Kursk gubernia for 1894, the Tsar underlined the words: "Many have managed to obtain documents that entitle them to living outside the Jewish Pale."⁷ The governor of Yekaterinoslav, Dmitry Martynov, in an 1895 report complained that the local authorities were powerless in the face of the trickery of Jews. "Unfortunately, that is true," the Emperor wrote on the margin, "but there's nothing to be done" [4, p. 43]. Thus, the legal system was clearly unable to stop the Jews: while failing to ease the social tensions and the threat of pogroms it aggravated the material situation of the mass of the Jewish population and marred the international image of the Empire.

Assuming the post of Interior Minister in April 1902, Plehve was aware that the preservation of the 1882 Provisional Rules would impede his actions in various spheres. However, being a sophisticated bureaucrat who realized that the mood of the monarch and his retinue precluded full emancipation of the Jews any time soon, he opted for gradual legalization of their residence outside the Pale and for relative broadening of their economic opportunities.

On June 1, 1902, after the Interior Ministry's General Affairs Department incorporated the Special Unit of the Department of Religious Affairs of Foreign Denominations which dealt with Jewish affairs, a Special Council under Deputy Minister Pyotr Durnovo was formed to deal with the general issues connected with the revision of the 1882 Provisional Rules. Among its members were also directors of the police and general affairs departments Aleksey Lopukhin and Aleksey Rogovich (the latter had initiated the creation of the Council).⁸

In late April of 1903, the Interior Ministry prepared a draft of the amendments to the 1882 Provisional Rules, which extended the list of places where Jews were allowed to reside. The draft was based on the memorandum submitted to the Council of Ministers by Dmitry Sipyagin as early as late March 1902. It proposed allowing Jews to live in 22 places within the Pale that were not towns or shtetls but had trade and industrial significance.⁹ It was not easy to determine the status of such settlements which typically sprang up around factories, landing stages and railway stations. Some of them were formally considered to be agricultural lands, but their inhabitants were no longer peasants. Others had no urban status solely because a large part or even the majority of their populations were Jews, who had no right to vote or to hold any official positions. In any case, these Jews were practically outlawed after the introduction of the Provisional Rules.

Plehve reworked and enlarged the initial list to 108 settlements and submitted

it to the Council of Ministers on April 27.¹⁰ On May 10, Nicholas II approved the corresponding ordinance and the list, which was pared down to 101 [8, p. 493, no. 22933; 9, pp. 338-340]. Significantly, five of the seven settlements dropped from the list were in the Bessarabia gubernia. This was also probably a reaction to the recent Kishinev pogrom. That left only one Bessarabian settlement on the list (like in the 1902 version). The largest number of settlements were in the gubernias of Vilno (26), Poltava (14), Yekaterinoslav (11), Grodno (9), Volyn (8), Kovno (7) and Chernigov (7). Out of the Sipyagin draft, only 16 settlements made it to the final list. Incidentally, in many of them Jews did not outnumber Christians and there were no Jewish residents at all in Vilno gubernia's settlements of Antokol, Rossa, Loseva Dacha and Rovnoye Pole. Thus, the 1903 ordinance did not only legalize the residence of Jews in earlier settled territories, but allowed the settlement of new places.

In August 1903, the Interior Ministry circulated to the governors a letter requesting them to indicate the amendments they wanted to be introduced in the 1882 Provisional Rules. A Special Meeting to prepare a revision of the laws on Jews was called in January 1904. Plehve appointed as its chairman Lieutenant-General Ivan Obolensky, former Governor of Kherson and Kharkov, who had experience of dealing with the Jewish population. The members of the council were the governors of Vilno (Pahlen), Bessarabia (Sergey Urusov), Pskov (Emmanuel Vatatsi), Mogilev (Nikolay Klingenberg) and Warsaw (Dmitry Martynov), chief of the Moscow police Dmitry Trepov, Lopukhin and others. Heated discussions arose during the meetings, with Lopukhin stating that "the Minister allowed the most decisive discussion of the Provisional Rules."¹¹

The Council became virtually divided between those who opposed restrictive legislation (Vatatsi, Lopukhin, Pahlen, Urusov) and those who considered the repeal of the Provisional Rules to be premature. Count Urusov, for example, argued that the situation in which, in spite of practically uncontrolled eviction of Jews, many of them continued to live where they were not allowed to, with direct connivance of the authorities, had a corrupting impact on the administration. Gubernia boards and police administrations were inundated with Jewish eviction cases which they were unable to handle in time. Meanwhile "preventing Jews from living outside cities and shtetls artificially concentrated them in cities and shtetls in excessive numbers leading to impossibly low wages, a striving to leave for other places and provoking unrest."¹² Pahlen claimed that the 1882 Provisional Rules had effectively created a new Pale reducing Jewish settlement by almost 90% [31, pp. 12, 63-64]. But not all found these arguments convincing. One of the Council members, Ananyev uyezd Marshal of Nobility Mikhail Malayev in Kherson gubernia, argued that "if police and administration bodies were overburdened with Jewish eviction cases, this merely indicated the need to increase the staff, but can on no account be grounds for repealing the law under discussion."¹³

The Council met at least three times in 1904 (on January 12, 14 and 22), but after the start of the Russo-Japanese War, governors had other matters to attend to and the Council's work was put on hold [45, p. 487]. Even so, on May 30, 1904,

Plehve submitted a memorandum "On some changes in the legislation on Jews" proposing that persons with a higher education and major merchants be allowed to live outside towns and shtetls within the Pale. The minister noted that "the Jews who have acquired a higher education stand out from among their co-religionists in their views, living conditions, habits and inclinations" and "have more in common with the rest of the population of the Empire than with the ignorant Jewish masses" because "the families of Jews with a higher education constitute an entirely distinct group in the Jewish community."¹⁴ It was not until after Plehve's death in August 1904 that Nicholas II approved the Interior Ministry draft law [10, pp. 871-873, no. 25016].

Meanwhile the residence rights of Jews within the Pale continued to broaden. In late 1903, they were legally allowed to settle in 58 more places (including eight settlements in the Vilno and Yekaterinoslav gubernias where they previously did not live).¹⁵

Plehve showed an interest in other ways of alleviating the situation of the Jewish population in the Empire. Together with Anatoly Koni, Pavel Korf, and Andrey Saburov he supported the petition of the Vilno Jewish Society urging the creation of a workhouse in the city. On January 7, 1903, the petition was considered at the Fund for Workhouses. A. Putilov recalled that Plehve "thought it impossible to turn a blind eye to the dire material situation of the Jewish population which is choking in the settlement Pale even as their kin who are incomparably more harmful to the state live happily outside the Pale."¹⁶ The Interior Minister was also mindful of the fact that "there is a marked weakening of religious principles and family authority among the Jews, due to which Jewish youth swell the ranks of people who are prepared to destroy public order and are becoming embittered" [21, p. 274]. He was aware that Jews were actively supporting the Neo-Populists (Social Revolutionaries) and Social Democratic organizations [3, pp. 332-333; 1; 2].

However, the Finance Minister Witte objected to the creation of a workhouse in Vilno. He feared that it would set an undesirable precedent triggering a spate of "petitions from a lot of places where the Jews will hail the opportunity to open mutual help societies and there would be no grounds for forbidding it." He also had a feeling of unease because these institutions were under the patronage of Aleksandra Fyodorovna and he felt that "the people should not be led to look upon the Russian Empress as a guardian of the Jews" [21, pp. 274-275].

In spite of the legal loosening of restrictions within the Pale Plehve bore the brunt of public criticism after the Jewish pogrom in Kishinev on April 6-7, 1903, when some fifty people died and several hundred were injured (for more detail see [17, pp. 130-146]). On May 18, *The Times* of London carried an alleged confidential letter of the Interior Minister to the Governor of Bessarabia, Vikenty Raaben, warning of planned anti-Jewish actions and ordering "to contribute to the immediate stopping of disorders which may arise, by means of admonitions, without at all having recourse, however, to the use of arms."¹⁷ Although an official disclaimer followed,¹⁸ the publication made a strong impression on the public opinion in Europe and the USA. The foreign press and the Russian liberal and

radical circles assured a broad public resonance and practically with one voice put the blame on Plehve, if not for organizing the pogrom, at least for conniving in the pogrom makers.

The behavior of the Bessarabian governor did indeed compromise the government.¹⁹ According to the head of the Interior Minister's office, Dmitry Lyubimov, Raaben involuntarily created the impression that the authorities took a wait-and-see position. After calling in troops at the start of the disturbances, he "entirely distanced himself from giving any orders, assuming that it was up to the army to give orders. The troops stood still throughout the day waiting for directions from the civilian authorities" [27, p. 84].

In the evening of April 6, Raaben sent a wire to Plehve assuring him that he had delegated the necessary powers to the military and that the unrest was subsiding. However, the minister already knew (including from the journalists who were on the spot during the tragedy) that the pogrom was continuing and immediately sent Lopukhin to Kishinev. With the consent of the War Minister, Plehve also contacted the commander of the Odessa Military District Count Aleksandr Musin-Pushkin to find out the reason for the passivity of the army. According to the Count's report, later confirmed by Lopukhin, Raaben, "after summoning the troops, gave no further orders, did not visit the place of the pogrom and did not even send over his official substitutes." The troops had no formal grounds for action because they had not been given an order and the pogrom-makers did not attack them while Raaben had not ordered the use of arms whereupon command would have passed to the military authorities [27, pp. 84-85].

Speaking about the London publication, Lyubimov had no doubt that "such a letter was never written and could not have been written" [27, p. 86]. High-ranking police officers insisted that Plehve was not involved in the pogroms.²⁰ Lopukhin, who was in charge of the official investigation into the Kishinev events, claimed that the letter printed in *The Times* was a fake [25, pp. 15-16]. Pavel Zavarzin, a long-serving head of the gendarme office inside the Pale, recalled that the Interior Ministry envisaged "severe punishment, impeachment and even dismissal for any illegal actions of the executive agents on the Jewish question" [51, p. 442].

As a rule, the authorities succeeded in putting down Jewish pogroms. Thus, on August 11, 1902, police failed to stop the clashes between local Catholics and Jews in Częstochowa, Piotrkowska gubernia, but the army units stationed in the city stepped in to restore order.²¹ One day before the Kishinev pogrom, unrest broke out in Pinsk when a crowd of Jews tried to free arrested political propagandists, but was stopped by two army companies summoned by the Minsk Governor.²² On August 29—September 1, 1903, the army put down a pogrom in Gomel. On the whole, the local and central administrations sought to contain flare-ups of mass violence.

S. Urusov, who succeeded Raaben in early May, was also convinced that "Plehve could not have been so rash as to risk leaving evidence of his provocative plans in the hands of the governor whom he barely knew and in whom he had little trust" [45, p. 405]. At the same time, Raaben was probably let down by his personal qualities and his lack of firmness at a critical moment. Besides, he was

compromised by the Vice-Governor, Vasily Ustrugov who, with the Governor's connivance, effectively took control of all the cases that had to do with Jews. Being totally in control of the gubernia administration, Ustrugov felt it was his task "to contain the Jews to the point of breaking the law; but sometimes, in certain cases he allowed laxity that made one suspect motives that were not entirely unselfish" [45, p. 354].

In a belated attempt to calm down the public opinion Raaben addressed a meeting of the local elite representatives on April 20 in the courtyard of the Governor's house to refute the charges of some pogrom-makers who "spread absurd rumors that the top government had allowed Jew-bashing."²³ To be sure, if Raaben had that letter from the Minister he would not have missed the chance to cite it to justify his confused behavior [37, p. 31; 17, p. 127].

The journal *Osvobozhdeniye* was quick to join the Plehve-baiting campaign.²⁴ One of its correspondents wrote to Pyotr Struve:

In general one wishes *Osvobozhdeniye* published more materials about the Kishinev pogrom. Even the data of Russian newspapers abroad warrant some generalizations that are very important at this time. The Kishinev pogrom should become the center from which the hardest blows to the government would come. Needless to say, it is the blows coming from this side that the government fears most.²⁵

This appeal was very much in line with the principles of one the journal's founding fathers, Dmitry Shakhovskoy, who believed that "one of the prime tasks of such an organ as *Osvobozhdeniye* is to discredit the government. And this is not a secondary task, no, it is a matter of vast importance, of primary political significance" (quoted from [39, p. 78]). Having said that, the influence of this periodical on Russian society should not be overestimated: most of its copies were circulating in Europe among Russian émigrés and travelers [39, p. 98].

Meanwhile *The Times* continued to publish items on the Kishinev riots acquainting its readers with reports from its own correspondents and clippings from publications in European and American newspapers. Count Urusov recalled that Kishinev was visited by an English agent who gathered data on the aftermath of the April events. He was allowed to make a tour of the city and even to visit the prison castle where he talked with the detained rioters [45, pp. 376-377].

Nicholas II did not make any public statements about the pogrom. For his part, Plehve wrote to the Emperor on April 26: "In the wake of the Kishinev unrest I think it would be useful to send a circular letter to administrative bodies that would replace a government report on these riots."²⁶ On April 30, the minister circulated his letter setting forth the official version of the events, and on May 24, he received a Jewish deputation. Expressing his condolences, Plehve, they said, was extremely courteous and charmed them, assuring them that the Tsar was also grieving over what had happened.²⁷

Nevertheless the reaction to Nicholas II's silence was largely negative. "Since 1903," S. Urusov remembered:

[I]t became evident for everyone that the sovereign is an enemy of the Jewry, if not in his

actions, then in his heart and conviction. Attempts to elicit from the sovereign at least some kind of condemnation of the pogroms or an expression of sympathy for the victims by gift of his own money met with failure [45, p. 375].

Considering the strength of anti-Semitic feeling at the court, Urusov did not rule out that the chief of the Kishinev security department, Lavrenty Levendahl, may have provoked the pogrom hoping to divine the secret wishes of those on high [45, pp. 408-409].

Public opinion in Russia and abroad expected an open investigation of the circumstances of the tragedy. However, the government was obviously unwilling to disclose them banning press publications and deciding to hold the trial behind closed doors. The European press published a series of "placatory" articles, but the Interior Ministry had neither "control over the Western papers, nor the means to ensure a favorable assessment of its statements, nor the possibility to prevent the publication of hostile articles" [17, p. 100]. So it had to resort to administrative measures. *The Times* correspondent Dudley Disraeli Braham, who had nothing to do with the Kishinev events, was expelled from the country. On June 24, 1904, Plehve asked the German Embassy to Petersburg what grounds were needed to shut down *Osvobozhdeniye* or expel its publisher from Stuttgart, and as early as June 28 Struve, having fled Germany with his wife, was looking for a new home in Paris [33, pp. 356-357].

