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*Vasiliy A. Anikin, Yulia P. Lezhnina,  
Svetlana V. Mareeva, Ekaterina D. Slobodenyuk*

# **WHO SEEKS STATE SUPPORT IN THE NEW RUSSIA AND WHY?**

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*Vasiliy A. Anikin<sup>1</sup>, Yulia P. Lezhnina<sup>2</sup>,  
Svetlana V. Mareeva<sup>3</sup>, Ekaterina D. Slobodenyuk<sup>4</sup>*

## **WHO SEEKS STATE SUPPORT IN THE NEW RUSSIA AND WHY?<sup>5</sup>**

This paper investigates the underlying nature of the demand for state support in Russia in the labor market and employment, social investments, and material support. Based on recent findings from social policy studies, the authors tested four different mechanisms: (a) the demographic features of the population, (b) household incomes and disposable assets including human and social capital, (c) interests, and (d) locus of control and cultural attitudes. Drawing on an all-Russian representative monitoring survey conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 2018, the authors argue that the population's demand for state support has a very complex nature. The relative effect of income has a paradoxical nature. On the one hand, the Russian data confirm the hypothesis of 'the altruistic rich', developed in recent studies, which predicts that, in societies with high inequalities, higher incomes boost the likelihood of demand for redistributive policies. On the other hand, higher incomes foster state escapism among those Russians who do not consider the state as a reliable agent capable of solving their problems.

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<sup>1</sup> National Research University Higher School of Economics. Institute for Social Policy; Institute of Sociology of the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences; E-mail: vanikin@hse.ru

<sup>2</sup> National Research University Higher School of Economics. Institute for Social Policy; National Research University Higher School of Economics. Institute for Social Policy; Institute of Sociology of the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences; E-mail: jlezhnina@hse.ru

<sup>3</sup> National Research University Higher School of Economics. Institute for Social Policy; National Research University Higher School of Economics. Institute for Social Policy; Institute of Sociology of the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences; E-mail: smareeva@hse.ru

<sup>4</sup> National Research University Higher School of Economics. Institute for Social Policy; National Research University Higher School of Economics. Institute for Social Policy; Institute of Sociology of the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences; E-mail: eslobodenyuk@hse.ru

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## Introduction

Today, the welfare state model based on the state's active role in the provision of social services is in a deep crisis, and there have been multiple attempts to review and transform it [Chung et al., 2018]. Similar processes are taking place in Russia, too, as a result of which the government is increasingly engaged in uncertainty trading [Greene, 2018], destroying “the informal agreement with society” [Tikhonova, 2013]<sup>6</sup>. The societal order in Russia has historically been based on the population's support of a neo-etacratric (‘statist’) model in which the interests of the macrocommunity prevail over the interests of the individual, resulting in a noticeable demand for proactive state policies in all key spheres of the public life [Avraamova, 2006], [Anikin, 2016], [Mareeva, 2018], [Petukhov, 2011], [Social'nye neravenstva... 2008], [Tikhonova, 2011, 2018], [Shkaratan, 2009b]. In this regard, studying the population's expectations of the state as well as the state's role in society is a pressing task, now that the demand for political change is growing among Russians.<sup>7</sup>

The problem, however, is that studies of this type in developed countries are usually focused on the population's normative expectations of the state which reflect people's social attitudes and are barely linked to their real needs [Cappelen et al., 2018], [Garritzmann et al., 2018], [Gingrich & Ansell, 2012], [Roosma et al., 2014]. This study, on the contrary, is aimed at expectations which reflect, among other things, the actual needs of Russians and not only their conventional ideas of the state's role in society in general.

This research identifies factors that are significantly associated with the population's demand for help and support from the state in modern Russia, namely in a) the provision of employment and jobs, b) social investments which are understood as government support of education and healthcare, and c) financial support (that is, the need for a direct distributive policy). In addition, this study allows a comparison with those who acknowledge that they do not need government support to solve any of their problems.

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<sup>6</sup> Notably, some proponents of the civilizational approach believe that any kind of social contract in Russia is irrelevant as such, because “Russia had no ‘agreement-based’ institutions similar to Western municipalism and vassalage” [Lipkin, 2012, p. 50]. Instead, a “command-based” system of social relations developed, with laws “establishing not rights but jurisdictions and punishments for non-compliance with orders” [Ib., p. 43].