Such was the atmosphere in the summer of 1903 in which Plehve met Theodor Herzl, the leader of the international Zionist movement who came to Petersburg to discuss the prospect of moving Russian Jews to Palestine. Herzl and his supporters expected that anti-Semitism, which was widespread in the European countries, would stimulate Jews to move to their historical motherland whereupon the recognition of an independent state would provide the great powers with the easiest way to solve the Jewish question [35, p. 41]. By that time, Herzl had already met with Wilhelm II and Abdul Hamid II. Through the Grand Duke of Baden he passed a letter to Nicholas II seeking to persuade him that Zionism could divert the Jews from socialism and asking permission to come to Russia to present his ideas to the Tsar personally [24, p. 46].

In the early 20th century, Jews were leaving Russia in large numbers. They accounted for more than 70% of Jewish immigrants into the USA. Many of them headed to Canada. At the same time, the birth rate in the Russian gubernias was also high, such that at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries they accounted for half of all the Jews in the world [19, pp. 175, 182]. So Herzl had reason to see them as a mobile demographic community.

The Empire's authorities regarded Zionism with great interest. The Interior Ministry's police department had for years gathered reports of governors and heads of gubernia gendarme offices containing data about Zionists. Eventually, on June 24, 1903, Plehve sent a circular to the governors which effectively banned the activities of all Zionist organizations except when they were aimed at Jewish emigration from Russia [24, p. 51].

The Minister set forth his position at the very first meeting with Herzl on July 26, 1903. "We expect all the peoples of our Empire, hence also from the Jews,

that they treat the Russian state with patriotic feelings,” he declared. “We want to assimilate them and we move toward this goal by two paths: the path of education and the path of economic rise” [14, p. 219]. For his part, Herzl ardently desired the Russian Tsar to “persistently” petition the Sultan on behalf of the European settlers, which would enable them to gain a foothold in Palestine and eventually create their own state. Moreover, he felt that Russia could render financial assistance to the émigrés “using for this purpose some funds and taxes of purely Jewish origin.” He also hoped for the legalization of Zionist societies in Russia in accordance with the Basel program of 1897. At the forthcoming 6th Zionist Congress in Basel Herzl was prepared to make a declaration on Zionists’ cooperation with the Russian government if it backed the colonization of Palestine and promised “in the near future to expand the Pale of settlement for those Jews who would not wish to emigrate.”²⁸ Because the agreement to this proposal rested on the Emperor, the Minister took a pause, but on July 31 apprised Herzl that Nicholas II approved of the Zionist approach to the solution of the Jewish question and was very dismayed “to be suspected of something inhumane.” At the same time, the Minister made it clear that “we do not by any means want to get rid of all our Jews” [14, p. 230].

On August 1, the Zionist leader wrote to Plehve about the need to speed up Nicholas II’s petition to the Sultan because “at the present time the Ottoman government, eager to please Russia, would do more than at any other time whatever is requested of it. The mere express wish of His Imperial Majesty would be sufficient.”²⁹ Recalling his trip to Russia, Herzl said:

I encountered there a measure of understanding of our Zionist aspirations and a wish to do something decisive for us. I spoke in defense not only of Zionists, but of all the Jews in Russia. I tried to achieve some improvements in their plight and received assurances that the question of such an improvement would soon be raised. The Russian Government will not set obstacles in the way of Zionism if it preserves a calm and loyal character, like today. The Russian Government is ready to use its influence with the Sultan to support our aspiration to achieve a Palestinian charter.

He described his meetings with Plehve as “a major diplomatic gain” [15, p. 8].

The Russian Jews kept a close watch on Herzl’s initiatives, but did not go along with him all the way. According to Henrich Sliosberg, a prominent public personality, “nobody authorized Herzl to declare on behalf of the Jews that they consider their stay in Russia to be temporary, as it were, and are ready to leave their country.” Simultaneously Sliosberg was sure that Herzl was misleading Plehve when he offered, in exchange for equal rights, to persuade the foreign Jewish banks to stop financing the Russian revolutionary movement [27, pp. 88-89].

On September 10, Herzl shared with Plehve his impressions of the 6th Zionist Congress held in Basel on August 23-28. He still believed that the English, French, and German governments would support the Palestine colonization project. But Petersburg was still expected to play the decisive role in its implementation:

Great hopes are now pinned on the government's promise contained in your Excellency's letter of August 12. Disappointment in this hope would mix up the situation and everything Zionism, which my friends and I represent, would lose would go to the revolutionary parties. The saving decision now rests with your promised intercession with the Ottoman government.³⁰

On October 28, Herzl asked Plehve to arrange another audience with Nicholas II.³¹

Because the Kishinev events had triggered a stormy reaction in the world, Plehve was also interested in the Congress and in how the Russian delegation there behaved. "As far as I know, Herzl reassured him, and I say it as an honest person, none of the Russian delegates to the Congress did anything, legally or morally, that was unworthy of a Russian citizen."³²

Herzl's meeting with the Tsar never took place and the ideas he discussed with Plehve met with a predictably cool reaction at the Foreign Ministry. The then Minister Vladimir Lamsdorff was engaged in settling the Macedonia crisis and was loath to present additional demands to Turkey [26, pp. 37-38]. He suggested to Plehve to put the Russian ambassador to Constantinople Ivan Zinoviev in charge of petitioning for the allocation of Palestinian territories for Zionist settlement. The Foreign Ministry, with Plehve's consent, apprised him that "His Imperial Majesty's government is fully supportive of the proposal and the Interior Minister has seen fit to write about it to Dr. Herzl, who made it public with the Minister's consent."³³ Plehve promptly, on November 23, apprised Herzl of the task that had been put before Zinoviev. Simultaneously, he allowed his letters to be quoted, despite the confidentiality of their correspondence, if the need arose to confirm the readiness of the Russian government to assist the Zionists.³⁴

However, Herzl was already growing skeptical about the prospects of his plans. He wrote to Plehve on December 11:

With all due humility I have to confess that I do not entertain excessive illusions concerning the effect of mediation in this form, knowing the mores and practices of exceedingly crafty Turkish diplomacy. The mediation of the Russian ambassador, even very strenuous, risks ending up in the archives of Sublime Porte along with the documents of other fruitless mediations.

Therefore, Herzl was asking permission to publish the November 23 letter sent to him by the Minister, if only in part. Still better, in his opinion, would be to arrange an audience for him with Nicholas II and allow him to then write about it in the press. Herzl assured:

Then at least everybody would see the delectable intentions of the Russian government to help to resolve this luckless Jewish question through the humane means of Zionism, and this would have an impact on the international public opinion at this precise moment.³⁵

Zinoviev promptly sent to Count Lamsdorff a letter expressing doubt about the chances of success of the mission with which he was charged. The missive landed on the Emperor's desk and on December 16, he scribbled on it, "A fair

account.”³⁶ Consultations stalled because the Russo-Japanese War began, and in the summer of 1904, Herzl and Plehve passed away almost simultaneously.

At the height of his correspondence with Herzl, on October 23, 1903, Plehve also met with Lucien Wolf, a prominent English public figure, journalist and historian of the Jewry. Wolf wrote about Plehve:

He knows the Jews and values the merits of that intelligent race... He shares the opinion of those who believe it is difficult to give the Jews free access inside Russia, because the Russian peasant is very poor and if the Jews settled there he would have to share his scant resources with the settlers, most of whom belong to the non-productive class” [47, p. 122].³⁷

The Interior Minister did not only express his disquiet about the Jewish youth being carried away by revolutionary ideas, but also showed concern for the welfare of Jews and a readiness to expand the territories where they could live. In this way, he hoped to bring about assimilation of the more elevated, cultured part of the Jewry and to improve the material position of its poorer and uneducated strata. He saw Zionism above all as a counterweight to socialism, but he did not believe in the political perspective of Jewish emigration to Palestine.³⁸

At the same time, he was thinking of a plan of resettling Jews to the Far East, to Manchuria, a subject he intended to discuss with the governor Admiral Evgeny Alekseyev. Plehve also approved of Wolf’s idea of settling Jews in Southern Siberia “to create a quasi-Russian barrier against increasing Chinese and Japanese forays.”³⁹

Thus, the reputation of a “fierce anti-Semite” he had acquired since before the Kishinev events [18, p. 94], when he took part in developing restrictive legislation in the 1880s and 1890s, failed to do justice to his complicated views. Plehve was probably not being evasive when he said: “If in my capacity of deputy minister I had to act against the Jews in some commissions, do not forget that I was executing the orders of other people” [48, p. 33]. As the Interior Minister, he sought to defuse tensions over the Jewish question, while deeming it necessary to keep the scope and nature of legal relaxations under control.

An experienced administrator, he was mindful of the red line of admissible concessions, which enabled him to maintain the fickle balance without antagonizing the monarch. At the same time, he was of course influenced by personal experiences. Some of his contemporaries who were critical of him attested to the warm feelings he displayed when recalling his friendships with Jews as a young man.⁴⁰

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Notes

- ¹ Researchers outside Russia take a more balanced approach. See [18; 37; 13; 17; 23, pp. 265-273].
- ² State Archive of the Russian Federation (GA RF). F. 586. Op. 1. D. 96. Ll. 5ob.-6. ³ Ibid. Ll. 4-5.
- ⁴ Russian State Historical Archive (RGIA). Collection of Printed Gubernia Reports in the Custody of the Reading Hall (hereinafter "Collection"). Op. 1. D. 42. Ll. 3 ob., 36 ob.
- ⁵ Ibid. D. 17. L. 113 ob.
- ⁶ Ibid. L. 115 ob.
- ⁷ RGIA. Collection. Op. 1. D. 48. L. 45.
- ⁸ GA RF. F. 102. Deloproizvodstvo 2. Op. 76a. D. 2113. Ll. 1-1 ob.
- ⁹ RGIA. F. 1405. Op. 82. 1904. D. 9722. Ll. 32-56 ob.
- ¹⁰ Ibid. F. 1263. Op. 4. D. 27. Ll. 293-316.
- ¹¹ GA RF. F. 102. Deloproizvodstvo 2. Op. 76a. D. 2114. L. 41.
- ¹² Ibid. L. 21.
- ¹³ GA RF. F. 102. Deloproizvodstvo 2. Op. 76a. D. 2114. L. 21.
- ¹⁴ RGIA. F. 1405. Op. 82. 1904. D. 9724. L. 3ob.
- ¹⁵ RGIA. F. 1263. Op. 2. D. 5625. Ll. 201-204; также ПСЗ-III. Т. 23. Отд. I. № 23664. С. 1076.
- ¹⁶ Russian State Archive of Literature and Art (RGALI). F. 1337. Op. 1. D. 217. L. 143.
- ¹⁷ *The Times*. May 18, 1903, p. 9.

- ¹⁸ *Pravitelstvennyy vestnik* (=Government Herald). May 13(26), 1903, p. 2; Hero of the Day. *Osvobozhdeniye* (= Liberation). May 19 (June 1), 1903. No. 23, p. 412. See also [12, pp. 300-301].
- ¹⁹ It is hard to agree with the opinion of E. Judge, who wrote that after the pogrom V. S. Raaben was scapegoated [18, p. 97]. The governor could not have been unaware of the degree of tensions in Bessarabia. Indeed, he was repeatedly warned of the threat of unrest by the chief of the Kishinev security police L. N. Levendahl [27, p. 85].
- ²⁰ See, for example, [44, p. 31; 18, p. 99].
- ²¹ GA RF. F. 102. Op. 100. Deloproizvodstvo 3. D. 1508. Ll. 8-9; RGIA. Library. Op. 1. D. 69. Ll. 101ob.-102. Characteristically, the authorities tried to conceal this information and did not include it in the bimonthly bulletins of gubernia news (*Petrokovskiye gubernskiye vedomosti*. September 7, 1902. No. 36, pp. 11-12; September 28. No. 39, p. 10).
- ²² GA RF. F. 601. Op. 1. D. 1046. Ll. 2-2ob.
- ²³ *Bessarabets* (= Bessarabian). April 22 (May 5), 1903. No. 104, p. 3.
- ²⁴ *Osvobozhdeniye*. May 8(21), 1903. No. 22, pp. 377-379. For more detail see [39, pp. 84-85].
- ²⁵ Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI). F. 279. Op. 1. D. 89. Ll. 2-2ob.
- ²⁶ GA RF. F. 601. Op. 1. D. 1046. L. 1.
- ²⁷ *The Times*. May 28, 1903, p. 3; Department of Manuscripts of the Russian State Library (OR RGB). F. 126. K. 13. L. 231ob.
- ²⁸ GA RF. F. 586. Op. 1. D. 610. Ll. 2ob.-3ob.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.* L. 5.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.* L. 9.
- ³¹ *Ibid.* L. 12ob.
- ³² *Ibid.* L. 11.
- ³³ GA RF. F. 586. Op. 1. D. 317. Ll. 1-1ob.; Foreign Policy Archive of Imperial Russia (AVPRI). F. 151. Op. 482. 1903. D. 3427. Ll. 5-7.
- ³⁴ GA RF. F. 586. Op. 1. D. 317. L. 2ob.-3.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.* D. 610. Ll. 16-17.
- ³⁶ AVPRI. F. 151. Op. 482. 1903. D. 3427. L. 10.
- ³⁷ After that meeting, Wolf delivered a report at a meeting of the Anglo-Jewish society which was well-received. In asking permission to publish this text, he hoped that "openness will produce a very good impression on the Jewish community" (GA RF. F. 586. Op. 1. D. 610. L. 26).
- ³⁸ GA RF. F. 586. Op. 1. D. 610. Ll. 24ob.-25.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.* L. 25.
- ⁴⁰ See [48, p. 303]; GA RF. F. 586. Op. 1. D. 610. L. 23; [14, p. 231].

Translated by Yevgeny Filippov

“Russia Invaded by Germans”: The Story of a Literary Sensation

Evgeny ABDULLAEV

Abstract. This article is devoted to the literary episode involving an anonymous pamphlet entitled “La Russie Envahie par les Allemands,” which appeared at the Leipzig Book Fair in 1844 and quickly became a sensation in Russia and Europe alike. Its author, Filipp Vigel (Weigel), a former member of the Arzamas literary society, had fallen under the spell of the Slavophiles. The pamphlet was a manifesto, and the first attempt at a historical-philosophical justification of the anti-German sentiments that were widespread among the Russian elite during the reign of Nicholas I. The book’s publication is examined in the context of the rivalry between the Ministry of the Interior (where Vigel served from 1829 to 1840) and its Third Department, believed to be a stronghold of the German party, versus the rising Pan-Slavism in Europe, whose principal champions were in correspondence with Vigel. In addition, the article considers the connection between the pamphlet’s fragment describing Pushkin’s death and the anonymous anti-German letters received by V. Zhukovsky and Count A. Orlov upon the poet’s tragic demise.

Keywords: F. Vigel (Weigel), A. Pushkin, A. de Custine, N. Grech, A. Benckendorff, D. Valuyev, Nicholas I, D. Bludov, Slavophiles, nationalism.

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In early October of 1844, a slim pamphlet in French titled “La Russie envahie par les Allemands” (Russia Invaded by Germans)¹ appeared at the Leipzig Book Fair. It was published anonymously, with Paris and Leipzig indicated as the places of publication [52]. The speed with which it became known in Russia is remarkable.

“Have you read ‘La Russie envahie par les Allemands,’ and is it making a sensation?” Aleksey Khomyakov asked Yury Samarin in a letter of October 10 [1, p. 313].

“For God’s sake buy or order the book ‘La Russie envahie par les Alle-

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mands’—and order a copy for me,” Faddey Bulgarin wrote to Vladimir Storozhenko, his Tartu acquaintance, “it is a chef d’oeuvre of everything written in Russia; the truth about Livonian Germans like nothing that has ever been written. I have read it—it’s a gem” [43, pp. 259-260].

“There is no reason to attack the recently published book, said to be entertaining, ‘La Russie envahie par les Allemands’... Some of our wanderers abroad must have helped the anonymous author,” General Aleksey Yermolov wrote to General Nikolay Muravyov in November [17, p. 318].

The pamphlet was mentioned by Ivan Pushchin, who was in Yaloturovsk at the time [34].

And yet the book was not on sale for the general public. Nikolay Yazykov in a letter to his brother Aleksandr (December 27) put the blame for this on the Germans: “Deubner the book-seller refused to release it—what can you expect from a German?” [53, p. 378].

The German and French press responded to the pamphlet, but the Russian press was silent. The topic was taboo: in 1832, the journal *Evropeets* (The European) was shut down over quite innocuous hints about “the Russian Germans” [5].

Before long, the name of the author of the pamphlet became known. The man behind the mysterious caption “Notes recueillies un vieux soldat, qui n’est ni pair de France, ni diplomate, ni député”² was Filipp Vigel, a former member of the Arzamas circle, a man of letters and a statesman.

Indeed, Vigel was neither a French peer, nor a diplomat, nor a deputy. Nor was he *an old soldier*; his entire career was in the civil service. And of course he was not French, though he wrote in French with the same facility as in Russian.

Perhaps he could be called *old* by the standards of the time: he turned 58 in November 1844. Four years earlier he had retired, was forced to retire, after serving at the Ministry of the Interior for more than eleven years, as vice director since 1829 and then as director of the department of religious affairs of foreign denominations. Having become a private individual, he traveled and wrote his memoirs (“Notes”) which would later become famous.³

“La Russie...” was his first published work.⁴ It was prompted by the publication in 1843 of the four-volume *Russia in 1839* by Astolphe de Custine. That work, which almost instantly became a bestseller, triggered a spate of Russian anti-Custine reactions. Some of these works were commissioned pieces, but some were written in good faith: The authors “used the polemic with it (Custine’s book—*E. A.*) as a pretext for general historical-philosophical reflections on the destiny of Russia”⁵ [29, p. 493].

Vigel’s pamphlet was one of the “unsanctioned” responses.

“It Would Take Tomes to Pour Out All My Bile”

The prelude to the writing of “La Russie...” was Vigel’s journey undertaken in

early June of 1843.⁶ After “a three-day voyage across the stormy Baltic Sea,” he arrived in Germany. He then headed south to the Austrian Empire, to Bohemia; on June 24 (July 5) he was in Prague [16, p. 174]. He spent some time in Marienbad,⁷ before going to Paris.

In Paris Vigel met the French man of letters Hippolyte Auger whom he had patronized when the latter lived in Petersburg. In 1843, Auger was living through hard times and was thinking about a trip to Russia. Vigel mentioned de Custine’s book during their very first meeting: “M. de Custine has done much harm to my fellow countrymen” [8, p. 481]. Then he suggested that Auger should write a refutation of the book. Auger agreed because he had personal literary scores to settle with Custine.

Vigel introduced Auger to the publisher of *Severnaya pchela* (The Northern Bee) Nikolay Grech (the author of another anti-Custine pamphlet [20]); Grech accepted with enthusiasm the idea of bringing in a Russophile Frenchman into the anti-Custine polemic. Grech wrote several times about Auger to Leonty Dubelt, the right-hand man of Aleksandr Benckendorff, chief of the secret police department—Third Section of His Imperial Majesty’s Own Chancellery. Grech was planning to co-write with Auger a vaudeville entitled “A Journey to Russia” mocking Custine. It was to be staged in Paris. Nicholas I at first backed the idea but then decided in favor of ignoring the book by Custine and the other anti-Russian pamphlets, which appeared on the crest of its success [42]. Thus, the plan of Vigel and Grech came to nothing, except that Auger wrote reminiscences about his second visit to Russia in 1844-1845.

To return Vigel. After staying in Paris until at least the 20th of October, 1843,⁸ he moved to Germany. In late December, he met a young Slavophile, Dmitry Valuyev, in Dresden. The latter wrote about it to his relatives:

Here I met Vigel again, he did not like Paris and is returning to Moscow; says he would write a response to Custine, except that he would need tomes to pour out all his bile, and he was afraid to stir it up [23, p. 328].

So, the topic of a response to Custine crops up again, but this time around Vigel is mentioned as the potential author. It is possible that it was the Slavophile Valuyev, who was at the time establishing links with European book publishers [36], who prodded him on to write if not “tomes” at least a small pamphlet.

Vigel returns to Russia in January [8] and apparently gets down to writing. Valuyev undertakes to deliver the manuscript to Europe for publication.⁹

The pamphlet, published in time for the Leipzig book fair, far transcended the framework of anti-Custine discourse. Only a brief introductory part and a couple of references in the body of the text are devoted to *Russia in 1839*. All the rest is dedicated to the main topic, i.e., the role of the Germans, mainly the Baltic (Ostsee) Germans, in Russian history.

Vigel himself was one quarter German, a Baltic German.¹⁰ In the 1810s, as a member of the Arzamas society, he was noted for his sympathy toward the Germans, especially as regards the German literature and theater [12, p. 275].

However, in the early 1840s, Vigel, according to Hippolyte Auger, experi-

enced “holy hatred” for the Germans: “He wrote a pamphlet on this topic (in French) in which he partly gave vent to his anger (*un peu de sa bile*)” [8, p. 568].

So the bile Vigel “needed tomes” to get rid of filled a pamphlet. Another memoirist who was benevolently disposed toward Vigel, Mikhail Dmitriyev, recognizing that it contained “a lot of what was true” nevertheless noted that Vigel as an author had displayed “a feeling of hatred he was particularly prone to” [10, p. 444].

“A Religious and Military Order”

The first impression Vigel’s pamphlet was likely to produce on the reader was that it was a historical work. It described in chronological sequence the emergence of Germans in the Baltic lands, their settlement there, etc. right up to the Livonian War. Subsequent “invasion of Russia by the Germans” was also described in historical sequence. A separate chapter was devoted to every ruler beginning from Peter I.

And yet “La Russie...” was not a historical study. It is not that Vigel has many inaccuracies and stretches. And not that more than a third of the pamphlet is devoted to Russia and Europe of his time, which was what the “historical part” was written for. It is not a historical, but a historical-philosophical work reflecting the same intellectual trend as the “philosophical letters” of Pyotr Chaadayev or the historical essays of Nikolay Gogol (in his *Arabesques*). Vigel’s opus may have been inferior to the former in terms of philosophical depth and to the latter in terms of vivid imagery, but it made interesting reading, not least due to the intellectual elegance with which it was written.¹¹

Vigel was not the first to raise this sore topic of Russian thought of the Petersburg period. “German preponderance” was already widely discussed in the Decembrists’ circles [38]. It also engaged the minds of the Slavophiles to whom Vigel was close in the late 1830s and early 1840s. It is no accident that the history of the writing and publication of “La Russie...” features the Slavophile Valuyev and that it is mentioned in the correspondence between Khomyakov and Samarin cited above. The topic was not confined to the Slavophiles; a little later the “Westernizer” Aleksandr Herzen wrote about “the hostility between Slavs and Germans” and about the Russian government “flooding the ministries with Germans” [21, pp. 178, 179].

But perhaps in Vigel’s case the most important thing was that the topic was supported by a certain part of the Russian administrative elite, apparently including Dmitry Bludov, Vigel’s friend since the time of their service at the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive and later the superior and protector when the latter served at the Interior Ministry. There was a tacit rivalry between that ministry, which Bludov headed up from 1832 to 1839, and the Third Department [6], which was considered to be the stronghold of “the German party.”

The Third Department expressed not only the interests of the monarchy, but the specific interests of the top bureaucracy the monarchy had fostered. More precisely, the Third Department expressed the interests mainly of the privileged ethnic group within the ruling elite, that is, 'the Russian Germans' [33, p. 317] (see also [5; 3]).

"The German party" did not have a distinctive ethnic character since many Russians had joined it for various tactical and ideological reasons. And vice versa, there were a good many "Russophiles" among the Russian Germans.¹²

Even so, the Third Department, according to Vigel, was considered to be the "bulwark" of "the German party." Its frictions with the Interior Ministry may well have fueled the anti-German feelings of the latter's staff, including Vigel. At least one episode of these frictions directly involved Vigel. He refers to it enigmatically in his pamphlet:

The virtues of the Emperor (Nicholas I—*E. A.*) magnify the power usurped by the Germans... However, at times he regards some shortcomings, even mere foibles, as crimes. Delving into the private lives of those they dislike the German clerks inform the government of the minute details of their lives, distort facts and eventually lead to the disgrace of one of the most useful servants of the state, an ardent supporter of the national cause and a devoted friend of the Emperor [52, pp. 117-118].

There are grounds for believing that "one of the most useful servants of the state" and "an ardent supporter of the national cause" was none other than Vigel himself. And "mere foibles" in "private life" referred to his homosexuality.

Vigel had been marked out as "the man to watch" by the Third Department since 1830, when Bludov was promoting his candidacy for Department chief.

Bludov had to... do some unpleasant explaining... to the chief of the secret police Benckendorff who wrote to him that rumors had reached the Tsar 'privately' about Vigel's laziness¹³ and 'his behavior which is all too well known to all those who know him.' Bludov feigned not understanding the hint at Vigel's 'Asian proclivities' and wrote to Benckendorff that he knew Vigel as a very good and hard-working bureaucrat, as an honest and exceedingly unselfish man. His intercession worked. But with Bludov's departure from the ministry, Vigel had to retire with disgrace and a pledge to move out of Petersburg on account of the selfsame 'behavior that is all too well known to those who know him'¹⁴ [44, p. 33].

So, Vigel had ample reason to pour his bile on the "Germans."

Come to think of it, he had reason to dislike Benckendorff and his agency since an earlier time. In 1826, the secret police arrested Vigel's nephew Aleksandr Alekseyev, Junior Captain of the Jäger Regiment. He was found to be in possession of Pushkin's poem "On 14 December 1825," the title under which was circulated an extract from Pushkin's elegy "André Chénie," published *before* the uprising. In spite of the absurdity of the charge against him, Alekseyev was indicted and spent two years in prison. Recounting the episode in his "Notes," Vigel adds that this was only "the beginning of Benckendorff's terrible absurdities" [45 II, p. 282].¹⁵

“Who Stood to Gain from the Death of Russia’s Greatest Poet...”

The Third Department was involved in yet another, far from trivial, episode of Vigel’s anti-German crusade associated with Pushkin. Vigel had known Pushkin since the Arzamas days. Pushkin was one of the few acquaintances to whom Vigel referred without his customary bile and whose significance he recognized. Custine in his book wrote about Pushkin in a fairly casual, not to say dismissive way [9]; however, here Vigel does not challenge Custine; he needs Pushkin in “La Russie...” for other purposes:

Everything that shines in Russia, wounds and insults the German eye; a striking example is what happened after the tragic death of Pushkin, who had the misfortune of not liking the Germans too much. All the social estates gathered in crowds to bow to his remains; this shared impulse was not only a manifestation of mourning for the poet, but also of sincere reverence for the Tsar, who was the poet’s protector and whose words of consolation alleviated his dying suffering... Alas, the high-ranking Germans who had reason to wish for the death of Russia’s greatest poet tried to denigrate him by recalling the indiscretions of his youth; they presented the universal mourning as a seditious manifestation and sent soldiers to prevent disturbances that might allegedly have happened during the funeral [52, pp. 115-117].

Boris Kazansky drew attention to the similarity between this extract and an anonymous letter received by Count Aleksey Orlov on February 1, 1837 [22, p. 311]. In reality, there were two anonymous letters. The first was received on January 31 by Vasily Zhukovsky; it referred only to “impudent aliens and foreigners” who enjoyed “overt protection and preference” in Russia. The letter to Count Orlov openly spoke about “unlimited power... of the pack of Germans” [41, pp. 195, 196]. Both letters urged the need to bring pressure to bear on the Tsar to induce him to rein in the German influence.

At first glance, the anonymous author’s plan was naïve: the letters were to produce the reverse effect. This was exactly what happened. Both Zhukovsky and Count Orlov forwarded the letters to Benckendorff; the chief of the secret police saw in them “a welcome confirmation of what he had been claiming all along, namely that the malicious Society of December 14 is not dead and is rallying around the name of Pushkin” [41, p. 196], and showed them to the Emperor. As a result, troops were sent to avert expected disturbances at the poet’s funeral.¹⁶

Nevertheless, as a demonstration of the anti-German party these letters were a well-thought-out move. And it had been made by someone who was thoroughly familiar with the alignments of forces at the court (Count Orlov was considered to be the informal leader of that party) and the sentiments that prevailed among the courtiers.¹⁷

Hypothetically, Vigel himself might have been the author of these letters. Vigel was a past master at sending such “signals”: it is interesting to compare these anonymous letters with the notorious denunciation of Chaadayev sent to Metropolitan Serafim of Petersburg three months earlier.

The Church appeals to you for protection: my pleadings are nothing compared to its holy wrath. You, you are duty-bound to explain to the government the dire consequences that would ensue from further leniency and to indicate the means of curbing such outrages. (Vigel to Metropolitan Serafim, October 21, 1836 [15, p. 78]).