<sup>7</sup> Data from the all-Russian monitoring by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, October 2018. For more details, see newspaper *Kommersant*, issue No. 203 as of November 6, 2018, p. 3.

## The Population's Demand for Government Support: Interests, Needs, Values

The theoretical analysis of the demand for state support is largely based on studying the population's attitude towards welfare policy<sup>8</sup>. Researchers agree that these need mechanisms fall into two major categories: (1) individual interests [Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003], [Knijn & van Oorschot, 2008] and (2) social values and norms [Blekesaune, 2013], [Edlund, 2006], [Hasenfeld & RaVerty, 1989], [Groskind, 1994], [Morten & Jæger, 2006]. It is well documented that both these mechanisms are complemented by information about socialization conditions, national culture as reflected in the existing social policy, and the current state of the social sphere, etc. [Blekesaune, 2013], [Chung & Meuleman, 2017], [Chung et al., 2018], [Kootstra & Roosma, 2018].

The significance of individual interests [Zdravomyslov, 1986] in the perception of welfare policy and its mechanisms can be examined from several perspectives. Women's interests are traditionally evaluated through the need for daycare and schools. Professionals' interests (especially in countries with a liberal welfare regime) are viewed in terms of job stability and security, opportunities for professional development and employment based on one's human capital [Iversen & Soskice, 2001], [Rehm, 2011], [Edlund, 1999], [Svallfors, 1997], [Andreb & Heien, 2001], [Bean & Papadakis], [1998; Forma, 1999].

People with low incomes are expected to demand more redistribution. In the 1990s, the population with relatively low incomes were viewed as the main source of the demand for the provision of an adequate standard of living [Edlund, 1999], [Cook & Barrett, 1992]. In other words, it was typically assumed that the demand for redistribution policies and material support would decrease with increasing income. However, the latest studies have revealed the more complex nature of this relationship. For instance, using the example of the United States, Dimick et al. [2017] empirically confirm the classic political economy hypothesis of Meltzer and Richard [1981] according to which growing inequality creates a larger demand for redistribution policies [Finseraas, 2009], adding that the higher the income, the stronger this effect ("the altruism of the rich"). In all likelihood, such support results from the fact that greater inequalities are perceived as unfair. In Russia, the level of inequality, as manifested in the consistently faster growth of income and wealth among the top 1% of the population, is extremely high. Furthermore, the gap between the median class and the rich in Russia is significantly bigger than that between the median class and the poor [Tikhonova et al., 2018], which can also explain the fact why Russians may support redistribution policies while their income is growing [Lupu & Pontusson, 2011].

For available resources, one should also take into account intangible assets, such as social

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<sup>8</sup> A more detailed review of literature on the population's demand for state support is given in the paper by [Anikin et al., 2019].

capital which can help solve a whole range of everyday problems from employment to receiving welfare support. The most plausible hypothesis in this regard is that the likelihood of the demand for state support is significantly lower among Russians who can solve problems using their connections and social contacts.

For the values and norms that determine the population's need for welfare policies, we place importance on studies focusing on issues relating to economic egalitarianism or redistribution [Achterberg et al., 2011], [Blekaesaune & Quadagno, 2003], [Dimick et al., 2017], [Luo, 1998], as well as different aspects of the perception of the welfare state model [Andreß & Heien, 2001], [Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003], [Campbell, 2012], [Chung et al., 2018], [Finseraas, 2009], [Gingrich & Ansell, 2012], [Jaeger, 2006, 2009], [Mettler & Soss, 2004], [Svallfors, 1997, 2004, 2010, 2012]. To explain post-Soviet statism, some scholars highlight the significance of institutional bodies in citizens' positive assessment of social policy, electoral loyalty, and regime support [Cerani, 2009], [Gelman & Starodubtsev, 2016]. Therefore, the priorities of the social policy were considered not vis-a-vis a response to societal demand or interest articulation but as a result of the position and vision of the authorities [Cook, 2010].

An examination of the population's expectations of the government's social policy in transitional societies brings to the fore the role of sociocultural modernization [Mason et al., 1995], [Domanski & Heyns, 1995], [Salmina, 2014], [Anikin, 2006], [Salmina, 2012]. Its central aspect is the development of a certain type of thinking characterized by an internal locus of control, individual responsibility, preference for equal opportunities, self-development, etc. [Anikin et al. 2007], [Tikhonova, 2012, 2018]. In this regard, it is essential to evaluate the relative contribution of the factors related to norms and values and, in particular, to the internal/external locus of control, willingness to rely on oneself or on outside help, and preferences for 'equality of opportunity' or 'equality of outcome'.

## **Methodology and Data**

The empirical analysis is based on the data from the 8<sup>th</sup> wave of the Monitoring Survey conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences titled "The Dynamics of Social Transformation in Modern Russia in Socioeconomic, Political, Sociocultural, Ethnoreligious Contexts". The 8<sup>th</sup> wave was conducted in April 2018 using all-Russian two-step quota sampling. The sample size was 4,000 respondents, age 18 and older, who belong to major occupational groups, reside in all economic regions of the country, according to the zoning of the Russian Federal State Statistics Service, and represent their population by gender, age, and type of settlement.

To identify various types of demand for state support, depending on certain life circumstances, a question was asked about the required government support. It was phrased as follows: “*For what family problems do you need state help and support the most?*”<sup>9</sup> (see Tab. 1).

**Tab. 1. The distribution of responses to the question: “For what family problems do you need state help and support the most?”**

(in percentage points)

Response options (the list of problems)	Percent
Employment	21.9
Ensuring fair remuneration	40.7
Access to required education and skills	10.8
Solutions to pressing healthcare problems	35.9
Housing	19.1
Material support	31.4
Other	0.6
State support is not needed, for a respondent can cope with everything on her own	17.1

*Notes:* All respondents could select up to three options.

Following the findings of Garritzmann et al. [2018], responses to the question were aggregated to three main non-overlapping categories, domain axes of the demand for state support:

- labor market policy (employment support and/or ensuring fair remuneration).
- social investment (obtaining necessary education and skills and/or solutions to pressing healthcare problems);
- social support <sup>10</sup> (provision of housing and/or material support);

Since all respondents could select up to three options, to ensure the non-overlapping of the given categories, they were constructed in a way to include those respondents who simultaneously selected two of the response options referring to the respective category (third response option could be from another category or missing) as well as those who chose one option from the respective

<sup>9</sup> We would like to emphasize that in this case we want to focus on the specific types of the demand for state support, based on people’s personal situations. That is why only this question was used for modeling, while variables reflecting normative ideas of the role of the state in general were included as independent factors when developing expanded models.

<sup>10</sup> The rationale behind both material support and provision of housing as part of the social policy has to do with the humanitarian function of the latter, so for the sake of simplicity we will refer to this as the demand for social support, bearing in mind the convenience of this term.

categories with no other options selected in their response. Those who did not fall into any of the three categories, as they showed no clear preferences for a certain type of support although they needed it, formed the mixed group. A separate domain comprises Russians who do not need state support. The occurrence of these types of the demand for state support, according to the proposed construction, is given in Figure 1.




Fig. 1. Demand for state support in various spheres of life, %

Figure 1 shows the demand for state support among the total population, the working population and non-working pensioners. Rounded values are shown. Welfare states have traditionally had different programs in place for the working age and the elderly because their needs are different, hence this breakdown makes sense. This is simply to show that the demand for state support within the demands is heterogeneous, given the fundamental characteristics of the population. The working population is more likely to demand state intervention in the labor markets, whereas the non-working pensioners are more likely to seek social support. The considered domains are computed as non-overlapping categories, for there were individuals who selected less than three corresponding options presented in Tab. 1. However most of the respondents showed varying preferences for state support; that is why they were categories as those with “mixed demands”.

Variables measuring the considered demands take binary values, where “1” stands for a particular demand and “0” denotes for all other cases. We, therefore, consider three dummy variables standing for the corresponding types of ‘purified’ demands for state support. No-demand responses are also measured vis-à-vis a binary outcome variable that takes a value of 1 for those respondents who preferred this choice and 0, otherwise. For the sake of consistency, those respondents who had “mixed demands” were omitted from further analysis.

To study the factors behind the demand for state support in real-life situations, we conducted an econometric analysis based on a set of variables similar to demographic and socioeconomic characteristics examined in Garritzmann et al. [2018]. We included in the model two variables that represented the attitudes towards the market economy and classical liberalism. Both variables are pairs of value judgements. The first statement characterizes respondents that “are able to provide for themselves and their families and do not need government support” (individualistic mindset); the alternative statement captures a pronounced paternalistic attitude – “without government support my family and I cannot survive” (paternalistic mindset) – which was used as a comparison category. The second pair also consists of two alternative statements regarding the nature of (in)equality<sup>11</sup>. The first one is about “equality of opportunity” which is seen as “more important than equality of income and conditions for realizing every person’s potential”. According to the other, alternative, statement, “equality of income, position, and living conditions is more important than equality of opportunity for the fulfillment of every person’s potential”. This statement – “equality of outcomes” – was used for comparison.