You are aware of the popular spirit, patriotism and love of the fatherland, dedication to the throne, and reverence toward the Tsar; but further neglect of the loyal subjects, multiplying abuses in all departments of governance, unlimited powers handed to unworthy individuals, a pack of Germans, all this causes grumbling and discontent among the public and the people itself. Your Excellency, in the name of your Fatherland, the peace and good of the Tsar you are asked to petition His Highness to act in accordance with the common wish, untold benefits will flow from this, otherwise, Your Excellency, we shall pay a bitter price, and pay it soon, for insulting the people. (From an anonymous letter to Count Orlov, February 2, 1837 [41, p. 195]).

Other coincidences can be found. The letter to Zhukovsky ends with assurances that it was written by “a loyal subject who wishes glory and good to the Tsar and the Fatherland and who is *living through the fourth reign*” (my italics—*E. A.*) [41, pp. 194-195]. This almost repeats the way Vigel introduces himself in the preface to his “Notes”: “I was born under Catherine, entered service under Paul, continued it effectively under Alexander and am ending it under Nicholas” [51 I, p. 6]. These coincidences, though, can be attributed to the common rhetoric of the time characterizing such correspondence; the question of Vigel’s authorship is still open.

“The Ghost They Named *Pan-Slavism*”

The pamphlet ends with an appeal to France where Vigel discerns with alarm growing German influence: “outrageous Romanticism reeking with foul-smelling tobacco and chased down with viscous beer.” Vigel seems to forget that, as he twice stresses in his pamphlet, his exposures target Russian Baltic (Ostsee) Germans and not the Germans of Germany.¹⁸ Vigel warns that after Germany’s imminent reunification the Germans would develop revenge-seeking plans with regard to the lands that were once parts of the Holy Roman Empire (on this point Vigel must be credited with considerable foresight).

These plans can be stopped only by France allied with the Slavic peoples, above all Russia. So far, Vigel continues, there is no unity between the Slavs; but it may be provoked by Germany itself. To undermine the position of the Slavic peoples, the majority of which (outside Russia) live in the Austrian Empire, and to induce the Austrian government to take a tougher stand with regard to the Slavs, “the Germans have summoned a ghost which they have named *Pan-Slavism*.” Austrian Slavs will have to seek protection by Russia, “the only Slavic power which has preserved its national independence,” and this will spark a conflict between the Russian and Austrian empires. In this Vigel also turned out to be a prophet, albeit his prophecy would take time to come true.

For Vigel, however, Pan-Slavism was not a “ghost” invented by the Germans (though this topic was indeed belabored by the German press).¹⁹ On April 28, 1842

Vigel writes to Khomyakov about the “Pan-Slavic interests of Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolayevich, then a teenager. On “a detailed splendid map” he hashed in various shades of one color the lands belonging to Russia and “all the Slavic lands under alien rule.” “He feasts his eyes on this map,” Vigel adds approvingly [27, p. 226]. (Indeed, in the future this Grand Duke would be one of the Romanovs most sympathetic to the Slavophiles.)

The Slavic theme cropped up during Vigel’s meetings with Hippolyte Auger in Paris in the summer of 1843:

Slavism (*le slavisme*) was his (Vigel’s—*E. A.*) hobbyhorse. I have always thought that it was the Pan-Slavic secret society founded in Moscow, of which he was an active member, that had sent him on a tour of Slavic countries, other than Poland, and he liked to tell me how he was received and how the Slavs under Austrian rule honored him. He was seen as an apostle and missionary, and Moscow as the mother country [8, p. 486].

Indeed, while in Prague Vigel had met Václav Hanka, the Slavic philologist and Russophile (with whom he later corresponded) [16]). He probably met another prominent Slavic scholar, Pavel Josef Šafárik.²⁰ Both Hanka and Šafárik were major figures in the Czech national revival who actively supported the Pan-Slavic movement.

Pan-Slavism is also associated with the name of Dmitry Valuyev with whom Vigel, as has been said, met in Dresden in late 1843 and who then organized the publication of “La Russie.” Valuyev also had active links with Hanka and other Czech Pan-Slavists [36, p. 96], such that his role in the fate of Vigel’s pamphlet was not accidental.

Thus Vigel’s pamphlet was the first manifesto of Russian Pan-Slavism. This was how it was received by some French reviewers who rightly guessed that the author was “a subject of Emperor Nicholas,” but mistakenly believed that the pamphlet emanated “directly from the Russian government” which thereby sought to disavow its support for Pan-Slavism²¹ [28, p. 375]. But there was no support in the first place. Nicholas I was suspicious of Slavophiles and of Pan-Slavism, as indeed of any movement that could potentially upset the status quo that he guarded so zealously.

And yet, Pan-Slavism was going from strength to strength spreading beyond the Slavophile right-wing conservative circles. Four years later, in 1848, on the back of the revolutionary processes in the Austrian Empire and the First Slavic Congress in Prague, Herzen and Bakunin would express sympathy for Pan-Slavism. “The ghost of Pan-Slavism” was stalking Europe as much as “the ghost of communism” heralded in another famous manifesto, also written in 1848. No wonder one of the authors of that manifesto, Friedrich Engels, inveighed heavily against Pan-Slavism more than once. But that is another story. Let us see the end of the story of Vigel’s pamphlet.

“The Pamphlet Which Has Become a Rare Book”

Initially the pamphlet created quite a stir. The expression “La Russie envahie par les Allemands” was eye-catching. Hippolyte Auger recalled: “The powerfully

written pamphlet was a huge success. Although he (Vigel—*E. A.*) denied his authorship, his acerbic mind revealed itself and I saw him rub his index fingers as a sign of joy” [8, p. 566].

Even if Vigel was hiding his authorship, he was not doing it strenuously, having himself read “*La Russie...*” at a Moscow salon, at the house of retired colonel Pavel Pisemsky on Malaya Dmitrovka street. Pisemsky was a nephew of Bludov and had known Vigel since the Arzamas days.²² When the reading was finished, Nikolay Sushkov, a former colleague of Vigel’s at the Interior Ministry, whispered to Vigel that he had guessed who the author was. To this Vigel, without denying it, asked him not to divulge the secret for the time being” [8, p. 232].

Hippolyte Auger recalls yet another meeting devoted to “*La Russie...*”:

Vigel announced to me that he was going to have a party at his place: ‘Up until now,’ he told me, ‘you have been a stranger to our tacit agitation, you do not know what a volcano is throbbing in the womb of our mother.’ ‘Whom do you want to overthrow?’ ‘The Germans.’

The party was devoted to the pamphlet, but the pretext for it was the arrival in Moscow of Mrs. Shevich, the second daughter of Count Bludov.²³ Slavism was about to shine there through its most ardent champions. Vigel was the hierophant of these mysteries, and Mr. and Mrs. Pavlov were helping him in these dedications, which, as he put it, were becoming more numerous and important by the day. It was a mystical, historical, political, scholarly and literary evening with ice-cream and *petit fours* [8, p. 566].

Thus, like the party at Pisemsky’s, this gathering was also indirectly connected with the figure of Bludov. The mention of the Pavlov couple in this connection is also interesting. Aleksey Aleksandrovich Pavlov was also a colleague of Vigel’s at the Interior Ministry and his wife Anna Petrovna Pavlova was a sister of General Yermolov (whom the Third Department considered to be the idol of “the party of Russian patriots”²⁴ [42, pp. 19, 20]). As a matter of fact, according to Auger, on the occasion Vigel had invited people of diverse persuasions:

Among those present were the writer Zagoskin, a totally harmless man, director of the Imperial Armory,²⁵ and several people whose names I do not remember other than Chaadayeve, the editor of *Telescope*, Belinsky, an eternally furious propagandist, and Granovsky with his nice and noble tone [8, pp. 568, 569].

The above, though, contains at least two inaccuracies. The editor of *Telescope* was Nikolay Nadezhdin, who printed Chaadayeve’s “Philosophical Letter” (whereupon the magazine was shut down); as for Belinsky, he could not have attended that Moscow party, because in late 1844 and the first half of 1845 he was in Petersburg. Likewise, one wishes that Auger had described how “the Germans were overthrown” during that literary soirée and what was said about Vigel’s pamphlet.

Passions around the pamphlet soon subsided. The author was not repressed. “*La Russie...*” was not even mentioned in the annual reports of the Third Department for 1844 and 1845 in the section “Books and magazine articles in Russia.” Perhaps the reason for this was the death of Benckendorff in September 1844;

he was succeeded as the head of the Third Department by Count Orlov, an informal leader of the “Russian party” (and addressee of the anonymous letter on the death of Pushkin). Although no serious changes occurred in the work of the agency or in the staff, the balance of forces changed. For example, the report of the Third Department for 1845 already cited cases of abuses on the part of the Baltic nobility:

...the higher and middle estates in the Baltic gubernias, separating themselves from the common rights and duties of the dominant people of Russia, keep themselves in their original position, as it were. Therefore, especially at present, with the spread of Orthodoxy in the Baltic gubernias, it would be proper to gradually and cautiously to weaken the local privileges that restrict the rights of Russians and to put Orthodox believers there in the position the dominant people should occupy within its Empire [42, pp. 372-373].

These lines might well have come from Vigel. On the whole, however, the expected change of the policy toward Baltic Germans did not take place. Perhaps the Tsar did express some dismay about “La Russie...” (but this calls for a separate archive study). As the French journalist and translator Pierre Paul Douhaire wrote in 1858:

[W]e already saw fifteen years ago a flare-up of antipathy of the Slavic race toward the German race and we remember the book published under this title, which caused a sensation in St. Petersburg and Moscow. The Pan-Slavic party made active use of this; but these expressions of hatred stopped because of the displeasure of Emperor Nicholas I, who had the weakness to apply to himself everything that was said against the Germans [11, p. 414].

The topic of German preponderance remained taboo. In 1848, the Slavophile Yury Samarin was incarcerated for two weeks in the Peter and Paul’s Fortress for public reading of his *Letters from Riga* which criticized the Baltic nobility. In a personal meeting with him Nicholas I put the gist of the charge against him with his characteristic bluntness:

You were aiming directly at the government. You wanted to say that since the time of Emperor Peter I and until myself we have all been surrounded by Germans because we ourselves are German... It (the book — *E.A.*) seeks to undermine trust in the government and its link with the people, accusing the government of sacrificing the national interests of the Russian people to the Germans (quoted from [31, p. 56]).

Although this accusation may well have been leveled against Vigel’s pamphlet it was decided to ignore it. The year 1844 was relatively calm, unlike 1848 when Europe was rocked by revolutions.

As time went on, Vigel’s pamphlet fell into oblivion. With the enthronement of Alexander II, Slavophilism was “legalized,” including the “anti-German topic,” which stopped being ignored by the newspapers. The aura of being forbidden, thanks to which “La Russie...” attracted attention, faded dramatically.

The pamphlet and its author were still occasionally mentioned in Germany—typically in sharply negative terms.²⁶ Special mention should be made of the book by the German journalist and historian of literature Julius von Eckardt entitled

The Russian and Baltic Types in the History of Literature in which a separate chapter is devoted to the author of "La Russie..." The chapter is entitled "Filipp Vigel, German Russian Nationalist" [14]. In Eckardt's opinion, Vigel's pamphlet

is a genuine expression of traditional ideas of the Russian nationalist party about the history of Livonia. Although they lack any documentary basis and they contradict generally known facts, they are repeated from generation to generation. Namely, that German settlement of Livonia took place much earlier than the subjugation of Rus to Mongolian rule, that the largest part of the Baltic lands had nothing to do with the Polotsk and Novgorodian princes, that Biron never cared about Livonia and Estland... is beyond dispute. The fact that Vigel turns it upside down, as do Pogodin, Samarin and others after him, merely proves that falsification of history is an inseparable part of the system in whose creation some "national" politicians have excelled [14, pp. 25-26].

The memory of the author of the sensational pamphlet began to fade little by little. True, the 1860s to 1890s saw the publication of the bulk of his works, "Notes" as well as his journalism: "Notes on the Current State of Bessarabia," "Kerch," "Moscow and Petersburg" and "Trois mémoires à propos de la question polonaise en 1831" (Three Notes on the Polish Question in 1831). With the exception of "Notes," posthumous publications did not have much resonance: The spoon clearly was late for dinner. What might have been sharp and topical in the context of Nicholas I's censorship ceased to be sharp or topical.

As the aforementioned von Eckardt wrote about "La Russie..." in 1880, "the pamphlet, much discussed in its time, has now become a bibliographical rarity" [13, p. 94].

Vigel's reputation also played a part. He did not fit in with the liberal literary canon (especially after his denunciation of Chaadayev, published in 1870), nor did he fit in with the conservative canon. The Slavophiles at best published him,²⁷ but did not go any further. There was too much in his figure that was dubious and controversial.

In Soviet literary scholarship, which inherited and ideologically confirmed the liberal canon formed by the beginning of the century, Vigel was doomed to oblivion. After the publication of his "Notes" at the tail end of the relatively pluralistic 1920s, Vigel's name sank into obscurity for many years; with the exception of the "Notes," which were sometimes cited by Pushkin scholars. Occasional references to "La Russie..." sometimes failed to mention the author's name [22; 34].

The situation changed but little in the thirty post-Soviet years. The full text of "Notes" and much of Vigel's correspondence, as well as some of his historical-philosophical works remain unpublished.²⁸

As Solomon Streich wrote almost a century ago, "when the time comes for complete reissue of all the monuments of Russian culture, even if in its negative reflection, everything written by Vigel will probably be printed too" [44, p. 7]. One would like to hope that this time has arrived. Without Vigel's historical-philosophical writings the picture of the intellectual life of Russia under Nicholas I would be incomplete and the idea of the development of Russian political thought would be that much poorer.

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Notes

¹ This is the traditional translation of the title in Russian historiography. Considering the polysemy of the verb *envahir*, it can also be translated as "Russia Inundated by Germans."

² "Notes of An Old Soldier Who is neither a French Peer, nor a Diplomat, nor a Deputy."

³ The full text of "Notes" has yet to be published. The most complete edition was brought

out in 1891-1893 [51]; in 1928, an abridged edition included some previously bowdlerized fragments [45]. The quotations from "Notes" in this essay are from the 1891-1893 edition except when the text quoted is absent in that edition and is present in the 1928 edition.

- ⁴ Eight years earlier, in late 1836, Vigel made an abortive attempt to publish a small article "A Quick Look at the History of the Slavs" in Pushkin's *Sovremennik* journal. The publication was banned; see [35].
- ⁵ Among the former is a pamphlet by Xavier Labensky, a Polish diplomat in the Russian service [48]; among the latter is the pamphlet by Fyodor Tyutchev "Letter to Dr. Gustav Kolb, Editor of *Vseobshchaya Gazeta*" [47].
- ⁶ Vigel's departure is mentioned in P. Vyazemsky's letter to A. Turgenev of June 11, 1843 [30, p. 264].
- ⁷ This is mentioned in the diary of Modest Korf [24].
- ⁸ His letter to Hanka from Paris is dated October 21 [16, p. 175].
- ⁹ See [32, p. 73]. Unfortunately, in reporting that it was Valuyev who published Vigel's book in Leipzig (the year of publication is mistakenly indicated as 1843) the author does not indicate the source of this information.
- ¹⁰ His grandmother on the father's side, Gertrude von Brümmer, was a Baltic German. "Through her my father and uncles had the honor of being related to the Buxhöwdens, Breverns, Rosens and other famous Livonian barons," wrote Vigel, adding that it was an honor in which he had "never taken much pride" [51 I, p. 8].
- ¹¹ Yet reviews in the French press noted "the exotic character of style" [37, p. 239], and even claimed that the book was "poorly written" [28, p. 384]. However, proficient Vigel was in French, it was not his native language.
- ¹² See [40]. Vigel recognized this noting in another work, "Moscow and Petersburg," that "Russia has no more loyal sons than Russified Germans and no fiercer enemies than Germanized Russians" [50, p. 579].
- ¹³ Metropolitan Iosif (Semashko) wrote in his memoirs that Vigel was a kind of chief who led "a salon life and had no time and no ability to attend to business" [39, p. 71]. This seems to chime with complaints about Vigel's "laziness" filed with Nicholas I (though the source was probably Metropolitan Iosif himself as he wished the Uniates to come under the jurisdiction of the Russian Church sooner). Vigel was probably a fairly efficient officer, the fact that he headed up the department for so long can hardly be attributed solely to Bludov's patronage.
- ¹⁴ Unfortunately, S. Streich does not give the source.
- ¹⁵ This part of "Notes" was apparently written after Benckendorff's death; however, "La Russie..." was written when the chief of the secret police was still alive, so that Vigel decided to sugar the pill to be on the safe side. Without calling Benckendorff by name, he refers to him as a man "of German extraction," but adds that he was "like Catherine, French in spirit and Russian in his soul."
- ¹⁶ As well as reprisals against Lermontov: his words "the foes of Freedom, Genius and Repute" and "in greedy crowd standing by the throne" were seen—perhaps not without reason—as a hint at the "German party" [18, p. 247]. Vigel, who would meet the poet in 1839-1840, called him a "Russoman" [50, p. 577].
- ¹⁷ Württemberg ambassador to Petersburg Prince Hohenlohe-Kirchberg wrote: "On this sad occasion the eye of an outside observer could see further proof of how strong and powerful is the purely Russian party (*le parti purement russe*) to which Pushkin belonged... Immediately after the duel between Pushkin and the young baron Heeckeren the majority took the side of the latter, but it took less than 24 hours for the Russian party to change the public mood in Pushkin's favor and it would have been ill-advised to challenge this party by showing the slightest sympathy for the object of its hatred" (quoted from [19, p. 12]).
- ¹⁸ That said, from the opening pages of his pamphlet Vigel hardly draws any distinction between the Balts and the Germans. He stresses several times that the Balts (Ostseeans) have much stronger links with Germany than with Russia; he declares their hostility and sense

of superiority with regard to the Slavs to be “a common German” feature. Citing examples of the preponderance of the Balts, Vigel often mentions Germans who were not of Baltic extraction (without making this reservation), for example, E. Kankrin who was born and reared in Germany, or V. Schwartz who came from a noble family in Smolensk gubernia.

¹⁹ See on this the book by the Polish émigré journalist Walerjan Krasinski *Panslavism and Germanism* [25] published four years after Vigel’s pamphlet. Although Krasinski’s book is overtly anti-Russian, the two authors are one in criticizing Germany’s policy of assimilating the Slavs in the 1840s.

²⁰ In 1838, Vigel took an active part in raising funds in aid of poverty-stricken Pavel Šafárik [26]. In a letter to Hanka from Paris (9/21 October 1843) Vigel asked him to convey to Šafárik his “very tender and respectful sentiments” [16, p. 175].

²¹ Cf.: “To us it is obvious that the anonymous author of the pamphlet is a subject of Emperor Nicholas and that he has written it with the permission of the Russian government although he wishes to pass himself off as a Frenchman... It is therefore interesting to discuss the reason and goals of this mysterious manifesto. Germany is beginning to fear the activation of Russia in the Slavic provinces located outside the empire, including part of the former Poland and more than half of Austria. The Tsar is thought to be striving to reunite the whole great Slavic family under his scepter and implement the ideas of so-called Pan-Slavism in the near future. What does the author of the pamphlet do? He tries to rebuff the attack by drawing up an indictment of Pan-Teutonism” [37, p. 239].

²² Pavel Pisemsky is mentioned among those present in the minutes of the Arzamas meeting on November 18, 1815 [49, p. 297].

²³ Lidia Dmitrievna Shevich (1815-1882), maid of honor, a friend of the Karamzin family, was acquainted with Pushkin.

²⁴ See also Yermolov’s sympathetic reference to Vigel’s pamphlet in the beginning of this essay.

²⁵ Prose writer and playwright Mikhail Zagoskin, a half-cousin of Vigel, was director of the Armory at the time.

²⁶ Cf.: “Staring at you from every line of this 138-page book is a narrow-minded rootless Petersburg bureaucrat of the Nicholas school, a petty boss whose horizon is limited to the view from his office window” [4, p. 4177].

²⁷ Pyotr Bartenev published documents from Vigel’s archive in his *Russian Archive*; the first stand-alone edition of Vigel’s “Notes” was brought out by Mikhail Katkov.

²⁸ According to A. Afanasyev, who published Vigel’s unknown work “Europe and Asia” in 2009, the Department of Written Sources of the State Historical Museum (OPI GIM) has autographs and copies of Vigel’s unpublished works in French: “The Rise of the Russian Monarchy and other Great Powers”; “Poland and Livonia”; “A Brief History of Poland Since Ancient Times”; “Poland: A Historical-Cultural Essay and Eastern Rulers” [2, p. 300]. Unfortunately, because of the quarantine restrictions of the last two years, I had no chance to become acquainted *de visu* with these and some other archive materials thematically connected with “La Russie...”.

Translated by Yevgeny Filippov

Moscow and Petersburg in Tolstoy's Novel *War and Peace*

Viktor SHCHERBAKOV

Abstract. Moscow and St. Petersburg have repeatedly been the subject of comparative characterization in Russian literature. Leo Tolstoy in his novels also tried to outline and compare the characters of the two Russian megacities, which have traditionally been rivals. In *War and Peace*, Moscow is depicted in detail and with love, while St. Petersburg is shown in a schematic and aloof manner. The comparison of the two capitals is extremely contrastive here: aristocratic Petersburg and “folksy” Moscow are presented as antipodes and remain so during the Napoleonic invasion. This article traces the ideological and psychological roots of this mythologeme. It shows that it is based on both objective historical reasons (the vigorous development of St. Petersburg in the 19th century and the lag of Moscow, which at the time had a “provincial” look), and Tolstoy’s deeply personal sympathies and antipathies, to which he strove to impart a universal character.

Keywords: Leo Tolstoy, the novel *War and Peace*, Moscow and St. Petersburg, the war of 1812.

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We know the Petersburg of Pushkin, Gogol, Dostoevsky, Nekrasov, Blok, Andrey Bely, Akhmatova... But we do not know the “Petersburg of Tolstoy.” Such an artistic notion simply does not exist. And yet, much of the action in Tolstoy’s novels takes place in Petersburg.

The characters in *War and Peace*, *Anna Karenina* and *Resurrection* arrive in Petersburg, leave Petersburg, ride through Petersburg’s streets, but they do not see Petersburg. Nor does the reader. At any rate, Tolstoy describes this space in a perfunctory manner. Here is Pierre Bezukhov heading for Anatoly Kuragin’s place: “It was a duskless Petersburg June night” (WaP, vol. 1, part 1, IX; [17,

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p. 48]). And this is Natasha Rostova going to a Petersburg ball: “The dignitary’s well-known house on the English Embankment shone with countless light” (WaP, vol. 2, part 3, XIV; [17, p. 471]). A little further there is a mention of Tavrichesky Garden near which lives maid of honor Peronsky at whose house the Rostovs have to make a brief stop. Tavrichesky Garden is again mentioned in the next chapter because Speransky’s house is located nearby (Tolstoy extracted this detail from *The Life of Count Speransky* [6, p. 353]). This is about all that the huge novel has to say about Petersburg.

There is no mention of Petersburg’s sights in *War and Peace*—no bridges, spires, churches, palaces or squares. Not even the Neva River. Tolstoy has no interest in Petersburg as an architectural or natural landscape. He does not show it to us, merely using deft touches and patches to create an illusion of a lived-in place with which almost everyone has some personal associations, confidently counting on the reader to fill in the missing details in his imagination.

There is practically no mention of Petersburg landscape in *Anna Karenina*, a novel about Tolstoy’s contemporaries: “a deserted Nevsky Avenue” is mentioned once (part 4, XVII). Vronsky, we are told, had a “large apartment on Morskaya” (part 1, XXXIV),¹ and there is a mention of a large house of Princess Betsy Tverskoy on Bolshaya Morskaya (part 2, VI). Nevsky and Morskaya are mentioned once each in *Resurrection*.

Nikolay Antsyferov, an inspired researcher of “the soul of Petersburg,” noted that Tolstoy

has contributed nothing of substance to the description of Petersburg... Constantly choosing Petersburg as the place of action in his novels, he nowhere touches upon the individuality of our city... It remains to lament the fact that we have been left without an image of Petersburg created by L. N. Tolstoy [1, pp. 131-132].

As a source of creative inspiration, Petersburg did not exist for Tolstoy. Unlike Pushkin or Gogol, he had no superlatives for it. For Tolstoy, it is simply a city inhabited by people, and he likes these people less than others.

Among the innumerable subdivisions that can be made in the phenomena of life, one can subdivide them all into those in which content predominates and those in which form predominates. Among the latter, as opposed to the life of a village, a zemstvo, a province, even of Moscow, can be counted the life of Petersburg, especially its salon life (WaP, vol. 3, part 2, VI; [17, p. 726]).

Indeed, in Tolstoy’s works Petersburg is a city of salons, dignitaries, courtiers and balls; the rest of Petersburg—the world of merchants, petty clerks, artisans, cabmen, servants and Petersburg beggars—did not interest Tolstoy and was largely unfamiliar to him. In a rough draft of the preface to *War and Peace* he wrote: “The life of civil servants, merchants, seminarians and *muzhiks* does not interest me, I only half understand it; the life of aristocrats of the time thanks to the artifacts of the time and other reasons, I understand, find interesting and likable” [14, vol. 13, p. 55].

The life of Petersburg’s high society, too, he largely knew as an outsider who had grown up in the province and preferred rural life to city life, although as a

man of letters and a count he was well received in some of Petersburg's drawing rooms, for example, by his relative Aleksandra Tolstoy, a spinster and a lady-in-waiting whose interests revolved around the imperial family and religion. "The five children of Alexander II and Empress Maria Aleksandrovna occupy the main place in my life," she wrote [13, p. 230]. Aleksandra Tolstoy may have been one of the prototypes of the lady-in-waiting Anna Pavlovna Scherer and in any case she reinforced Tolstoy's notion that Petersburg was peopled by "phantoms."

In *War and Peace* Petersburg is the Mecca of career-seekers of every stripe. Of Boris Drubetskoy, that "high-society Molchalin," as Pisarev aptly called him ("The Old Gentry," 1868; [8, p. 77]), Tolstoy writes: "He loved Petersburg and despised Moscow" (WaP, vol. 2, part 2, VI; [17, p. 382]). Another social climber, Adolf Berg, receives in Petersburg decorations for fictitious military exploits and holds "some sort of especially profitable posts" (WaP, vol. 2, part 3, XI; [17, p. 464]).

In the lives of the main characters of *War and Peace* Petersburg plays either a harmful or useless role: here Prince Andrey takes part in the Speransky commission and comes to the conclusion that it is "idle work;" here Pierre first attends booze parties, then marries unhappily and then wastes time on symbolic Masonic "works." "His life meanwhile went on in the same way, with the same diversions and licentiousness" (WaP, vol. 2, part 3, VII; [17, p. 451]). The only Freemason whom Pierre respects and loves, Iosif Alekseevich Bazdeev, does not take part in the activities of Petersburg's masonic lodge and "permanently" lives in Moscow.

The Moscow family of Count Rostov (in many ways copied from the Tolstoy family) feel like strangers in Petersburg.

Despite the fact that in Moscow the Rostovs belonged to high society... in Petersburg their society was mixed and indefinite. In Petersburg they were provincials to whom the very people that the Rostovs fed in Moscow without asking what society they belonged to would not lower themselves (WaP, vol. 2, part 3, XI; [17, p. 464]).

The young Count Tolstoy was such a provincial when, at the age of twenty, he came to the capital city intent on conquering it.

At first, the city made a very favorable impression on him. On February 13, 1849, Tolstoy wrote to his brother Sergey that he intended to stay in Petersburg "forever," that Petersburg life was having "great and good influence" on him, making him "accustomed to activity" and order:

Somehow you cannot do nothing; everybody is busy, bustling, and you won't find anyone to lead a dissolute life with... for him who wants to live and is young there is no place in Russia like Petersburg [14, vol. 59, pp. 28-29].

Young Tolstoy intended to sit for candidate's exams at Petersburg University and join the civil service in Petersburg, but then abruptly changed his mind about the civil service and decided to become a cadet of the cavalry regiment. At the time, he was prone to change his plans quickly. Eventually he failed to choose a *métier* and left Petersburg after five months of a life of dissipation (gambling, Gypsies, dinners at expensive restaurants) leaving behind huge debts in the amount of 1,600 rubles, including a debt to a fashionable restaurateur (Dussaut)

and an equally famous tailor (Scharmer). In a letter dated May 1, 1849, he asked his brother Sergey to sell the village of Malaya Vorotyinka so that he could pay off his debts [3, pp. 255, 259]. He led the same dissolute kind of life in Petersburg again in 1855-1856 when he came there as a young officer from Sebastopol. Tolstoy drew on this life experience in describing the young Pierre Bezukhov and his cavorting in Petersburg: "Pierre had not managed to choose a career for himself in Petersburg, and had indeed been banished to Moscow for riotous behavior" (WaP, vol. 1, part 1, XIII; [17, p. 69]).