A logistic regression analysis was employed to study the determinants of the three various demands and non-demand for state support. Our data also had some missing values, mostly produced by the 8.2% of non-responses to the question about household income. Another source of missing data is the variable that counted the household size the respondent was living in at the time of interview (0.3%). Since we were unsure about the assumption of random process underling the form of the missingness, these values were discarded by listwise deletion. The most problematic variable is household income. The results of the econometric analysis are presented in the following-up section.

## **Determinants Contributing to the Development of Various Types of Demand for State Support**

### ***The effect of demographics***

Overall, econometric modeling in accordance with the strategy of Garritzmann et al. [2018] did not reveal universal factors that would be significant for all types of demand, aside from income (see Figure 2a, Figure 2b, and Figure 3). The same demographic mechanisms as in the West take place in Russia. Just as in some European countries, women in post-Soviet Russia are more likely to hold jobs that entail routine and low-paid non-physical labor [Gimpelson et al., 2018], [Klimova & Ross, 2012]. Such jobs are plentiful and always available, and women may find them “convenient”, as employment of this kind allows them to take care of their families. As a result, the issues of healthcare and the education of household members are traditionally women’s area of responsibility, and, as seen in Figure 2a and Figure 2b, women are much more active than men in expressing a need

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<sup>11</sup> The classic division into (in)equality of opportunity and (in)equality of outcome. See: [Atkinson, 2015].



for state support through social investments and financial support, with the latter resulting in stronger transfer functions of the state. In addition, women are more to be overrepresented in older age groups which typically show a strong demand for healthcare.




Fig. 2a. The determinants of the demands for state's intervention on labour market and social investments.




Fig. 2b. The determinants of demands for various types of social support and no demand for state support.

**Notes:** Both Figures depict odds ratios of the main effects computed from the coefficients of logistic regression. Horizontal bars represent confidence intervals computed out of robust standard errors. An effect is not statistically significant, when a confidence interval crosses the vertical line. The explicit values of the estimated coefficients as well as the reference categories for categorical variables are

given in Appendix B. Model fit statistics are published in Appendix A.

For age groups, non-employed senior Russians are statistically less prone to support the idea of employment-related support from the government due to the low relevance of this issue for them, opting for other priorities instead, which sets them apart from other representatives of middle and older generations (age 30 and above). Young people need employment support from the state more than other age cohorts, which indirectly reflects their less secure position, increasingly typical not only for Russia but for other countries as well [Dwyer et al., 2018]. This may turn into a rather serious problem in the future, especially with the government aiming to minimize its participation in these issues, for this course of action disrupts yesterday's cohesion between the authorities and the people and, as a result, brings the trust of the population in all government institutions and the elite, including the president, down to critically low levels<sup>12</sup>.

### ***The altruism of the rich, their investment burden and social values***

The income effect is complex. 'The altruism of rich' is likely to be a statistical pattern for most of the demands for state support; even for the no-demand mode (see Figure 3). The only exception relates to demands for labor market interventions. The probability drastically falls from about 0.4 to almost 0.1, as households become richer, though the relationship is not linear. In other words, a doubling of the average monthly income of Russian households may lead to a 20% decrease in the likelihood of the demand for state intervention into employment policy. This clearly demonstrates the main reason for this demand – “bad”, low-paid jobs.

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<sup>12</sup> See respective survey data conducted by the Levada-Center: <https://www.levada.ru/2018/10/24/odobrenie-institutov-vlasti-6/> (available: October 31, 2018)




Fig. 3. Average predicted probabilities of demand for various types of state support by income and social values

*Notes:* The predictions are contrasted by opposite social values ( $val\_opp$ ="equality of opportunities" vs  $val\_opp$ ="equality of incomes" (equality of outcomes)). A green line represents the average predicted probabilities over raw levels of household income ( $i\_hh$ ). The shadowed area around this line stand for 95% confidence intervals.

Considering the social support and social investment modes, an income increase (which can be hypothetically viewed as a rough approximation of the distributive policy measures) contributes to the demand for state support in these areas ; this increase significantly intensifies the need for government intervention. Should the state be successful in boosting incomes, it may effectively decrease the need for state intervention in labor markets and demand for state support in general, which can be considered a highly desirable outcome, but it will foster people's demand for state intervention in social spheres.