Tolstoy, who always sought to improve himself, tried to avoid Petersburg as a city of temptations and vices. This is what he wrote to his wife about his son Lev in a letter of November 5, 1882:

I am constantly anxious for him lest he gets misled in this morally despicable city. Here are all the temptations of a luxurious capital... I remember myself as a young man going crazy with a special immoral kind of craziness in this luxurious city without any principles other than depravity and servility [14, vol. 84, p. 168].

After 1861, Tolstoy came to Petersburg only a few times on short business visits. He never had a house in Petersburg. Nekhlyudov's perception of the northern capital might very well be Tolstoy's:

Petersburg in general affected him with its usual physically invigorating and mentally dulling effect. Everything so clean, so comfortably well-arranged and the people so lenient in moral matters, that life seemed very easy (*Resurrection*, part 2, XV; [15, p. 394]).

2

Petersburg in *War and Peace* is a capital city in which people "are living, but can't feel the land where we stay" (Osip Mandelstam)—without being aware of the vital interests of Russia and without taking its woes close to heart.

The top news in Petersburg are secondary events, such as General Bennigsen's imaginary victories over Napoleon during the 1807 campaign or the meeting of two emperors. Tolstoy never misses an occasion to make an ironic remark: "In 1808 the emperor Alexander went to Erfurt for a new meeting with the emperor Napoleon, and there was much talk in Petersburg high society about the grandeur of this solemn meeting" (WaP, vol. 2, part 3, I; [17, p. 436]).

Even during the Patriotic War against Napoleon Petersburg lives its usual life:

The calm, luxurious life of Petersburg, concerned only with phantoms, with reflections of life, went on as of old; and beyond this course of life it took great effort to realize the danger and the difficult situation the Russian people were in. There were the same levees and balls, the same French theater, the same interests of the courts, the same interests of the service and intrigues (WaP, vol. 4, part 1, I; [17, p. 955]).

Tolstoy's depiction of Petersburg society is always marked by affectation verging on satire. The "enthusiast" Anna Pavlovna Scherer, the weathervane of court

opinions Vasily Kuragin and his wayward children (the “idiot” Hyppolite and the adulteress Helen) embody the pointless activities of outsiders who have no strong bonds with their people. News from the theater of hostilities reaches them in a distorted and biased form as if learned from European newspapers. Here they honor Wittgenstein with great pomp and circumstance as *le héros de Petropol* after his success in a few local battles; they read the grandiloquent letter from the Reverend Platon as if it were the Gospel; after the battle of Borodino they discuss the sovereign's anxieties, the death of Kutaisov and the illness and death of Helen Kuragin. The General Staff sitting in Petersburg makes “useless” plans of defeating the enemy even as impossible or belated orders are sent from Petersburg to the front. Petersburg occupies considerable space in *War and Peace*, yet remains on the periphery of Tolstoy's artistic vision, and Tolstoy does it deliberately: he thinks of it as a city that exists separately from the Russian people and Russia's destiny.

Needless to say, this is no more than a mythical-poetic construct which has little in common with the real Petersburg of the early 19th century. Many prominent Petersburgers saw their houses and apartments in Moscow pillaged by the French, all Petersburg youth took part in the Patriotic War, a large militia (16,500-strong) was formed, it being the second such sacrifice (Petersburg had put up an 11,000-strong militia during the second war against Napoleon in 1806-1807), Wittgenstein's army was engaged in heavy fighting against Marshals Oudinot and Saint-Cyr who were pushing toward Petersburg; during the Patriotic War Petersburg did not feel safe even for a day, especially after the enemy occupied Moscow and there were fears that Napoleon would strike at Petersburg (Napoleon considered this option).

In a word, Tolstoy chose to ignore many important features of Petersburg's life in 1812 not to compromise his conviction that Moscow bore the brunt of the Patriotic War while Petersburg looked on its woes from outside.

3

It is telling that Tolstoy's Petersburg, the most densely populated city in 19th century Russia, turns out to be a city without people: if *War and Peace* is to be believed, its inhabitants are either ladies-in-waiting or dignitaries or guardsmen.

Moscow, on the contrary, is depicted as the focus of people's life and an arena of mass scenes, be it Alexander I's appearance before the people at the Kremlin (where people fight over the biscuits he throws to them) or the murder of Vereshchagin, or epic scenes of the Russian army leaving Moscow in which the people is invariably presented as a great ungovernable mass that determines the course of history.

The cold, spare and superficial depiction of Petersburg is in striking contrast with the thoroughness and warmth Tolstoy brings to the description of Moscow:

In Moscow, as soon as he [Pierre] moved into his huge house with the dried- and drying-up princesses, with its enormous staff, as soon as he saw—on driving through the city—the Iverskaya Chapel with countless candles burning before the gold casing, saw the Kremlin Square with its untrampled snow, the cabbies, the hovels of the Sivtsev Vrazhek, saw

old Moscow men, who desired nothing and were not hurrying anywhere as they lived out their lives, saw little old women, Moscow ladies, Moscow balls, and the Moscow English Club—he felt himself at home, in a quiet haven. For him Moscow was comfortable, warm, habitual, and dirty, like an old dressing gown (WaP, vol. 2, part 5, I; [17, p. 555]).

As early as 1865, the critic Nikolay Solovyov, discussing the merits of Goncharov's novel *Oblomov*, wrote:

One wonders, though, why the author has placed his hero in Petersburg and, of all places, in the most crowded Gorokhovaya Street; his proper place is in Moscow in Spiridonovka, everything that seeks rest heads for Moscow. In this mass of small houses and crooked, narrow streets it is easy to get lost and feel protected from everything that worries and nags. You can hardly hole up like this in a provincial town because there everything is in view, people all know one another; and finally, these towns, in spite of their smallness, are sometimes so full of life, such growth that you cannot help feeling invigorated. Likewise, Petersburg, because it is so crowded and cramped, does not offer calm places: not having a single hill, people there live as if they are in the mountains, one above the other; climbing, bumping into each other. You lose your guard for a moment and before you know it you are tumbling head first. Petersburg is largely a seaside city: a city of anxiety and movement. Quick changes of climate, constant diseases, the danger of floods and so on—all this may have formed the troubled, active character of which there is too much in a Petersburg denizen. Petersburg is a totally inconvenient place for Oblomov (The Art Issue. The works of N. A. Dobrolyubov, 1865; [11, p. 440]).

Moscow with its suburbs of wooden houses, measured and unhurried life as it was in Tolstoy's time was far closer to him, more congenial, more simple to understand and more convenient than Petersburg. *War and Peace*, which brought him great fame, was published in Moscow. *Anna Karenina* was published there too. Tolstoy frequently visited Moscow and since 1882 had a house in Khamovniki, a wooden house with a fruit-bearing garden, which partly reconciled him with the city's hustle and bustle.

Petersburg, the summit of Russian urbanism, oppressed and repelled Tolstoy. On that point he was on the same page with the Slavophiles. Aleksey Khomyakov wrote: "Petersburg has always been and will be solely a government city... The life of government power and the life of the people's spirit are separate even in their location" ("On the Old and the New," 1839; [5, p. 26]). It was not for nothing that the democrat Nikolay Shelgunov described *War and Peace* as "a Slavophile novel" ("The Philosophy of Stagnation," 1870; [7, p. 359]). At least at the time of writing his epic novel Tolstoy was much closer to the Slavophiles than ever, which was not lost on Nikolay Strakhov, a "native soil" Slavophile who wrote a glowing review of *War and Peace*.

Moscow is portrayed in *War and Peace* as the center of the Russian cosmos and a magnet that attracts all the forces of Europe. Napoleon is entranced upon entering Moscow and almost does not believe his eyes surveying its grand panorama

from Poklonnaya Hill: "In the clear morning light he looked now at the city, now at the map, checking the details of the city, and the certainty of possession excited and awed him" (WaP, vol. 3, part 3, XIX; [17, p. 891]).

The image of Moscow as seen with the eyes of the conqueror has erotic associations, stressing its femininity: "Napoleon saw from Poklonnaya Hill the quivering of life in the city and felt, as it were, the breathing of that big and beautiful body." The author then quotes Napoleon's real sentence in his conversation with captive General Pavel Tuchkov: "Une ville occupée par l'ennemi ressemble a une fille qui a perdu son honneur" ("A capital occupied by the enemy is like a young woman who has lost her honor"). "And from that point of view he looked for the first time upon the Oriental beauty lying before him" [Ibid.].

On the very same page (though not in all the editions) is perhaps the most famous place: "Every Russian person looking at Moscow feels that she is a mother; every foreigner looking at it and not knowing its maternal meaning, should feel the feminine character of this city, Napoleon felt it" [16, vol. 5, p. 79].²

In the typesetter's copy of the manuscript Tolstoy speaks about it at greater length and even more ardently:

Moscow is a 'she,' anyone who feels it is aware of this. Paris, Berlin, London, especially Petersburg, are a 'he.' Although *la ville*, *die Stadt* are feminine gender and the word for city (in Russian—*Г. С.*) is masculine, Moscow is a woman, she is a mother, sufferer and martyr. She suffered and will suffer, she is not graceful, not well-built, she is not a virgin, she has given birth, she is a mother and therefore she is meek and magnificent. Every Russian feels that she is a mother, every foreigner (and Napoleon felt it) feels that she is a woman and she could be insulted [14, vol. 14, p. 370].

As we see, the image of Moscow in *War and Peace* is highly mythologized: Tolstoy's Moscow, like goddesses in ancient cultures, oozes the symbolism of gender, the maternal element, sexual energy and reproduction of life.

Upon entering Moscow, the unstoppable enemy army is absorbed, diluted and depleted in its huge organism. During the month it stays there, it loses its strength such that it can think of nothing but flight. This was how Tolstoy saw things. From the purely historical point of view this is to a large extent an exaggeration, like Tolstoy's conviction that the Battle of Borodino had determined the outcome of the war and the fate of Napoleon's empire. Tolstoy does not even mention the bloody battles of 1813-1815 beyond noting that all of them were the death throes of a beast mortally wounded in Moscow (WaP, vol. 4, part 2, II; [17, p. 729]). In Moscow scenes, Tolstoy comes across as an ardent patriot for whom no hyperbole is excessive.

After the flight of the French the burnt-down Moscow remains as much of a magnet as before. Tolstoy compares it to a stirred anthill, which the industrious insects instinctively try to rebuild seeking to restore the habitual way of life:

Moscow, in the month of October, despite the fact that there were no authorities, no churches, no holy objects, no wealth, no houses, was the same Moscow it had been in August. Everything was destroyed, except for something immaterial but mighty and indestructible... In a week there, were already fifteen thousand inhabitants in Moscow, in two—twenty-five thousand, and so on. Rising ever higher and higher, this number, by the fall of 1813, had reached a figure exceeding the population of the year 1812 (WaP, vol. 4, part 4, XIV; [17, p. 1129]).

Tolstoy frequently used factual material, but in this case, his “figures” are fictitious. No such statistics exist. Indeed, authoritative sources say that the size of Moscow’s population was growing slowly. By the beginning of 1812, Moscow had a population of 275,000, and after the Napoleonic invasion (in December 1812) it had dropped to 162,000. In 1816 it stood at 166,500, in 1822 at 234,000, and in 1825 at 257,700; it was not until 1829 that the population exceeded the pre-war mark of 303,600 [4, p. 162; 12, p. 33; 9, p. 9]. Other than that, Tolstoy was right: Moscow did not perish, like ancient Ryazan,³ and was largely built back by the end of Alexander I’s reign.

5

The Napoleonic invasion was a watershed event that divided Moscow’s history into “before” and “after” the fire. The flames of 1812 destroyed not only more than two-thirds of its buildings, but in many ways the traditional pattern of Moscow life.

However, in place of burned-out antiquity Moscow got something larger, a second lease of life, a development impetus. After 1812, Moscow lived through a second period of resurgence, which dramatically changed its character and role.

Having lived through a catastrophe and realized the fickleness of all earthly things, Moscow developed an appetite for change. Construction and repair were pursued with a vengeance. Since then for more than two centuries, Moscow has been building and rebuilding itself non-stop, even its historical center has never settled in its architectural forms.

This was remarked already by Vissarion Belinsky in his 1844 article “Petersburg and Moscow”:

Moscow is proud of its historical artifacts, monuments, it is itself a historical artifact in external and internal terms. But like its pre-Petrian artifacts, it is an odd mixture with the new: of the Kremlin only the original drawing has survived, for it is altered every year and new buildings appear. The wind of change is blowing toward Moscow as well, erasing little by little the imprint of antiquity [2, p. 393].

In the 177 years since these words were written the principles of Moscow urban development have remained the same: the historical center (including the Kremlin) was redeveloped under Nicolas I, and again afterward, it was destroyed and redeveloped in the Soviet time, restored and rebuilt in the 1990s and it is being redeveloped today. To be sure, many old landmarks have been preserved, there are churches and monasteries that are older than Petersburg, and there are well-preserved 18th-century townhouses and 17th century chambers, but they do not determine Moscow’s present-day look, antiquities more and more being pushed into the background of modern life or reconstructed to look like new.

Paradoxically, Petersburg, founded 556 years after Moscow, looks like a much older city frozen in its forms because its historical center was much less affected by redevelopment, and indeed the city itself has not been developing so dynamically over the past hundred years. Moscow’s permanent development, in spite of the loss-

es and occasionally ugly extremes of new construction, is living proof of the fact that Moscow is still a vibrant city, which lives more by its present than by its past.

The traditional rivalry between the two capitals resulted in the two cities swapping their places, as it were. While formerly Moscow was the custodian of traditions, today it is Petersburg that is regarded as "the cultural capital." Whereas formerly Petersburg was the business center of Russia where provincials flocked "to catch their fortunes and ranks" and Moscow was considered by Petersburgers to be a "backwater," today things have reversed: the government, the bureaucracy and the business elite are in Moscow and today's provincials usually come to Moscow in search of fortune. No wonder Moscow's population is growing steadily (even though overall population statistics are not comforting) more than twice exceeding that of Petersburg.⁴

The characters of Moscow and Petersburg citizens have also changed significantly over the last 150 years, and again, they have not only changed but swapped places, as it were. Whereas in the 19th century Petersburg citizens were considered businesslike and arrogant, engrossed in the interests of the moment and Muscovites were thought to be slow and traditional, today these reputations are no longer relevant and are barely discernible—in reverse. This of course has much to do with clichés and myths, but there is no denying that today Moscow embodies the political and business Russia, the role Petersburg played in the 19th century.

In the above-mentioned 1844 article Belinsky wrote about the "quiet, *provincial*" status of Moscow [2, p. 413], which shows how much water has flown under the bridge over the last 177 years. Today's Moscow can least of all be described as "provincial," "archaic," and "quiet." The fact that at the very beginning of the 20th century Chekhov's *three sisters* longing to get away from a provincial city wanted to go "to Moscow" and not to Petersburg is a telltale literary sign of the changed reality which put the ancient capital to the forefront of Russia's life.

For three centuries, Moscow and Petersburg have been rivals symbolizing the struggle and unity of opposites. Pushkin, Gogol, Belinsky, Herzen, Khomyakov, Evgeny Zamyatin have left vivid comparative descriptions of Moscow and Petersburg. Leo Tolstoy also gave due to this topic, in fact, in *War and Peace* we find not just a comparison, but a stark juxtaposition of the two capitals. This is very much in the spirit of Tolstoy, his antinomy-based thinking and character.

Tolstoy wrote a great deal about *love* (often in the lofty Christian meaning) but himself he was not a source of all-embracing and all-forgiving love. There was much in this world that he did not love and he said so openly. Petersburg was the embodiment of everything Tolstoy *did not love*.

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Notes

- ¹ The reference is to Bolshaya Morskaya Street, often called simply Morskaya in the 19th century.
- ² Quoted from the first edition of *War and Peace* [16; Vol. 5, part 1, XIX]. The words about Mother Moscow were deleted from the 1873 edition. The 90-volume *Complete Works* cites "variants" of this passage [14, vol. 11, p. 444].
- ³ Today's Ryazan is the former Pereyaslavl-Ryazansky, which in 1778 was named after the ancient Ryazan destroyed by Batu Khan in the winter of 1237. The archeological preserve Staraya Ryazan (Old Ryazan) is located 50 km from the modern Ryazan.
- ⁴ 12.7 million versus 5.4 million (2021).

Translated by Yevgeny Filippov

Vladislav AKSYONOV. *Rumors, Images, Emotions. Mass Sentiments of Russians during the War and Revolution (1914-1918)*. Moscow: Novoye literaturnoye obozreniye, 2020, 992 pp. (In Russian.)

Igor BOGOMOLOV

For his monograph Vladislav Aksyonov has chosen the subject which has already become a trend of historical studies on its own right. Soviet historiography traditionally studied the revolutionary moods of the “masses” as opposed to the “reactionary” responses of the bourgeoisie and certain “irresponsible” elements among the proletariat and peasantry. A “patriotic” wing came to the fore in the last few decades to concentrate on examples of patriotism among Russia’s population that was ready to make any sacrifices for the sake of the Motherland during World War I [1]. The question is, did “patriotism” mean unquestioned support of the government? Did the Duma act patriotically on the eve of the revolution? Where is the dividing line between patriotism and revolutionary ardor? In search of answers to these and other similar questions, we are inevitably drawn into a discussion about the 1917 revolution (which could or could not have been avoided) and about its nature. In an effort to get out of this vicious circle, contemporary historians use new approaches to discuss the revolutionary epoch; they rely on new methodological instruments and hitherto unknown sources. The sentiments of human communities of the past are more and more frequently discussed in the context of social psychology [2]; much more attention is paid to images and rumors as responses of people to their social environment [4]. The frameworks of the revolution are widened because today World War I is perceived as part of it (see, for example [3]).

Vladislav Aksyonov follows these trends. He has concentrated on rumors, images and emotions of Russian society in the times of World War I. Rumors cre-

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ate “distorted images” different from those imposed by propaganda. During social and political upheavals, rumors and images (of external and internal enemies, power and the army) become combustible material of public discontent expressed in emotional upheavals and affective and, therefore, illogical and unreasonable, actions. This explains why researchers became interested in the emotional component of the revolutionary epoch.

The monograph consists of seven sections, each dealing with a “certain form of sentiments of the popular masses” (p. 9). The first—*Idea*—deals with the ideas that formed the foundations the sentiments of the masses on the eve and the early stages of the war. The concept of “delayed revolutions” and the phenomenon of “patriotic sentiments of 1914” received a lot of attention.

The author has relied on Max Weber’s theory of affective-emotional social action to point at the common nature of revolutionary (strikes and peasant disturbances) and patriotic actions of the times. Driven by different political ideas they practically always relied on identical emotions as “factors of archaic rebelliousness” (p. 65). V. Aksyonov insists that it is incorrect to oppose revolutionary and patriotic feelings: In the course of war when the crisis was gradually unfolding, the formal borders between these two concepts were gradually disappearing. The February revolution is an ideal example, because “for many it was a patriotic revolution when power was deposed to save Russia” (p. 22).

When writing about the patriotism of summer 1914, the author has pointed to its “dual and ambivalent nature” (p. 55). In fact, even the sincerest of inspirations cannot be interpreted only as support of power. It was “perceptive exaltation” that pushed aside rational thinking and covered up fears. Inspiration and euphoria coexisted with hatred. At first glance, it was only about Germanophobia, but the forms of manifestation of these “patriotic feelings” already in 1914 were fraught with danger to the authorities. The rout of the German embassy in St. Petersburg is better known than other crops up of rebellious feeling among seemingly loyal population.

In Section Two—*Action*—the author has demonstrated the highly contradictory feelings of the public during the mobilization and manifestations of the first days of the war. He criticizes “patriotic” historiography, which relied in its assessments on the number of demonstrations held when the war began, the number of mobilized and of gathered donations, materials from the press and official information. Sources have revealed that these figures were nothing but a screen behind which there was a varied and far from uniform picture of events. More likely than not, demonstrations were organized by official structures and right-oriented monarchist organizations and, as could be expected, were not massive in the capitals and even smaller in provinces. Mobilization, likewise, was not smooth. It was accompanied by conflicts with the police, fist-fighting and routed wine shops.

Until recently, the attitude of different population groups to the war remained on the periphery of historical studies. The author of the reviewed monograph paid attention not only to the conscripts but to their wives and mothers, and also students and children. Mobilization increased the protest potential of the female part of the empire’s population fairly prominent during the February events. Patriotism

of students should not be taken for loyalty to the regime. In fact, many in Russia looked at the war as Russia's movement to "freedom." The psychological trauma caused to children by military propaganda strongly affected this generation, who were somewhat older by the time of the revolution and the Civil War.

Section Three—*Word*—deals with the mass consciousness of peasants. Aksyonov admits that this was a far from easy task because there is no "comprehensive study of mass consciousness of peasants as a multi-level structure" (p. 192) in which there were rational and irrational elements. It was dominated by archetypal-mythological and pragmatic levels that determined the attitude of peasants to the most important questions—war, land, God and power.

Lack of understanding of the war and its rejection, the problems and hardships it was causing increased eschatological expectations and displeasure with the powers that be. The author, however, has rightly pointed out that the feelings widespread among peasants should not be defined as "anti-monarchist" or "republican." The opposite was true: The ideal image of the tsar changed but little, while "paternalism remained the main feature of power in peasants' minds" (p. 193). The theoretical level of consciousness of those who lived in villages was poorly developed, a fact frequently ignored by researchers.

Section Four—*Text*—covers the subject of urban written culture during the revolutionary epoch. The author has in mind written texts with "a stricter and orderly structure," which had fewer variations and interpretations than oral or visual narratives (p. 251). He relied on this foundation to analyze the sentiments prevailing in the urban population, their attitude to the war and revolution. He has paid special attention to patriotism on the whole and the patriotism of Russian society in particular, and criticizes the idea of patriotism as an exclusively positive emotion. We all know that love of Motherland is not enough to rally the nation; an image of the enemy clear to all and everyone is also needed. Patriotism of all types is rooted in "interconnected positive and negative emotions" (p. 254). In Russia, as in any state waging a war, an image of external enemy was accompanied by an image of an "internal" enemy, a precursor of a civil conflict.

Written texts were poorly developed and not widespread in Russian society, hence their weak influences on the minds of the absolute majority of the Russia's population. It should be said that in historiography "text" is often opposed to "words," which allegedly distort the "real" picture of events through rumors and visualization. The author insists on their even closer interaction. Rumors destroyed the borders between cities and villages, they brought the subjects, vocabulary and conceptual apparatus closer. "The processes of desacralization of power in the forms close to peasant consciousness were registered" in cities and towns (p. 317). Cases of mysticism and psychic disorders were on the rise; they added vigor to the "irrational layers of mass consciousness" (p. 351). Aksyonov has rightly pointed out that this trend stirred up serious political repercussions: a spontaneous riot might rely on an absolutely clear idea to become a political protest on its own right.

Section Five—*Image*—deals with the virtual space of World War I. The author believes that this is the most important trend of studies of public feelings,

since nonverbal communication reflects a vast layer of emotions. Aksyonov has considerably deepened his analysis and interpretation of the images discussed at several levels—iconographic, iconological and semiotic. An image is, in fact, a text with a structure of its own and internal and external ties. Its understanding as a text is very important from a practical point of view: so far, interpretation of images of those years has lacked any rules and depended exclusively on the researcher's impressions and conclusions. This has made analysis superficial with no solid theoretical basis as visual documents remained, in the majority of cases, "nothing more than an illustration of the author's conclusions" (p. 361).

Aksyonov has identified two main sources of visualization of the revolutionary epoch: "high painting" and "mass genres" (lubok prints, postcards and posters). The border between them is fairly conventional: "high" painting did not shun folk traditions. There were pictures stylized as lubok prints; some painters turned to millenarist subjects very popular among common folk. With few exceptions, realist presentations of the war failed. Critics, on their side, rejected new trends, which offered new interpretations of the epoch (suprematism being one of them). Even the recognized masters rarely succeeded with pictures of front-line realities; society refused to respond. Military defeats and an absence of bright impressive images decreased an interest in lubok prints and "patriotic" subjects in general. The press paid more attention to the "internal" enemy: not only German barons but also Russian merchants and bureaucrats. Very much as with texts, censors could not stop the process of visualized desacralization of power.

Section Six—*Symbol*—discusses the perception by society of the symbols and practices of representation of power that had survived from prewar times, especially the Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Popular Spirit triad. After 1905, it lost its consequence, but there were no alternative forms of power. The authority of the Orthodox Church was declining; it no longer was seen as the "national foundation" (p. 691). Aksyonov discusses the crisis of representation of autocracy from new sides and in a wider context. For example, "the photograph that showed the emperor in a car contradicted the paternalist ideas about the autocrat on a white horse" (p. 536), a conflict between the traditional and modernist perception of the world.

The conflict between the State Duma and the government was another miscalculation. The government "ascribed the Duma revolutionary feelings absent in the majority of its deputies" (p. 691). At this point, the views of society and power paradoxically met. By 1917, the Duma had already become a consolidating symbol of the opposition which tried to rely on the army with a doubtful effect: heroization of the army did not coincide with the fairly popular negative images of soldiers, officers and nurses. The author has come to an important conclusion that the conception of confrontation between "power" and "society" per se simplified the task of the opposition yet did reflect the real causes of the coming civil conflict.

Section Seven—*Emotion*—deals with the "psychological dimension" of 1917, rumors and images very popular in Russian society at that time. In 1917, as the revolution was moving closer, rumors became an important part of the po-

litical process. They not only affected the feelings of the masses but also political decision-making. They knew no borders; they permeated peasant huts, apartments of urban dwellers and Tauride Palace. In the decisive days of February 1917, rumors performed the important function of a “self-fulfilling prophecy”: Not only society but the authorities acted under its impression; this increased tension and made it much harder to suppress disturbances. Obviously false, they were accepted at face value not only by common people who lived in cities and villages but also by the police, gendarmes and ministers. The author points out several frequently used subjects of the revolutionary epoch, such as a “black car” and machine guns on rooftops. Many rumors survived not only the revolutionary year 1917 but also the Soviet period.

The “honeymoon” of the revolution left a void and disenchantment in many minds. Very much as before in villages, eschatological feelings spread in towns. This became especially obvious after the murder of the czar and his family in July 1918. The number of mental diseases and nervous disorders increased. Everyday life and social structure were destroyed to slide “into deprofessionalization and the loss of social status” (p. 815). A new epoch began, which meant not only regime change but also the Gregorian calendar, new vocabulary and a new alphabet (Russian orthography was reformed in 1918), new social relationships.

This voluminous and highly informative monograph extends, to a great degree, our ideas about the 1917 revolution, reveals its new sides and brings a huge layer of historical sources into scholarly circulation. It is, however, not free from certain flaws. It lacks a clear definition of “propaganda” as a concept, even though the author uses it several times in different contexts: “patriotic propaganda,” “military propaganda,” “official propaganda,” “conservative propaganda,” “sentimental propaganda.” Since during World War I there was propaganda in Russia, we should have been informed about the structures involved and the methods they used. The author has offered several examples of leaflets about “German atrocities,” but they do not offer a whole picture of how the machine of propaganda worked.

There are other not quite justified generalizations and simplifications. For example, the press is often referred to as “liberal,” “centrist,” “left,” “right,” “conservative” or “patriotic” with practically no indication which particular newspapers and journals belonged to which of these categories. Since there was “patriotic” press, there should have been “non-patriotic” press as well. Was the newspaper *Rech* published by Constitutional Democrats “patriotic”? It consistently criticized the government and, at the same time, insisted that the war should be continued to secure victory. Was *Russkoe slovo* centrist or liberal, and *Novoe vremya* rightist or conservative? When reading the book, you get, at first glance, an impression that these were merely formal differences. Yet reports of “German atrocities” in the press leave a very different impression. *Novoe vremya* was especially eloquent, while its long-time opponents—*Rech* and *Russkie vedomosti*—doubted that there were massive “atrocities,” they criticized the campaign waged against the “preponderance” and defended German literature against attacks.¹

Certain not fully justified interpretations arise from these simplifications. For

example, Aksyonov insists that the press never wrote about cases of mass suicides of teenagers “out of patriotic feelings” (p. 120). Here the author pushes aside the fact of censorship, even though he mentions it several times elsewhere. There is no shortage of archival documents that abound with examples of censorship: Military censors deleted parts of articles or even whole articles with descriptions of horrors of the war and everything that might have stirred up painful feelings in the reading public. This was done in full conformity with Art. 31 of the Temporary Provisions of Military Censorship [5, p. 12] and additional circulars.²

In another place, Aksyonov writes: “The official press ignored the realities of war, when both Germans and Russians treated the civilian population with cruelty and continued to promote the images of a German barbarian and a Russian holy warrior” (p. 608). Without asking which of the publications the author treated as “official,” I will only point out that not everything that appeared in the press at that time was obtained by newspapers themselves. A large share of telegrams, even in the newspapers published in the capitals (let alone in provinces), were supplied by the Petrograd Telegraph Agency. The content of what was published in newspapers close to power (such as *Novoe vremya*) might be different from official telegrams. The Main Administration of the General Staff supplied information about the situation at the front and in the enemy rear. It was strictly forbidden to refer to it as a source of information. This “unofficial information” was daily published both by semi-official *Novoe vremya* and oppositionist *Rech*. Like “telegrams from Petrograd,” this information reached Moscow and provincial newspapers. The enemy image as presented by the press and the attitude to the war were gradually changing. This can be detected only by very careful analysis of the materials of each newspaper and journal, with due account for the documents of the editors, military censorship, the Headquarters and the General Staff.