This may happen because the demand for state support in promoting social investments has less to do with "altruism" *per se*, than with the government's ongoing shift from investment to high-quality human capital, which leaves the population to solve those problems on their own. Spending on education and healthcare is income-elastic, growing along with the household budgets, as a result of which well-off Russians can feel a relatively greater need to pass their human capital expenses on to the state, as compared to the low-income population.

These findings are contrasted by different social values. Figure 3 shows there is a slight

difference between those who support “equality of opportunity” vs “equality of outcomes”. Equality of outcomes makes the decreasing effect of income steeper. For instance, the rich are less likely to demand state intervention in labor markets, if they believe in equality of outcomes. Adherence to the equality of opportunities strengthens the positive income effect on the probability of demand for state support of social investments. On the contrary, the uncertainty of the predictions for income effects on demand for state interventions in social investments and social support is higher (i.e. the confidence intervals are wider) for Russians who support equality of outcomes.

### ***Employment effect***

Compared to non-employed Russians, all salaried workers support (albeit with varying degrees of conviction) the model in which the state facilitates employment. The exceptions are managers (see Appendix B) who, apparently, are not in desperate need of government support, due to a more secure employment situation. In our opinion, this is a highly significant result demonstrating that the full employment policy pursued by the Russian authorities over the past 20 years [Gimpelson et al., 2018] is on the whole legitimate and approved by large swaths of the working population. On the other hand, this may indicate serious problems in this sphere which contribute to the perception of inequality in access to good jobs and, consequently, salaries as illegitimate [Anikin, 2018a; 2018b]. Perhaps this is why salaried workers support the state’s participation in ensuring fair remuneration. For example, Appendix B shows that when characterizing their labor compensation as unfair individuals are more likely to choose the model of employment support and are less likely to forgo government support in the form in social investments. Furthermore, the probability of the demand for employment support significantly increases if an individual has experienced long-term unemployment. These results confirm that Russians speak of real needs when seeking support from the government. An equal opportunity policy will be a legitimate instrument of satisfying those needs.

### ***Complementary role of social capital***

Can social capital compensate for these needs of the Russian population<sup>13</sup>? Despite our assumption, social capital does not offset the need for employment support but rather complements this type of government support. In other words, state support of employment and the use of one’s social connections to tackle this issue are processes viewed by the public as complementary, since counterposing them will not produce the desired results. As the “Labor market policy” model indicates in Appendix B, personal connections which help in finding a good job are positively related to the likelihood of opting for this model. Nevertheless, the social capital effect is not universal for demand

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<sup>13</sup> This factor was operationalized through the possibility of using one’s social contacts for receiving real support in various problems associated with the identified types of demand (in particular, finding a good job, solving housing problem, being able to borrow a large sum of money).

modeling as such. The “Social investments” model deteriorates considerably when some of the social capital metrics are added. Thus, the demand for social investments is scarcely related to the availability of relevant social capital, which again demonstrates that it is impossible for the state to fully pass these tasks on to Russians and their individual resources.

### ***Compensatory role of values***

As mentioned, Russian values and norms have a fairly important compensatory effect. However, the significance and weight of subjective factors play a crucial role only for models with a weaker role for institutional factors (paternalistic and income equality mindsets), as well as in the political escapism model (an individualistic mindset). For example, an individualistic mindset and personal resources increase the likelihood of never requesting state support by as much as 17.3%, as compared to those who admit they “cannot survive without help from the government”. Figure 2b shows the chances for no-demand responses increase about six times when people have an individualistic mindset. Their disengagement from state support is based on not only their material wealth but also, and to an even larger extent, on their psychological independence from the government.

Russians who are in need of material support from the state are considerably disadvantaged by “inequalities of outcome”, seen in the maintenance of low salaries and the lack of housing. Long-run adherence to the paternalistic attitudes and redistribution expectations of disadvantaged Russians may obstruct their chances to switch to the individualistic mindset when their incomes increase. Therefore, the issue of low income and unsolved housing problems produce crucial socio-cultural risks for society.