There are certain smaller drawbacks. The author is inconsistent when quoting sources; in some cases, obscene words are quoted in full, in others, left out.

These shortcomings cannot decrease the merits of the monograph. The author has succeeded in supplying the reader with the details of one of the most dramatic periods in the history of the Russian state.

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Notes

¹ See for example: German philosophy and German nationalism. *Rech.* April 17, 1915; Is Kant to blame? *Ruskiye vedomosti*. February 11, 1915.

² For example, the instruction did not permit the Moscow military censors to allow printing information “that might depress the readers.” See Russian State Military Historical Archive (RGVIA). F. 13839. Op. 1. D. 14, l. 10.

Translated by Valentina Levina

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VESTNIK ROSSIYSKOY AKADEMII NAUK

(Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences)

No. 8, 2020: **N. Turko, K. Dobrolyubova.** Geographic names of underwater landforms; **I. Grachev, S. Nekrasov.** Reliance on the national innovation system as a prerequisite for the implementation of national projects; **E. Balatsky, N. Ekimova.** Global university competition in the mirror of international rankings; **N. Koronkevich, E. Barabanova et al.** Ecological and economic indicators of anthropogenic impact on water resources in Russia and in the world; **O. Davydov, M. Novichkova.** Peace process on the Korean Peninsula: Problems and development; **A. Rozanov, S. Rozhnov, T. Yusupova.** The largest expedition in the practice of world paleontological science: To the 50th anniversary of the joint Russian-Mongolian paleontological expedition; **S. Glyantsev, A. Stochik.** How the “highest organ of the country’s medical thought,” USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, was created; **N. Bortnikov, V. Petrov, K. Lobanov.** Outstanding geologist, son of the Pomorian land [N. P. Laverov]; **E. Pivovarov, A. Skrydlov.** Unknown facts of Alexander von Humboldt’s collaboration with the Imperial Academy of Sciences Letters to the editorial board; **V. Sobolev.** Celebration of the 220th anniversary of the Russian Academy of Sciences; **L. Ingel.** On the “benefits of self-citation.

No. 9, 2020: Special issue of HRAS, dedicated to the history of Russia. **V. Vovina-Lebedeva.** The extinct world of old Russian Chronicles; **N. Rogozhin.** Russian statehood of the XVI-XVII centuries: power and society; **O. Volobuev.** V. I. Lenin in the assessments of contemporaries-participants of the revolutionary movement; **S. Leonov.** Civil war in Russia on the scales of the century; **B. Zhiromskaya, V. Isupov, G. Kornilov.** The population of Russia in 1939-1945; **O. Khlevniuk.** Soviet People’s Commissariats and decentralization of economic management during the Great Patriotic War; **E. T. Artemov.** Components of the success of the Soviet nuclear project; **E. Zubkova.** Soviet life as a subject of historical reconstruction.

No. 10, 2020: **A. Lisitsyn-Svetlanov, I. Bashlakov-Nikolaev** et al. Cartelization of the Russian economy: Main causes, consequences and ways to eliminate them; **V. Danilov-Danilyan, V. Kattsov, B. Porfiriev.** The problem of climate change—the field of convergence and interaction of natural and socio-humanitarian sciences; **A. Akaev, O. Davydova.** The Paris Agreement on Climate Change comes into force: Will the Great energy transition take place?; **A. Prokofiev.** Morality, probability and risk; **V. Koroleva, O. Ivanov** et al. Publication activity as an indicator of the effectiveness of scientific research on the example of chemical institutions; **V. Mironov.** A new index of publication activity; **A. Rizhinashvili.** Zoological Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences and institutional reorganization of hydrobiological research in the 1930s.

NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA

(Modern and Contemporary History)

No. 4, 2021: **I. Kaviaka.** German Question (1945-1990) in Anglo-American historiography: Key aspects of the problem study; **I. Suzdaltsev.** Modern English historiography of the Communist International: A general overview; **A. Yastrebov.** “Esto perpetual!”: “Two Cities” of Paolo Sarpi; **D. Kirilov.** Forms of representation of the monarch in Irish court odes during the reign of Queen Anne Stuart; **T. Labutina.** Great Britain and Russia on the way to restoring diplomatic relations (1720-1731); **N. Zherlitsyna.** The “Entente cordiale” and the rivalry of Great Britain and France in North Africa in 1830-1840s (The example of Morocco); **I. Magadeev.** “Shadows of empires”: Ways and means of stability in Central and Eastern Europe viewed by the British diplomats and political leaders in the 1920s; **V. Damie.** Anarchists of the Netherlands and the anti-colonial movement in Indonesia; **V. Bondarev, O. Rudaya.** Foreign policy aspects of the Soviet famine of 1932-1933; **A. Shubin.** Soviet-German military and economic supplies in 1939-1941 and the motives of the Soviet leadership; **M. Kurbak.** “A fatal compromise”: South African writers and the literature police” in South Africa (1940-1960); **A. Shchelchkov.** Latin America and the Soviet-Chinese conflict (the 1960s—mid-1970s); **K. Muratshina.** The first decade of the BRICS Group: Evolution of the cooperation structure; **I. Fadeyev, I. Anikyeu.** The 1917 Code of canon law: Codification and development of Latin canon law in the first half of the 20th century.

No. 5, 2021: **M. Petrova.** Career strategies of Russian diplomats in the second half of the eighteenth century (The cases of I. M. Simolin and P. A. Levashev); **L. Pimenova.** The diplomatic service of Louis XVI: The work of French Foreign Affairs Department in the 1780s; **A. Lazareva.** Martin Opitz (1597-1639), a poet in the diplomatic service during the Thirty Years’ war; **G. Shatokhina-Mordvintseva.** Diplomat Aleksandr Nikolaevich Golovkin: New touches to biographical portrait; **M. Anisimov.** Heinrich Gross of Württemberg: A diplomat on Elizaveta Petrovna’s service; **N. Tanshina.** K. V. Nesselrode and Ch.-A. Pozzo di Bor-

go: A diplomatic tandem; **E. Kudriavtseva**. The Russian ambassador in Turkey A. P. Butenev; **A. Namazova**. The Russian Empire and the Kingdom of Belgium: The establishment of diplomatic relations and the first envoys; **V. Vedyushkin**. The embassy of Pyotr Potemkin to Spain, 1667-1668: Some features of mutual perceptions and dialog of two diplomacies; **O. Khavanova**. Baron Alexander Stroganov's mission to Vienna (1761): Dynastic policy and symbolic communication; **A. Novikova**. Official diplomacy and informal relations at the court of Catherine the Great: James Harris' embassy to Russia; **A. Mitrofanov**. A French diplomat in the Russian service: Missions of the Count d'Antraigues in Venice (1795-1797); **P. Datsenko**. "Recognized leader of the German opposition?" Mission of the Württemberg envoy at the Bundestag Karl August von Wangenheim in 1817-1823; **L. Sadova**. Escalation of Swedish-Norwegian conflict in 1895 according to the documents of Russian diplomats; **A. Matveeva**. Embassy of the Russian empire in Berlin on the socialist movement in Germany in 1890-1898; **A. Khorosheva**. Socialist Jules Destrée at the Head of Belgian diplomatic mission in Russia, August 1917—March 1918; **A. Vatlin, L. Lannik**. Secret Notes to the Supplementary Treat of August 27, 1918: An Unknown plot from the history of Soviet-German relations at the end of the First World War.

ETNOGRAFICHESKOYE OBOZRENIYE

(Ethnographic Review)

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bel. On the origin of Ethnonym Rus' and of the Rurikid lineage: A look at the Slavo-Finno-Scandinavian frontier of the 9th—11th centuries AD from the point of view of kinship studies; **K. Maksimovich.** *Rodiči—*Ruotsi—Rus': Critical notes to the new etymology of an old ethnonym; **V. Kuleshov.** Once again on the origins of the ethnonym-socionym Rus'; **A. Romanchuk.** Rus' as "Rod": A critical analysis of G. V. Dziebel's hypothesis; **O. Balanovsky.** On the origins of the genetic lineage of the Rurikids as an issue not related to the "Normanist problem"; **G. Dziebel.** From etymological nuances to the integration of scientific disciplines: A reply; **M. Lurie, N. Savina.** Memory on demand: The Jewish past in today's Hlybokaye; **S. Petriashin.** Workers in Soviet Museum Ethnography in the 1950s: Class analysis and politics of time; **A. Plekhanov, U. Herasimau.** The formation of Ukrainian literary canon on the Donbass war: Emotional matrices of non-combatants; **T. Sem.** The material world of the early twentieth-century reindeer breeding Orochons of Transbaikalia in the dimension of culture.

VOPROSY FILOSOFII

(Problems of Philosophy)

No. 8, 2020: **V. Tishkov.** The Great victory and the Soviet people: Anthropological analysis; **A. Rubtsov.** Viruses and Civilization: The new impact of biocataclysms on the evolution of socio-cultural models and civilization projects; **A. Pavlov.** Capitalocene: The troubled future of capitalism; **O. Aronson.** Imaginary model (The sketch to formal understanding of revolution); **I. Apollonov, I. Tarba.** The problem of ethno-cultural foundations of historical consciousness of the person in the era of globalization; **G. Drach, E. Lipets, T. Paniotova, F. Efendiev.** Ethnos and ethic self-consciousness in the civilization discourse: Reflections; **Zh. Abdildin, R. Abdildina.** Evolution of morality in human and cultural history; **A. Zape-sotsky.** Cultural and creative logos by Abdusalam Guseynov; **A. Arabadzhyan.** Towards a reconstruction of Enrique Dussel's theological system; **V. Arshinov, V. Budanov.** Sociotechnical landscapes in optics of semiotic-digital complexity; **G. Aksenov.** Happy Albert Einstein's error; **A. Buzgalin.** On the other side of post-modernism: Global transformation of the 21st century and the revival of Leninist dialectics (To the 150th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Ulyanov-Lenin); **M. Zagirnyak.** The concept of the national state in Nikolay Alekseev's philosophy of his emigrant period; **E. Mareeva.** S. N. Mareev on Hegel and paradoxes of Soviet philosophy; **S. Mareev.** On practical sense: Hegel vs. Kant; **N. Motroshilova.** Awaited and unexpected in new book by Jürgen Habermas "Once again—history of philosophy" ("Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie"); **J. Habermas.** Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie. V. 1. Western European constellation of faith and knowledge. Foreword; **G. Lobastov.** The logic of concept in Hegel's philosophy (To the materialistic apology of Hegelian philosophy); **N. Artemenko.** Thematisation of passivity in Husserl's phenomenology and the problem of the intersubjective world; **V. Vasyukov.** Logical pluralism in Lvov-Warsaw school; **I. Gorenko.** Death in Christian and Buddhist traditions: To the problem setting.

No. 9, 2020: **M. Belousov, I. Blauberg, V. Vasilyev** et al. Franz Brentano: The critic of Immanuel Kant's philosophy; **V. Levitsky**. The concept of "social reality" as a marker of the constructivist turn in philosophy; **L. Anufrieva**. Philosophical aspects of private international law: Nature, concept and Substance; **V. Gutorov, A. Shirinyants**. On some peculiar properties of theoretical discussions about communism in the 21st century (Reflections on the book: Communism. Anti-Communism. Russophobia. Moscow, 2019); **A. Glinchikova**. Their role in development, evolution and crisis in political modernity; **A. Ivanov, V. Nekhamkin, I. Polyakova**. Mythologizing power of everyday life; **I. Liseev**. New methodological and ontological accents in the development of modern life sciences; **S. Merzlyakov**. Phenomenon of aphantasia in the context of discussion about consciousness; **E. Vostrikova, P. Kusliy**. Grammaticalization of category mistake and natural language; **A. Antonovsky**. Systemic-communicative theory of science 30 years later; **A. Vakulinskaya**. Ivan Ilyin's "Hegelianism." Analysis of the philosophical method on the example of the Moscow period; **E. Takho-Godi**. Aleksei Losev and Yuly Aykhenvald: On the history of biographical and aesthetic convergence; **A. Shishkov**. The scholasticism in Rus'; **A. Fokin**. Plotinus' doctrine on the intellection and consciousness of the One and its immediate analogues; **D. Loungina**. What does it mean, to take the words out of one's mouth? Kierkegaard's perusal of Feuerbach; **M. Frolova**. Human being in the global world: Risks and perspectives; **A. Ermichyov, K. Preobrazhenskaya**. The historical and methodological seminar "Russian thought" at St. Petersburg is 15 years old.

CHELOVEK

(Human Being)

No. 3, 2021: **K. Momdzhyan**. Homo sapiens adaptation and the law of natural selection; **E. Kosilova**. Psychopathology as an arbitrator in subjective paradigms controversy; **A. Antonovsky, R. Barash**. Non-systemic consolidation—main forms, factors, and approaches; **A. Zhavoronkov**. John Rawls' 100th birthday; **B. Kashnikov**. The specificity of the theory of justice and the problem of its implementation in Russia; **A. Prokofyev**. Circumstances of justice: From David Hume to John Rawls; **D. Aronson**. Fairness from a pragmatic point of view; **A. Zhavoronkov**. Rawls and the boundaries of public reason; **G. Kanarsh**. Rawls and the meritocracy controversy; **R. Apressyan**. John Rawls' conception of personal moral development; **V. Kirilenko**. Sources of the concept of human enhancement in the history of ideas; **V. Faritov**. Semiotics of drinking in the context of post-metaphysical transformations of modern philosophy; **S. Nikolsky**. Soviet man as a knowable reality. Part two.