## **Conclusion**

The analysis of the factors related to the differentiation of the Russian population’s needs which could be addressed by the state demonstrated that personal interests, rather than social attitudes, determine the population’s expectations, although the objective nature of those attitudes should not be ignored in the long term. In particular, demand for redistribution has to do with a paternalistic mindset and income equality, while people who have an internal locus of control and, importantly, do not view the state as an agent capable of solving their problems are less dependent on state support. Measures aimed at raising the income level in Russia help reduce these needs only for a part of the Russian population – mainly people with an individualistic mindset who are mentally prepared for and, most importantly, capable of taking responsibility for themselves and their families. The higher the level of inequality, the smaller this effect will be even among “individualists”.

This is explained by the fact that in countries with a liberal welfare state regime and significant inequality a higher level of income leads to stronger support for redistribution policies. This

phenomenon is called “the altruism of the rich” [Dimick et al., 2017]. As our research demonstrates, it is typical for Russia too. Thus, extremely high inequality of outcomes which manifests itself in Russia in corporate, interindustry, and interregional wage inequality becomes if not the main, then a hugely important driver of statist attitudes to redistribution among Russians.

This does not mean, however, that a policy against inequality of outcomes should prevail, which the agenda of the Russian authorities is now gravitating towards. Inequality of opportunity needs to be addressed in the first place, as the majority of Russians are incapable of solving this problem on their own. To achieve a more efficient outcome, the following government actions should be prioritized. Above all, the population’s need for employment support should be met. Social investment issues should be tackled along with the rectification of inequalities in access to good jobs and fair remuneration of skilled labor. The task of holding back inequality of outcomes (that is meeting the need of nearly one fifth of the population for financial support from the state) should come last. In addition, one should take into account that all three sets of measures are largely aimed at different categories and groups of Russians.

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## Appendix A

### Quality statistics of logit models (BIC')

Models	(1) Labor market policy	(2) Social invest- ments	(3) Social support	(4) No demand for support
1. Basic model (BM)	-108.608	<b>69.941</b>	-22.350	-466.988
2. BM + Dependency	n/a	n/a	-21.184	n/a
3. BM + Objective factors	-71.022	90.373	<b>-55.240</b>	-671.047
4. Integrated model	-71.628	122.185	-17.905	<b>-682.267</b>

Notes: Compared models in each of the four types of demand are nested. Modeling with factors determining dependency burden was conducted only with regard to the demand for social support. Specification of regression equations in the integrated model includes both objective and subjective factors. More detailed specifications of the examined models can be sent upon request. The general rule of model comparison is that the model with the smaller BIC' value is better quality (that is, more suitable for data description). For more details, refer to.: (Hosmer et al. 2013; Long 1997). By comparing differences in BIC' values, we see that the integrated model is not always the preferable one from the statistical perspective. The best models in terms of statistical modeling principles (BIC' values) are given in bold.

## Appendix B

### Econometric modeling of factors determining the demand for state support in various fields, an integrated set of variables

	(1) Labor market policy	(2) Social invest- ments	(3) Social support	(4) No demand for support
Males	0.102 (0.0893)	-0.261** (0.108)	-0.237** (0.101)	0.413*** (0.115)
Age groups (31–40 – c.c.)				
18–30	0.329*** (0.121)	-0.0768 (0.175)	-0.0162 (0.147)	-0.427** (0.177)
41–50	0.133 (0.119)	0.223 (0.161)	-0.523*** (0.155)	-0.222 (0.158)
51–60	-0.112 (0.150)	0.130 (0.186)	-0.421** (0.178)	0.443** (0.194)
> 60 non-working	-1.037*** (0.228)	-0.202 (0.244)	0.0571 (0.247)	0.0640 (0.287)
> 60 working	-0.404 (0.293)	0.383 (0.321)	-0.912** (0.401)	-0.0924 (0.354)
University graduate complete and higher	-0.284** (0.142)	-0.123 (0.161)	0.222 (0.143)	-0.0957 (0.165)
Household income (logarithm)	-0.334*** (0.0818)	0.411*** (0.101)	0.226** (0.109)	0.436*** (0.127)
Living with children under 18	-0.400*** (0.111)	0.235* (0.122)	-0.0213 (0.120)	0.0132 (0.132)
Social values				
Individualistic mindset vs. paternalism (c.c.)	-0.0759 (0.0900)	-0.0335 (0.118)	-0.627*** (0.110)	1.775*** (0.142)
Equality of opportunity vs. equality of income (c.c.)	0.269*** (0.0855)	0.198* (0.110)	-0.243** (0.0952)	-0.122 (0.119)
Number of people in household	0.0995** (0.0400)			
Seniors in household			0.213 (0.134)	
Students in household			-0.386** (0.175)	
Occupational structure (non-working population – c.c.)				

Managers	-0.380*	-0.295	-0.108	-0.186
	(0.218)	(0.243)	(0.253)	(0.256)
Professionals	0.610***	-0.513**	-0.338	-0.352
	(0.195)	(0.239)	(0.239)	(0.255)
Routine non-manual workers	0.274*	-0.567***	0.245	-0.316
	(0.155)	(0.187)	(0.194)	(0.226)
Manual workers	0.663***	-0.804***	-0.144	-0.382*
	(0.148)	(0.194)	(0.200)	(0.224)
Long-term unemployment	-0.228**			
	(0.109)			
Transfers as source of income			-0.0157	-0.135
			(0.125)	(0.153)
Unstable income			-0.237*	-0.401**
			(0.134)	(0.157)
Financial situation throughout the year (remain unchanged – c.c.)				
Improved			0.489***	-0.325**
			(0.154)	(0.153)
Worsened			-0.0338	-0.865***
			(0.109)	(0.150)
Self-rated well-being (“good” – c.c.)				
Satisfactory			0.164	-0.655***
			(0.180)	(0.140)
Bad			0.00714	-1.109***
			(0.217)	(0.264)
Self-rated housing conditions (“good” – c.c.)				
Satisfactory			0.424***	-0.778***
			(0.123)	(0.120)
Bad			1.523***	-1.906***
			(0.160)	(0.317)
Self-rated health condition (“good” – c.c.)				
Satisfactory		0.490***		
		(0.141)		
Bad		0.711***		
		(0.190)		
Self-rated access to healthcare (“good” – c.c.)				
Satisfactory		0.531***		
		(0.187)		
Bad		0.522***		
		(0.200)		
<i>Social capital –</i>				
-housing problem solution			0.496**	
			(0.245)	
-possibility to borrow over 100 thousand rubles			-0.496*	
			(0.265)	
-landing a good job	0.305**			
	(0.144)			
Lack of social capital				0.160
				(0.113)
Social values. Statements (partially agree, partially disagree – c.c.)				
“People in Russia are fairly compensated for their intellectual abilities and qualification”				
Agree	-0.123	-0.129	0.143	0.0409
	(0.129)	(0.152)	(0.136)	(0.145)
Disagree	0.219**	-0.122	-0.142	-0.441***
	-0.123	-0.129	0.143	0.0409
“Considering your skills level and work intensity, are you paid				

*significantly less than you deserve”*

Agree	0.391*** (0.0899)	-0.232** (0.113)	-0.160 (0.102)	-0.524*** (0.123)
Disagree	-0.0456 (0.137)	0.221 (0.151)	-0.250 (0.157)	0.200 (0.151)
<i>“The state must provide everyone with a certain guaranteed level of income”</i>				
Agree	0.206** (0.0988)	-0.190* (0.113)	-0.107 (0.107)	-0.278** (0.116)
Disagree	0.223 (0.195)	-0.113 (0.232)	0.0113 (0.230)	-0.164 (0.210)
Constant (average level)	1.516* (0.813)	-6.137*** (1.023)	-3.508*** (1.122)	-4.943*** (1.317)
Number of observations	3,666	3,672	3,672	3,672

Notes: Here and elsewhere, robust standard errors are given in parentheses: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Abbreviation “c.c” means comparison category used to interpret the specific effects of categorical variables.

## **Contact details and disclaimer:**

Vasiliy A. Anikin

National Research University Higher School of Economics. Institute for Social Policy. Senior Research Fellow. Institute of Sociology of the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Leading Research Fellow;

E-mail: vanikin@hse.ru

Yulia P. Lezhnina

National Research University Higher School of Economics. Institute for Social Policy. Senior Research Fellow. Institute of Sociology of the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Senior Research Fellow;

E-mail: jlezhnina@hse.ru

Svetlana V. Mareeva

National Research University Higher School of Economics. Institute for Social Policy. Center Director. Institute of Sociology of the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Leading Research Fellow;

E-mail: smareeva@hse.ru

Ekaterina D. Slobodenyuk

National Research University Higher School of Economics. Institute for Social Policy. Research Fellow. National Research University Higher School of Economics. Institute for Social Policy. Center Director. Institute of Sociology of the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Research Fellow;

E-mail: eslobodenyuk@hse.ru

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